To view the paper in full click here

http://www.agsiw.org/whats-at-stake-for-the-gulf-arab-states-insyria/

Executive Summary

Notwithstanding the range of views within the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Gulf Arab states are largely committed to the ouster of the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the reduction, if not elimination, of Iranian influence in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, in particular, are convinced that the strategic future of the Middle East, and specifically the role of Iran, will be determined by the outcome of the Syrian conflict. They believe that if Iran and its allies prevail and the current Syrian regime survives unreconstructed it will open the door for further inroads by Tehran into the Arab world and the eventual creation of a Persian miniempire in the region. They are even concerned that Iranian destabilization efforts will intensify within the GCC states, particularly Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province. Therefore, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, along with Turkey, have been the primary sponsors of a range of rebel groups, some of which are deemed extremist by the United States and other Western countries.

Yet the conflict in Syria has not been going well for the Gulf states. The joint Iranian-Russian “surge” of 2015-16 swung momentum back in favor of the regime in the most crucial parts of the country. Moreover, the United States and a number of key Arab countries, including Egypt, are starting to view the continuation of the conflict as more destabilizing and dangerous than the continuation of the regime and Iranian influence over Damascus. Despite their threats, Saudi Arabia and Turkey are unlikely to conduct a direct military intervention in the foreseeable future because of the enormous risks involved, although it cannot be ruled out entirely, especially in the longer term. What is most likely for the near term is a major increase in Gulf support for armed rebel groups, combined with intensified overtures to win Moscow’s backing for a post-Assad future in Syria.

The very least that the Gulf states can consider acceptable as an outcome to the Syrian conflict is the limitation of Iran’s ambitions in the Arab world and the regional containment of Tehran. As long as there is a prospect that the outcome in Syria will be the prelude to further expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East, the Gulf states are likely to persist in seeking sufficient military reversals to secure minimally acceptable political outcomes that ensure that Tehran cannot use the conflict as a springboard for acquiring even greater regional clout.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/obama-is-wrong-to-ignore-his-own-diplomats-advice

On April 6, 1971, 20 United States foreign service officers led by the consul general in Dhaka, Archer Blood, issued the first formal telegram of dissent in the history of the state department. It warned that US policy “has evidenced what many will consider moral bankruptcy” because Washington had “chosen not to intervene, even morally”, on the grounds that the conflict in what was then East Pakistan – which was bordering on genocide – “is purely an internal matter of a sovereign state”.

These courageous diplomats confronted Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger’s “realist” foreign policy that was amoral to the point of being immoral. Many careers were effectively destroyed, despite the then-newly-established “dissent channel” procedures designed to allow diplomats to safely raise policy objections.

There have been scores of dissent cables since, most notably regarding the Balkans during Bill Clinton’s presidency. But the idea that anything like the Blood telegram, in terms of its political impact and moral indictment, might be written today seemed unthinkable.

But this week 51 serving US diplomats – the largest group ever to join such a statement – submitted a dissent channel memorandum severely critical of US policy – or probably more accurately, non-policy, towards the terrible carnage in Syria.

It’s a searing indictment. These officials, most of whom are involved in shaping or implementing America’s Syria policy, describe it as having become overwhelmed by the violence, particularly from the regime. They say the relentless bombing of civilians by the regime is the “root cause of the instability that continues to grip Syria and the broader region”.

“The moral rationale for taking steps to end the deaths and suffering in Syria, after five years of brutal war, is evident and unquestionable,” their analysis holds. And because “the status quo in Syria will continue to present increasingly dire, if not disastrous, humanitarian, diplomatic and terrorism-related challenges”, it urges “a judicious use of stand-off and air weapons, which would undergird and drive a more focused and hard-nosed US-led diplomatic process”.

These diplomats make the point that many of us have been emphasising for years: that if Washington and its allies do not move to change the strategic equation on the ground, the regime will be under no pressure to make any political or diplomatic compromises whatsoever. Moreover, if Washington doesn’t act to influence the course of the conflict and the incentive structures that influence choices made by the armed groups, then others will – and not in order to serve American interests.

The general trajectory of events over the past year or so illustrates the point perfectly.

During the first half of 2015, a string of rebel victories shook the foundations of the regime. Iran’s notorious Major General Qassem Soleimani, impresario of the militias and terrorist groups operated by the Quds Force, was dispatched to Moscow complete with proposals, maps and battle plans. At the Kremlin he told Vladimir Putin that without a direct intervention the Assad regime might collapse. He proposed a surge, with Russia providing air power to back up regime forces, Hizbollah and the Iraqi militias and Iranian Revolutionary Guard troops on the ground.

President Barack Obama has suggested the intervention was a sign of weakness that left Russia “crippled” and “bleeding”. He appears quite alone in that assessment. The Russian-Iranian surge transformed the situation on the battlefield and reversed the momentum in favour of the regime at what strongly appears to be a limited and manageable cost.

To judge by his comments, Mr Obama seems incapable of accepting the proposition that the application of force in a given situation could strongly benefit the party that is exercising its power and their allies.

The memorandum essentially makes that very point to a president who seems as irrationally allergic to any application of force as his predecessor, George W Bush, was deliriously drawn to it. It is the logical extension of the development of a near-unanimous consensus of former Obama administration Syria policy officials. But the stakes have been greatly raised by the mere fact that this is now being said by stunningly large numbers of currently serving officials as well.

Whatever theoretical protections exist, as the Blood telegram signatories discovered, in reality mutinies are never welcome. The authenticity and urgency of this massive mutiny on Syria policy are emphasised by the fact that these officials know that the timing of their gesture, from a political and administrative standpoint, is all wrong.

Another former state department official, Aaron David Miller, noted, “the administration is not going to shift course in the final six months of the president’s term”.

Even if their wise counsel is ignored, the public and the media must vigilantly ensure they do not suffer some quiet retaliation either now or in the future.

These officials are not ignorant or stupid. But they are desperate and at their wits’ end. Clearly they sincerely felt compelled to speak now, because the ongoing non-policy on Syria can’t be allowed to do another six months’ worth of damage to the American national interest.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/ennahdas-rebrand-arrives-with-huge-consequences

Following my attendance at Ennahda’s party congress in Tunis last month, when the organisation adopted a raft of resolutions that rebranded the party from “Islamists” to “Muslim Democrats” and split the movement into separate religious and political wings, I have been arguing that the intentions of the organisation’s leadership, which remain hotly debated, are effectively irrelevant.

The key to the irreversibility of Ennahda’s rebranding is not the sincerity of its leadership in really moving past their Muslim Brotherhood origins. On the contrary, their commitment is beside the point. Instead, the key is that Tunisia is a genuine, albeit fragile, constitutional democracy.

In an undemocratic context, private views are essential. Political leaders will seek power, and, if they gain it, will then do what they wish. In that context, their personal opinions are all-important.

This is not how things function in a democratic system, where parties are, like it or not, bound by their own branding. They must be what they say they are, or the voters will turn on them. So will parts of their own constituency and leadership, which embraced the rebranding as a serious commitment and were not privy to any private reservations.

A simple matter for a secret society or underground group, as Ennahda once was can be duplicitous in its public appeals.

But now that it is an above ground organisation vying for power in an open and constitutional Tunisian system based entirely on voting in free and fair elections, this is no longer workable. In order to remain credible, even within its own ranks, Ennahda will have to become the very “Muslim Democrats” – analogous to the “Christian Democrats” in Europe – they now claim to be.

What about the behaviour of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt when they were elected, I’m asked. Well, this proves my point. Egypt was and is not a constitutional democracy.

Therefore, when Mohammed Morsi of the Brotherhood took power as Egypt’s president, he was under no publicly-driven political compulsion to behave in an open, equitable and reasonable manner.

And indeed, he did not. Mr Morsi began to amass power in a perfectly outrageous manner and made it clear that he intended, over the medium term, to stack the entire government bureaucracy with brotherhood ideologues and apparatchiks. Mr Morsi thereby provoked public outrage that even dwarfed the enormous protests against his predecessor, Hosni Mubarak, and he was ousted by a popularly backed military intervention.

Precisely because Egypt was not democratic, the only means to hold a Muslim Brotherhood government accountable was a similarly undemocratic, albeit then highly popular, extralegal intervention. At the time I called it “a coup by acclamation,” which most accurately summarises this sui generis turn of events.

What about Turkey, others ask. Again, this proves my point. Turkey has at times been more democratic than Egypt ever was, but it has also never been a fully fledged democracy as Tunisia has definitely become. Therefore, the personal inclinations and prejudices of president Recep Tayyip Erdogan are not only relevant, they are decisive.

Mr Erdogan rules Turkey like an old-fashioned Latin American caudillo, and anyone who believes that present-day Turkey is either democratic or constitutional in any meaningful sense is simply delusional.

When a single individual has accumulated all practical authority within a political party which, in turn, has come to monopolise national political power and authority (including through winning votes), this is not only undemocratic and unconstitutional, it is autocratic, arbitrary and borders on the despotic. Of course it matters in Turkey what Mr Erdogan privately thinks. Indeed, little else matters for the country’s biggest decisions.

So the mendacity of Mr Morsi in Egypt and Mr Erdogan in Turkey don’t contradict, but rather reinforce, that Tunisia’s constitutional democratic system will force Ennahda to be what they now claim to be: post-Islamist Muslim Democrats. Obviously should there be a regression towards dictatorship, autocracy or authoritarianism, all bets are off.

But as long as Tunisia remains fundamentally democratic and constitutional, Ennahda will have to live up to its new brand. Democratic politics is like religion: since no one knows what’s in anyone else’s heart, public words and deeds are all that matter. Islamists, above all, should be able to grasp this.

Others claim the Justice and Development Party in Morocco preceded Ennahda as a post-Islamist party. But because their reforms were made effectively under duress and the watchful eye of the King, their long-term intentions remain an important concern.

Finally, Ennahda’s historic transformation is already having a regional impact. In Jordan, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood has split into two, or possibly three, separate movements, at least one of which is likely to emulate the post-Islamist Ennahda transformation.

Should democracy in Tunisia thrive, as it must, and Ennahda can demonstrate the viability of a post-Islamist Muslim Democratic party, the long-term impact on Arab political culture is likely to be enormously healthy. It’s already begun.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/how-clinton-can-win-the-race-to-the-white-house

On Thursday, Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic party US presidential nominee, introduced what must inevitably be her main campaign theme against the de-facto Republican party nominee, Donald Trump: that his bizarre views and unstable, thin-skinned personality make him uniquely unsuited for the role of commander-in-chief of the world’s sole remaining superpower.

Her speech wasn’t perfect, but it was a good start. And if she hones this message, it should be enough to sweep her into the White House.

Over the past fortnight, Mrs Clinton – who is still facing an unresolved challenge from Bernie Sanders and is bedevilled by questions over her use of an unauthorised private email server when she was secretary of state – should, by all rights, be having a tough time.

But despite securing the nomination, it is Mr Trump who seems to have entered meltdown mode. Rather than unifying the party and switching to a more “presidential” persona, he has intensified his grotesque conduct, conspiracy theorising, combative attitude, incorrigible dishonesty, boundless vulgarity and blatant racism.

With few remaining holdouts, Republican leaders have gritted their teeth and endorsed Mr Trump in the most unprincipled display of obeisance to power in recent American history.

Dozens of Republicans who have been frank about Mr Trump’s manifest unfitness for office – most notably Paul Ryan and Marco Rubio – have capitulated and endorsed someone they are fully aware is unfit for a low level government position, let alone the presidency.

They must never be allowed to live down the infamy. Mr Trump’s candidacy is not normal, it is bizarre and poisonous. Despite his securing the Republican nomination, neither the party nor the media can change that.

Indeed, all efforts to recast Mr Trump as a normal candidate are, in themselves, malignant and malicious. Only wilful ignorance or calculated dishonesty can account for it, and neither is excusable.

Meanwhile, Mr Trump has been doing his best to humiliate his fellow Republicans by demonstrating the depths to which they are sinking in endorsing him.

He strongly reinforced his lack of any political values beyond his personal interests, particularly by attacking New Mexico governor Susana Martinez, a popular conservative Republican, simply because she declines to openly support him.

He unleashed a tantrum against the press for asking legitimate questions about his deceptive and dishonest claims about contributions to charities for military veterans. His performance was petulant and, again, entirely personal and personalised.

He once again demonstrated contempt for a free press, and highlighted his determination to restrict freedom of speech. When shocked journalists asked Mr Trump if this bullying tirade is how he plans to relate to the media if elected, he replied: “Yeah, it is going to be like this.”

In addition to a daily litany of lies – usually denials that he ever said things he is on record as saying, such as that various countries ought to have nuclear weapons or his support for the invasion of Iraq – Mr Trump launched an unprecedentedly racist attack against the judge presiding over a lawsuit against his so-called “Trump University”.

In the past he intimated that the judge, who was born in Indiana, “is a Mexican”. Mr Trump now claims that the judge’s Mexican ancestry is a “clear conflict of interest” because “I’m building a wall”, and that his ethnicity makes this jurist incapable of fairly hearing the case.

Mr Trump did not elaborate what other federal offices that “Mexicans” (from Indiana) should implicitly be barred from holding.

Such openly racist and blatantly self-serving comments are unprecedented from a major party candidate.

This is the Trumpery Republicans are bowing and scraping before, and the attitudes they are embracing and endorsing.

This is the person they are trying to place at the centre of power, not just in Washington but, far more than any other national leader, globally. There is absolutely no excuse for it, and anyone supporting Trumpery should never be allowed to live it down.

Trumpery is not, and cannot become, American political business as usual.

Mrs Clinton should stick to the “Trump as national danger” theme. Other lines of attack – Mr Trump as gouging plutocrat, gender-based arguments and so forth – will either backfire or prove ineffective.

His infantile response to her speech, mainly criticising her teleprompter reading ability and demanding she go to prison, was itself a fine example of why his mentality makes him entirely unfit.

To win, Mrs Clinton need only focus attention on the myriad ways Mr Trump himself consistently demonstrates how and why he cannot be trusted with the military and diplomatic power of the White House.

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opinion/tunisias-new-revolution.html?ref=opinion&_r=0

TUNIS — “Islamism is dead!” announced Said Ferjani, a leader of the
progressive wing of Ennahda, Tunisia’s main Islamist party, as we
drank coffee in a hotel cafe here last month. Mr. Ferjani, a former
hard-liner who once plotted a coup against the regime of President
Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, was upbeat as he described the historic
transition his party was about to make.

His wing had combined with the party leadership to push through a raft
of resolutions that would not only rebrand Ennahda but also break with
the tradition of political Islam that began with the Muslim
Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in the late 1920s. According
to Mr. Ferjani, Islamism had been useful under the Ben Ali
dictatorship when “our identity and sense of purpose” was threatened
by an authoritarian state. Now that Ennahda is engaged in open, legal
party politics under a new Constitution, which it helped to write, and
competes for national leadership, the Islamist label had become more a
burden than a benefit.

The party’s co-founder and leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, was more
circumspect when I interviewed him at his home. He shifted uneasily
when I asked him whether he thought Islamism was dead.

“I wouldn’t put it that way,” he commented. But he did reject the
label, saying, “We don’t see any reason to distinguish ourselves from
other Muslims.” Both Mr. Ghannouchi and Mr. Ferjani prefer the term
“Muslim Democrats” — which deliberately draws an analogy with the
Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe — to describe their
new, post-Islamist identity.

In particular, Mr. Ferjani’s explicit commitment to the principles of
freedom and equality makes him perhaps the foremost post-Islamist
political figure in the Sunni Arab world. While he calls himself a
conservative and extols “family values,” Mr. Ferjani says he regards
sexuality, sexual orientation and gender identity — including the
transgender issues preoccupying the United States — as private and
personal, and not matters for the state or legal authorities to
prescribe.

Mr. Ferjani also adheres to the neutrality of the state on religious
matters. He equates religious freedom with freedom of conscience, and
believes agnostics and atheists should enjoy the same civil rights as
monotheists.

Again, in our interview, Mr. Ghannouchi was predictably more cautious.
He advocated equality among Muslims of all sects, somewhat more
grudgingly extending it to Christians and Jews, and legalistically
referring to “constitutional protections” for atheists and agnostics.

At last month’s Ennahda Congress, the 1,200 delegates approved most of
the sweeping changes to the party’s platform that the Ferjani faction
and the Ghannouchi leadership had called for. The most important
measure drops the party’s commitment to “dawa,” proselytizing Islamic
values. This makes the party a purely political organization, with no
overt religious mission — a radical break from the Muslim Brotherhood
tradition from which the Ennahda movement sprang.

In Tunisia and across the Arab world, liberals, secularists and
critics of Islamism remain skeptical. On more than one occasion here
in the capital, I witnessed the idea of Ennahda’s new stance evoking
peals of laughter from prominent political opponents. They support
dialogue, cooperation, even coalition partnership with Ennahda, but
this “post-Islamist” declaration they found impossible to take
seriously.

It is true that many of the movement’s leaders have not fully
reconciled with the idea of moving beyond the Muslim Brotherhood
vision. After the 2011 revolution, which helped bring Ennahda to
power, the party seemed determined to cling on at all costs — until a
critical moment in 2013 when the Brotherhood government of President
Mohamed Morsi in Egypt was ousted by a military-backed uprising. After
seeing the downfall of its Egyptian counterpart, Ennahda scrambled to
protect itself by stepping down and agreeing to a series of
compromises.

That experience, combined with a new realism about most Tunisians’
lack of sympathy for an avowedly Islamist government, gave rise to
this project of rebranding. There’s no question that it’s all part of
Ennahda’s long-term plan to return to power.

But the sincerity of its transformation is hardly relevant. Ennahda is
no longer an underground movement or secret society. It is an
aboveboard political party that is vying for power in Tunisia’s
fledgling constitutional, democratic system.

This was always how Islamism was likely to evolve in practice. There
would never be an epiphany in which old-school authoritarian Islamists
were instantly converted in a moment of supreme insight into
democratic social conservatives. It is necessarily a messy, contextual
transition, primarily driven by the search for power in an Arab world
where most people are devoutly Muslim but remain suspicious of the
proponents of political Islam.

What Ennahda’s critics and supporters alike should understand is that
the intentions of its leadership don’t matter — in a democracy, it is
public words and deeds, not secret thoughts, that count. Even if the
rebranding as “Muslim Democrats” is a cynical ploy, the party will
have to follow through to gain power in a Tunisian society that won’t
accept old-style Islamism. Muslim Democrats will be what Ennahda has
to become.

The future of Islamism in Muslim countries everywhere is deeply linked
to the progress of the new-look Ennahda. And its fate is therefore
bound up with the survival of the new Tunisia.

Partly against its own inclinations, Ennahda has become the first
post-Islamist political party in the Arab world. The stakes, for the
region and for the world, in Tunisia’s fragile democratic experiment
have just increased immeasurably.

http://www.agsiw.org/is-the-arab-peace-initiative-really-in-play/