Monthly Archives: May 2016

Why the US can’t disengage from the Middle East

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/why-the-us-cant-disengage-from-the-middle-east#full

One of the key features of late Obama-era American foreign policy is the dominant mythology that all American – and, by extension, any western – military intervention in the Middle East is doomed to failure. President Obama has said as much, with increasing intensity, in a series of interviews, and it appears to have risen to an article of faith in the White House.

In his recent conversations with The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, Mr Obama extended this principle to Russia’s intervention in Syria. He spoke of enormous costs and claimed that “the notion that somehow Russia is in a stronger position now in Syria … is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of power in foreign affairs or in the world general. They are overextended. They’re bleeding,” he insists.

Neither the reality nor the assessments of his own officials corroborate Mr Obama’s opinion. Russia seems to have achieved a major effect on the strategic situation on the ground, in favour of itself and its allies, Iran and Bashar Al Assad, at limited cost and without being particularly overextended, let alone bleeding.

Mr Obama, it would seem, simply assumed that this would be the case, without any real evidence. But because it is an article of faith in the present White House that American intervention in the Middle East is doomed to fail catastrophically, it was extrapolated that any Russian intervention in the Middle East, including Syria, would be a similar disaster.

This thinking was perfectly illustrated in David Samuels’s recent New York Times profile of White House communications guru Benjamin Rhodes. In it, Mr Rhodes insists: “I profoundly do not believe that the United States could make things better in Syria by being there.”

This is more belief as faith rather than a well-educated and considered opinion of a real expert on the Middle East. That’s amply illustrated by his follow-up comment: “And we have an evidentiary record of what happens when we’re there – nearly a decade in Iraq.” That would only be valid if Syria today were practically the same as Iraq in 2003-2013, a laughable notion.

It’s a perfect example of leaping to conclusions based on the scantest knowledge and understanding, and allowing prejudices and political expediency, rather than well-informed and careful judgments, to dictate conclusions. Indeed, this whole article of faith about Middle East engagement being doomed to failure by definition is an unrealistic and ahistorical assumption based on a limited set of specific and contingent scenarios, primarily in Iraq and to some extent Libya.

For the sake of American foreign policy, and the interests of its regional partners, this myth has to be shattered before the next administration begins to formulate its own policies, lest it too fall victim to this indefensible dogma.

Enter Frederic C Hof, director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, formerly Mr Obama’s special adviser for transition in Syria and now one of his most incisive critics. In a piece published last week on the Atlantic Council website titled The Non-Option of Disengagement from the Middle East, Mr Hof quickly and devastatingly puts paid to the preposterous naysaying that has misguided the US administration’s recent approach to the Middle East.

Mr Hof points out that all of the instances cited by supporters of the doomed-to-failure mythology had specific causes and identifiable authors. “None resulted from a flawed consensus of ‘the foreign policy establishment’,” he notes. It is an absolutely crucial point.

“None signified the preordained failure of American military operations,” he explains, since “the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 featured diplomatic and military excellence” and serves as a studiously ignored but crucial counter-example.

The key is accurate assessment, and adequate planning, especially for post-conflict stabilisation, rather than wishful thinking that is either too aggressive or too passive.Mr Hof also rightly identifies “the vital importance to the world economy – and therefore to the American economy – of energy resources passing through the Strait of Hormuz”, the threat of terrorism and numerous other factors reinforcing the strategic centrality of the region.

Moreover, even if the US were to pivot to Asia, as Mr Obama keeps advocating, that would not reduce, but counterintuitively actually increase, the strategic importance of the Middle East. As scholar Kristian Coates Ulrichsen pointed out at a panel I moderated recently at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington: “The Gulf states have, themselves, already pivoted to Asia.”

Given the absolute dependency of Asian economies on the energy resources of the Gulf region, any American pivot to Asia would only reinforce, rather than undermine, the region’s economic, and hence strategic, importance.

As Mr Hof notes, the United States has no “castle, moat and drawbridge”. It will remain deeply engaged in the Middle East, like it or not, as long as it wishes to remain a global power. Therefore, it will have to take action from time to time, and ensure success. Even if the next administration doesn’t assign Mr Hof a senior role in American foreign policy-making – and it certainly should – it at least needs to listen to his simple, clear and wise counsel.

Why the US can’t disengage from the Middle East

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/why-the-us-cant-disengage-from-the-middle-east#full

One of the key features of late Obama-era American foreign policy is the dominant mythology that all American – and, by extension, any western – military intervention in the Middle East is doomed to failure. President Obama has said as much, with increasing intensity, in a series of interviews, and it appears to have risen to an article of faith in the White House.

In his recent conversations with The Atlantic’s Jeffrey Goldberg, Mr Obama extended this principle to Russia’s intervention in Syria. He spoke of enormous costs and claimed that “the notion that somehow Russia is in a stronger position now in Syria … is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of power in foreign affairs or in the world general. They are overextended. They’re bleeding,” he insists.

Neither the reality nor the assessments of his own officials corroborate Mr Obama’s opinion. Russia seems to have achieved a major effect on the strategic situation on the ground, in favour of itself and its allies, Iran and Bashar Al Assad, at limited cost and without being particularly overextended, let alone bleeding.

Mr Obama, it would seem, simply assumed that this would be the case, without any real evidence. But because it is an article of faith in the present White House that American intervention in the Middle East is doomed to fail catastrophically, it was extrapolated that any Russian intervention in the Middle East, including Syria, would be a similar disaster.

This thinking was perfectly illustrated in David Samuels’s recent New York Times profile of White House communications guru Benjamin Rhodes. In it, Mr Rhodes insists: “I profoundly do not believe that the United States could make things better in Syria by being there.”

This is more belief as faith rather than a well-educated and considered opinion of a real expert on the Middle East. That’s amply illustrated by his follow-up comment: “And we have an evidentiary record of what happens when we’re there – nearly a decade in Iraq.” That would only be valid if Syria today were practically the same as Iraq in 2003-2013, a laughable notion.

It’s a perfect example of leaping to conclusions based on the scantest knowledge and understanding, and allowing prejudices and political expediency, rather than well-informed and careful judgments, to dictate conclusions. Indeed, this whole article of faith about Middle East engagement being doomed to failure by definition is an unrealistic and ahistorical assumption based on a limited set of specific and contingent scenarios, primarily in Iraq and to some extent Libya.

For the sake of American foreign policy, and the interests of its regional partners, this myth has to be shattered before the next administration begins to formulate its own policies, lest it too fall victim to this indefensible dogma.

Enter Frederic C Hof, director of the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East, formerly Mr Obama’s special adviser for transition in Syria and now one of his most incisive critics. In a piece published last week on the Atlantic Council website titled The Non-Option of Disengagement from the Middle East, Mr Hof quickly and devastatingly puts paid to the preposterous naysaying that has misguided the US administration’s recent approach to the Middle East.

Mr Hof points out that all of the instances cited by supporters of the doomed-to-failure mythology had specific causes and identifiable authors. “None resulted from a flawed consensus of ‘the foreign policy establishment’,” he notes. It is an absolutely crucial point.

“None signified the preordained failure of American military operations,” he explains, since “the liberation of Kuwait in 1991 featured diplomatic and military excellence” and serves as a studiously ignored but crucial counter-example.

The key is accurate assessment, and adequate planning, especially for post-conflict stabilisation, rather than wishful thinking that is either too aggressive or too passive.Mr Hof also rightly identifies “the vital importance to the world economy – and therefore to the American economy – of energy resources passing through the Strait of Hormuz”, the threat of terrorism and numerous other factors reinforcing the strategic centrality of the region.

Moreover, even if the US were to pivot to Asia, as Mr Obama keeps advocating, that would not reduce, but counterintuitively actually increase, the strategic importance of the Middle East. As scholar Kristian Coates Ulrichsen pointed out at a panel I moderated recently at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington: “The Gulf states have, themselves, already pivoted to Asia.”

Given the absolute dependency of Asian economies on the energy resources of the Gulf region, any American pivot to Asia would only reinforce, rather than undermine, the region’s economic, and hence strategic, importance.

As Mr Hof notes, the United States has no “castle, moat and drawbridge”. It will remain deeply engaged in the Middle East, like it or not, as long as it wishes to remain a global power. Therefore, it will have to take action from time to time, and ensure success. Even if the next administration doesn’t assign Mr Hof a senior role in American foreign policy-making – and it certainly should – it at least needs to listen to his simple, clear and wise counsel.

Obama’s complex foreign policy legacy unpicked

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/obamas-complex-foreign-policy-legacy-unpicked

The battle to define the policy legacy of any two-term American presidency usually emerges as the election for a successor begins in earnest. Ever the astute campaigner, Barack Obama initiated the current debate through a series of interviews to The Atlantic magazine, published as The Obama Doctrine. The conversation has just been significantly extended by a profile in The New York Times of White House communications guru Ben Rhodes.

Mr Obama was elected with a mandate to correct a Bush-era foreign policy characterised by excessive interventionism, overreach and even hubris. As former Obama CIA director and defence secretary Leon Panetta puts it, he was “the guy who’s going to bring these wars to an end”.

Yet in Samuels’s account, Mr Obama is depicted as single-minded and inflexible in a manner surprisingly reminiscent of George W Bush. Bush-era recklessness has given way to a very different, but also profoundly dangerous, risk aversion.

It’s pointless to debate whether Mr Obama’s sins of omission have been as harmful as Mr Bush’s sins of commission. That’s totally subjective and can only be based on counterfactual scenarios. Moreover, it’s irrelevant, because even if Mr Obama’s worst errors prove less costly than the flabbergasting blunder of the Iraq war, they’re still highly damaging failures.

Mr Bush’s exit was haunted by the spectre of Iraq, which helped bring his Republican party crashing down to a historic defeat in 2008. Although its political fallout will be less dramatic, Mr Obama’s failure to act in Syria eventually may similarly define his foreign policy in largely negative terms.

Mr Obama is counting on the Iran nuclear deal to secure a historical legacy of at least relative success. But if the agreement doesn’t prevent the emergence of either a nuclear-armed Iran or a military confrontation, he will have lost the legacy gamble.

And a Syria policy that has killed more than 250,000 people and displaced millions, one of the worst terrorist organisations in history empowered, and parts of the Middle East and even Europe destabilised, will be hard to frame as anything other than a devastating moral and political failure.

Samuels’s article illustrates the monomaniacal groupthink dominating elements in the present White House: “Iraq is his [Mr Rhodes’] one-word answer to any and all criticism.”

Moreover, he presents Mr Rhodes, and by implication Mr Obama, as being fatalistically convinced – largely, and perhaps entirely, based on the American experience in Iraq – that there was nothing at all Washington could have done to improve the situation in Syria.

“I profoundly do not believe that the United States could make things better in Syria by being there,” Samuels quotes Mr Rhodes. “And we have an evidentiary record of what happens when we’re there – nearly a decade in Iraq.”

This echoes Mr Obama’s evidence-free assertions that Russia’s intervention in Syria is, by definition, a crippling failure and sign of weakness.

But of course, Syria isn’t Iraq. 2003 isn’t 2012. And these two realities are radically different in almost every respect. Only the most superficial and confused reading would conflate the challenges they posed to policymakers.

This is precisely the kind of amateurish error that would seem entirely convincing, and profoundly appeal, to those who just don’t know much about Iraq and Syria. Yet this excruciatingly facile analogy appears to have been definitive for the Obama administration.

An unnamed former senior Obama administration official told Samuels he thought the debate in 2012 about Syria was “honest and open” but has changed his mind. He says that, like Mr Bush, Mr Obama sticks with his existing beliefs no matter what the realities or “costs to our strategic interests” prove to be. Samuels insightfully notes both men “projected their own ideas of the good on to an indifferent world”.

Mr Panetta says he used to believe Mr Obama was prepared to act militarily to prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon, but now thinks that’s “probably not” true. Instead, he suggests that Mr Obama is so attached to the idea of ending wars that he wouldn’t have actually launched such an action, or even authorised increased sanctions on Tehran (which Mr Obama did oppose).

He adds that this mentality also helps explain American reticence on Syria. He explains Mr Obama’s calculations thus: “If you ratchet up sanctions, it could cause a war. If you start opposing their interest in Syria, well, that could start a war, too.”

Samuels’s article confirms some of the worst fears about how foreign policy is sometimes being poorly manufactured and cynically marketed by the current administration.

Mr Obama has correctly chided Donald Trump that the presidency is “not a reality show”. Yet Mr Rhodes boasts about having “created an echo chamber”. Unfortunately, behind such Machiavellian messaging lies not reassuringly sincere policy confidence, but a disturbingly absolutist certainty.

Ideologically-driven dogmatism isn’t restricted to past administrations. And no need of Trumpery – serious issues are already being addressed through openly contemptuous, reality TV-style manipulation rather than genuine persuasion. These attitudes and practices may, alas, prove inseparable from the rest of the Obama foreign policy legacy.

Clinton and Trump’s Mideast Policy Report Cards

The American presidential election will almost certainly be between former secretary of state Hillary Clinton and real estate mogul Donald Trump. This unprecedented contest – a real-life “wacky race” – invites a thought experiment: compare and contrast Middle East policy report cards for these would-be national leaders.

The manifest purpose of this academic fantasy is to gauge what the election might mean for the Middle East. But a latent aim is to test whether Mr Trump – who has never held any elected or appointed office – can be taken at all seriously.

So let’s temporarily put aside Mr Trump’s hate-speech, conspiracy theories, proposed entry bans on Muslim non-citizens and other provocations, and juxtapose his policy pronouncements with those of Mrs Clinton.

Start with Iran. Mr Trump vows to “renegotiate” the “terrible” nuclear agreement. But he doesn’t specify what, precisely, is so “terrible” or must be renegotiated. And yet he’s enraged that continued sanctions impede American investment in Iran.

This glaring incongruity reflects Mr Trump’s “lather, rinse and repeat” strategy. He blurts out whatever comes to mind, notes the public response, and repeats whatever resonates. “First thought, best thought” rarely had a more consistent practitioner.

Mrs Clinton was reportedly sceptical when negotiations began, and remains distrustful of Tehran. Her supporters argue this positions her perfectly to “rally the world to deter and punish Iran” if need be.

After leaving the state department, Mrs Clinton supported new sanctions. Barack Obama did not. He prevailed, and his defenders say that was crucial to reaching the agreement. Her supporters suggest additional pressure would have produced a stronger agreement.

Both Mrs Clinton and Mr Trump pledge strong support for Israel, although he wants to be a “neutral guy” in negotiations. As first lady in 1998, Hillary Clinton pioneered White House backing for Palestinian statehood. Both advocate a two-state solution, but neither propose measures to advance it.

Mr Trump echoes both Mr Obama’s “free riders” accusation against Gulf states, and the view that the Middle East has become less strategically significant. He angrily threatened to halt oil purchases from Saudi Arabia unless it contributes troops (or vast sums) to battle ISIL, apparently unaware that Riyadh has repeatedly pressed Washington to lead just such an offensive and offered significant ground forces.

Mrs Clinton embraces a more traditional American approach, insisting the Gulf region remains of “vital importance”. “Bolstering security cooperation” with GCC states is among her five key Middle East “policy pillars”. And she appears tougher on Iran and less sceptical of Washington’s Arab partners.

Mrs Clinton joins a virtual consensus of former Obama administration officials now publicly critical of the lack of US engagement in Syria. She regrets the US did not engage sufficiently with Syrian rebels, and implies she would correct this.

Mrs Clinton shares Mr Obama’s opposition to deploying American troops in Syria, whether against ISIL or the regime. Nonetheless, she has called for both “safe zones”, and more militarily ambitious and strategically significant “no-fly zones”. Moreover, she insists on removing Bashar Al Assad, which Mr Obama has been downplaying.

Mr Trump supports establishing refugee “safe zones”, as long as they are financed by Gulf states, but dismisses “no fly zones”. His insistence the region would be better off with Muammar Qaddafi and Saddam Hussein still in power was clearly intended to imply his support for continued Assad rule.

Mr Trump advocated deploying 30,000 American troops against ISIL in Syria, though he later denied he meant it. He has consistently advocated systematic torture, deliberate killing of family members, and possible use of nuclear weapons against ISIL.

Apart from combating ISIL, Mr Trump casts the Middle East as “one big fat quagmire” to be avoided whenever possible. But, in almost the same breath, he demands that ISIL-controlled Syrian and Iraqi oilfields be (somehow) seized, rebuilt by American oil companies, and then kept entirely for the United States.

If Mr Trump’s Middle East positions seem increasingly ridiculous, that’s because the more closely they are examined, the more clearly they reveal their absurdity. To itemise them is to sink inexorably into a morass of boundless incoherence, endless self-contradiction, wilful ignorance and empty bluster.

Mrs Clinton’s Middle East policies may seem unimaginative and underwhelming; they’re certainly predictable and politically safe. But they’re also neat and tidy, the dutifully-done homework of a would-be teacher’s pet. Her grade thus far is probably a “C, must try harder”.

Mr Trump’s policies resemble the latest crayon masterpiece of a disruptive class clown and playground bully. His grade can only be an “F, with urgent referral to remedial classes and special needs counselling”.

If Middle East policy is any indication, the American election will pit an orthodox, though often uninspiring, politico – who, apart from her gender, seems straight out of central casting for the role of president – against a truly bizarre figure, more like a cartoon character than an actual candidate.

But the real “report card zero” must go to those Republican leaders who – against their better judgment and merely to preserve their personal power – are about to try to turn this walking caricature of a politician into the president of the United States.

Four Probable Developments in U.S. Middle East Policy

 

U.S. foreign policy has historically favored consistency and gradual change, as befits a status quo power, rather than sudden transformations. Unanticipated events like Pearl Harbor and 9/11 that force dramatic policy shifts have been the exceptions rather than the rule. U.S. interests develop slowly over time and reflect the imperatives of numerous constituencies that compete in defining national priorities. A change in administrations does not return the country to square one. Therefore, whoever succeeds President Barack Obama is likely to have an overall approach to the Middle East that is similar to his. This is particularly true on broad consensus issues, such as the determination to avoid unnecessary military engagements, particularly in the Middle East, or the need for greater “burden sharing” by European, Arab, and other international partners.

However, because the political context is ever changing, and since any new administration must try to learn from the experiences of its predecessors, some modifications can be expected. At least four probable Middle East policy shifts that the next administration, from either party, is likely to adopt – campaign rhetoric notwithstanding – are already identifiable. These include a reevaluation of relations with Iran, intensified efforts to reassure traditional Gulf Arab allies, a more engaged policy on Syria and, eventually, a return to the vexed Israeli-Palestinian problem.

Re-evaluating Relations with Iran

While most Americans appear to support the nuclear agreement with Iran, a major achievement for U.S. diplomacy, the next administration will most likely re-evaluate relations with Tehran. This is likely to be true even of a potential Hillary Clinton administration, even though the nuclear agreement is especially popular with Democrats. It is unlikely that any future White House will be as deeply invested in the agreement as the Obama administration, and relations with Iran will continue to reflectincreasing tensions that are already developing.

The Obama administration overcame an extraordinary set of difficulties to achieve an agreement with Iran that, if implemented, will prevent Tehran from developing nuclear weapons for at least 10 to 15 years. Especially during his second term, Obama prioritized negotiating and then implementing the nuclear deal. Indeed, protecting the negotiations with Tehran appears to have influenced some other Middle East policies. The controversial 2013 Syrian chemical weapons “red line” volte-face is a striking case-in-point.

The next president is likely to be even firmer than Obama in insisting on strict implementation of the agreement, and take a tougher line on Tehran’s provocative behavior. Iran has intensified its destabilizing efforts to expand its influence in the Arab world largely through armed proxies. Iran has also expanded its ballistic missile development and testing program, which violates U.N. Security Council resolutions, international expectations, and the spirit, if not the letter, of the nuclear agreement itself.

The Obama administration has been increasingly responding to this pattern, using tougher language denouncing Iran’s behavior (such as direct references to “support for terrorist groups”), and moving closer to Washington’s traditional Arab partners. The next administration can be expected to intensify the process of rebuilding trust with the Gulf states. This would be greatly facilitated by Washington taking a tougher line with Iran, thereby clarifying U.S. intentions in the eyes of its Gulf partners.

Rebuilding Trust with GCC States

During the Obama administration, Washington’s relations with its Gulf Arab partners developed a radical dichotomy between perceptions and realities. The core reality remains one of a strong U.S. engagement in, and commitment to, the Gulf region and its stability and security. The U.S. military presence in the region is at historically high levels, given that the United States is not engaged in a major war, particularly higher than pre-9/11 engagement. Weapons sales, U.S. investment, and diplomatic engagement are all strong. So, during the Obama era the United States actually grew closer than ever to the Gulf states at many quantifiable, brass-tacks levels.

Yet the perception of U.S. disengagement from the region, and disregard for the interests and security of its regional partners, has nonetheless become widespread in Gulf societies. The breakdown of trust grew out of serious concerns about several U.S. policies, particularly the nuclear negotiations with Iran and Washington’s hands-off approach to the Syrian war. These anxieties were exacerbated by some of Obama’s comments in interviews, particularly one with Jeffrey Goldberg, and the combination has led to deep-seated doubts about U.S. intentions.

Obama’s summit meetings with Gulf leaders at Camp David in 2015 and Saudi Arabia in 2016 were useful but did not fully resolve suspicions. The next administration could be well-positioned to go much further in restoring frayed trust, particularly if the incoming president moves into the White House without carrying similar rhetorical baggage. The continued strategic significance of the Middle East, and the Gulf region in particular, to the United States as a major global power ensures that, unless it adopts the neo-isolationist foreign policy, the next administration will intensify efforts to rebuild the U.S. partnership with the Gulf states.

Under the next administration, particularly if it lasts for two terms, the United States and the Gulf states can more fully adjust to the “new normal” in their relationship. Although the partnership remains strong, both parties have adopted some new policy priorities that have restructured it somewhat. Americans feel overburdened by international commitments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, and will continue to resist military engagements and ask their partners to do more. The Gulf states have become more proactive and independent in their security posture. For Washington, this is a double-edged sword, as the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen demonstrates. It reflects the very self-reliance Washington has long advocated. But the political fallout and the humanitarian consequences of this intervention have produced considerable American unease.

The Gulf states must adjust to a new U.S. approach in which the United States continues its leadership role but with some modifications, and Washington must adjust to a new degree of independent decision making by its Gulf Cooperation Council partners. The resulting relationship could be healthier, and therefore more resilient, than the traditional arrangement. Since this transformation is unavoidable and already underway, one of the key tasks of the next administration will be managing this period of transition. This will require significant attention to bolstering the trust needed to sustain U.S.-GCC relations.

A New U.S. Policy on Syria (and ISIL)

Another likely policy development that may, at least partly, reassure Gulf states is a new U.S. policy toward Syria. However, it is unlikely that Washington and the Gulf states will develop a fully coordinated policy on Syria because their priorities diverge. But the lack of U.S. engagement on Syria has been so damaging to U.S. interests and credibility in the region that some significant change is unavoidable, particularly given the virtual consensus of former Obama administration officials who have been publicly critical of U.S. policy. However, most U.S. citizens are against a major deployment of U.S. ground forces, with the exception of some calls for the use of U.S. troops against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). So the bedrock of the Obama approach – avoiding a major U.S. ground intervention – will almost certainly continue, barring unforeseen circumstances such as a major attack on U.S. interests by one of the armed factions in Syria.

Syria policy is, in effect, inseparable from ISIL policy, since the extremist group has its headquarters, strategic depth, and largest concentration of military power in that country. The Obama administration has pursued an “Iraq-first” approach and, therefore, a de facto containment policy against ISIL in Syria. The incoming administration will have to seriously consider a greater integration of ISIL policy. It could also face strong pressure to intensify efforts should there be additional ISIL-related terrorist attacks in the West, and especially the United States.

The Obama administration deliberately declined to adopt a comprehensive policy on Syria during most of the conflict because it deemed all achievable outcomes to be unacceptable and all minimally acceptable outcomes to be unachievable. However, given the widespread view that this approach has not served broader U.S. policy goals, the next administration will assuredly have to adopt a Syria policy that identifies a preferred plausible outcome and works toward its realization. However, because its specifics will depend on, and be shaped by, many variables, what that will look like in practice is impossible to outline in any detail at this stage.

Re-engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Reviewing the experiences of the George W. Bush and Obama administrations, the next White House is unlikely to be enthusiastic about re-engaging with Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy. But it may not have the luxury of inaction, particularly if another massive spasm of violence in the occupied West Bank threatens the continued existence and political viability of the Palestine Liberation Organization and Palestinian Authority, the main institutions of secular Palestinian nationalism.

The West Bank has remained relatively calm, despite the growing frustration, and even desperation, of the Palestinians living under occupation, because most of them are opposed to widespread violence. Memories of the disastrous second intifada, from which Palestinian society has not yet fully recovered, and a long history of previous armed confrontations with Israel have left a strong impression that violence is a losing proposition for Palestinians. However, the recent wave of spontaneous knife attacks against Jewish Israelis by Palestinian youths suggests that a new generation without these memories is coming into its own. With no political horizon for liberation, the open-ended rule of a hostile foreign army, an unelected and unaccountable Palestinian Authority government with little credibility (and Hamas even more discredited and unpopular), and an increasingly grim economic outlook, another bout of sustained and major violence in the West Bank is extremely likely.

The United States, Israel, and some Arab countries including Egypt, Jordan, and perhaps the Gulf states, would have a powerful interest in acting quickly to prevent secular Palestinian nationalism from irrevocably disintegrating – especially as it could be replaced with a radical, or religiously extremist, agenda, or total anarchy amid a social and political vacuum among Palestinians. Such an explosion would require the United States, no matter how reluctantly or who is in the White House, to seriously re-engage with Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy.

The Obama administration may outline a U.S. position on the appropriate final status outcome between Israel and the Palestinians. These potential “Obama parameters,” however, are likely to be basically an updated version of the familiar “Clinton parameters.” The next administration will undoubtedly build on this legacy when it comes to the long-term outcome for ending the conflict. The goal of the revived U.S. engagement, however, may be more oriented toward preserving the viability of Palestinian nationalism rather than a full-fledged peace. Therefore, the emphasis may be more on measures designed to bolster Palestinian political leadership, society, and capabilities rather than securing a final status agreement with Israel.

Strengthening Palestinian institutions necessitates some concessions from Israel, and restrictions on its occupation activities. But it could focus more on enhancing bilateral U.S.-Palestinian ties, building the Palestinian economy and other institutions, and much more purposeful, focused U.S. and international efforts at preparing the groundwork for the eventual creation of a Palestinian state. It will be difficult to make much progress on this track without significant cooperation from Israel, but there may be no alternative for Israel and the United States if the Palestinian national movement, as it has existed since the early 1960s, appears to be on the brink of permanent dissolution. And there is no power other than the United States that is capable of even potentially helping Israel recognize its stake in preserving the prospects for a two-state solution.

Conclusion

These four anticipated changes to the U.S. posture in the Middle East are very different propositions, although some are closely related in important respects. For example, taking a tougher line with Tehran in the next few years is one of the ways that the imperative of rebuilding trust with the Gulf Arab states will be achieved. That said, and campaign rhetoric notwithstanding, no one will be cancelling or arbitrarily renegotiating the nuclear agreement if both sides continue to meet their fundamental commitments.

By contrast, with regard to Syria the most that can be said with relative certainty is that the United States will be adopting a more integrated and less piecemeal approach that moves away from policy fragmentation and ceding the field almost totally to others. An Israeli-Palestinian re-engagement is the biggest outlier of the four issues, because it will not reflect a planned or deliberate policy shift. Instead, it is an overwhelmingly likely contingency that will probably look and feel much like an emergency, requiring both a re-engagement and a new approach from Washington.

Within the broad framework of U.S. policy continuity, changes are always at work, especially when a new administration takes office. However, these four Middle East policy challenges will almost certainly be dealt with differently by the next administration than they have been under “the Obama doctrine.”

A Looming Crisis in Lebanon

 

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/opinion/a-looming-crisis-in-lebanon.html?_r=0

In Levantine landscapes, history is piled high. The present is layered on the remnants of the past, both modern and ancient.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in Lebanon’s capital, Beirut. Sparkling buildings and sweeping urban highways rise up out of heaps of rubble that remain a quarter-century after the 1975-1990 civil war. Yet the crumbling edifices of earlier eras are also, amazingly, still inhabited.

Beirut is an organic museum, vibrant and wretched. Pain and hope coexist on its overflowing, labyrinthine streets, and on sinuous coastal roads, shameless wealth lies alongside desperate poverty. A struggling middle class is caught in between. But neither rich nor poor can escape the stench from mounds of uncollected refuse, the evidence of the country’s infamous “trash crisis.”

Metaphors involving unwanted detritus have been irresistible to commentators as Lebanon again finds itself in the crossfire of geopolitical conflict. The regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia has found a new focal point in Lebanon with its uneasy equilibrium.

At the center of the crisis is the growing role of Hezbollah, the Shiite political party and militia. Beyond its Lebanese strongholds, the group has also become one of Iran’s main strategic assets in the region: Heavily supported by Hezbollah fighters, the Russian-Iranian surge in Syria has swung the momentum of the war back in favor of the government of President Bashar al-Assad.

Lebanon’s own political dynamics have also shifted. Beirut has long been trapped in a Syrian orbit; as the fortunes of the Assad regime have revived, Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon has grown. Hezbollah had already angered the Saudis and their Gulf allies by its intervention in Syria and support for Iran. The Shiite group has also stalemated domestic politics by blocking the selection of a new Lebanese president.

In January, the Gulf states were deeply affronted when Lebanon declined to support an otherwise unanimous (including even Iraq) Arab League condemnation of a mob attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran after the execution of a dissident Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia. This snub from Beirut convinced them that thanks to Hezbollah’s rise, Lebanon was now in Tehran’s pocket. Warnings to the Gulf states’ Lebanese allies that Hezbollah’s influence needed curbing seemed to go unheeded; in practice, though, those factions have little alternative but to deal with Hezbollah as usual.

Worse, from the Saudi perspective, Hezbollah has started operating not just beyond Lebanon but in the kingdom’s back yard. The Saudis see Hezbollah’s hand, as well as Tehran’s, behind the Houthi rebels in Yemen. This caps a history of accusations of Hezbollah subversion in the Gulf.

Yemen was the last straw for Riyadh, which axed $4 billion in support for Lebanon’s military and intelligence services. The Gulf states also declared Hezbollah a terrorist group and outlawed support for it.

Punitive expulsions of Lebanese expatriates from the Gulf, which is suffering its own economic problems from the collapse in oil prices, have left Lebanon reeling from the loss of remittances. Travel warningsfrom the Gulf governments have also damaged Lebanon’s tourism industry.

Other sectors of the Lebanese economy long supported by Gulf financing, like media outlets, have been hard-hit, too. The financial crisis is palpable and widespread, so that the stinking piles of garbage and wandering bands of desperate Syrian refugees in Beirut may be harbingers of a deeper malady.

The drying up of Gulf funds now threatens the foreign exchange flows on which Lebanon’s banks depend. The remaining reserves are rapidly depleting, which in turn imperils another backbone of the national economy, Lebanon’s financial services industry.

The Gulf states’ cutting off aid to their Lebanese allies — an incongruous grouping of Sunni, Druze and Christian factions whose only common ground is a shared fear of Hezbollah — undoubtedly cedes the field to Iran. But as a senior Gulf diplomat told me, “Our money in Lebanon just didn’t stretch as far as Iran’s.” It did not have the same political impact because most Gulf aid went to national institutions like the army, while Iran’s mainly goes directly to a proxy militia: Hezbollah. With the growing power of Hezbollah, the Gulf states felt that, by underwriting Lebanon’s national institutions, they were subsidizing what were becoming, in effect, Iranian assets.

The key to Lebanon’s relative stability, as the veteran Druze leader Walid Jumblatt told me, is that “its security services are able to work with the Syrians, the Saudis, the Iranians and the West simultaneously.” If that balance is lost, Lebanon’s fragile equilibrium may collapse.

Worse, with proxy conflicts raging in Syria, Yemen and elsewhere, Lebanon, too, is a potential battleground for indirect Iranian-Saudi hostilities. So far, the country’s competing factions have united to quarantine the spillover of the Syrian war to a remote part of northern Lebanon. But should Tehran or Riyadh authorize a new theater of confrontation, Lebanon is a potential powder keg.

The Gulf states have made their point. But unless they resume their engagement with Lebanon, then, as the Obama administration has warned, Tehran’s control can only grow.

The international community must shore up Lebanon’s economy and help it cope with the staggering Syrian refugee crisis. Washington should use its ties to Riyadh and newfound leverage with Tehran to persuade both that stability in Lebanon is in their interest: All have a stake in stopping the Syrian conflict from expanding into Lebanon and preventing the Islamic State from radicalizing local Sunnis. As a first step, they should ensure Lebanon at last gets a new president.

The country is poised, in a way familiar to the Lebanese, between tense calm and a potential conflagration. But the pressures are rapidly mounting, and outside actors will have a decisive role in determining whether the country can avoid being sucked into the inferno raging around it.