http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/us-republicans-face-a-series-of-grim-decisions

Donald Trump will be the Republican presidential nominee. Last Tuesday he swept five primaries. Neither of his opponents can amass enough delegates to win without backroom chicanery. And he has finally reached the 50 per cent mark in national polls of likely Republican voters.

Mr Trump is closer to outright victory than most realise. Conventional wisdom holds that a Republican candidate needs 1,237 delegates, a mathematical majority, to win. But GOP party rules expert J Randolph Evans argues the real number is 80, not 100, per cent of the majority, which comes to about 1,100 delegates.

Mr Evans predicts a stampede of uncommitted delegates to any candidate who reaches the 80 per cent threshold since party “insiders want to remain insiders and the bandwagon effect always takes over”.

Mr Trump now has 996 delegates, and his main rival, Ted Cruz, a mere 565. He will easily secure the additional 104 required by Mr Evans’s persuasive analysis.

Republican leaders have therefore begun to reconcile themselves to the reality that Mr Trump will be their nominee – although they’re adopting a range of conclusions and responses.

The party establishment has been compelled to evaluate the political consequences of a concerted effort to deny Mr Trump the nomination if he can be prevented from securing 1,237 delegates. Many key insiders now feel that, disastrous though a Trump nomination will almost certainly be, a behind-the-scenes plot to unseat him if he falls just short of the magic number could be even more damaging, and possibly fatal, to the party.

The forthcoming Trump nomination is without doubt extraordinarily dangerous and perhaps catastrophic for Republican power at the national level.

His negative ratings are so high and his personality so toxic beyond his passionate, but distinctly minority, bloc of supporters that his leadership could undo Republican majorities in the Senate and even the House of Representatives, in a replay of the traumatic GOP rout of 2008.

Such a debacle is plausible only if Mr Trump becomes, in the eyes of most other Americans, an exceptionally repulsive face of the Republican Party.

Much of the GOP establishment has concluded that the party faces a grim binary. It can go down to a devastating defeat with Mr Trump, but live to fight another day. Or its leaders could try to stop him and provoke such outrage and incredulity from the Republican rank and file that the resulting backlash might actually destroy the party.

Therefore, many now think the safer course is, counterintuitively, to allow the Trump campaign to drag the party to a probable crushing defeat rather than try to nullify his primary victories. Hence insider efforts to bring down Mr Trump have been largely abandoned. The potential price is simply deemed too high.

But Republican leaders know their base has selected probably the worst, in every sense of the term, presidential nominee in modern American history. Mr Trump’s unprecedented and complete lack of political experience, evident policy ignorance, bigotry, misogyny, violent rhetoric, conspiracy theories, crude bluster and unmistakable narcissistic personality disorder make him distasteful beyond his base.

The percentage of Americans who view him unfavourably, which most polls measure in the upper 60s, is unheard of for a major candidate. Worse, his unpopularity rating has actually been steadily increasing. To be competitive in a general election, Mr Trump would have to radically transform his image. But he’s so well known and set in his ways that this seems implausible.

Many significant constituencies – including women, Latinos, African-Americans, Arab and Muslim Americans, and even many neoconservatives – will not only oppose Mr Trump, but also be energised by the threat he poses.

Hillary Clinton is, historically, an exceptionally unpopular candidate with “unfavourables” in the low 50s.

Yet most polls show her trouncing Mr Trump by 7 to 10 per cent. Undoubtedly many Republicans will reluctantly vote for her. Almost all Republican candidates in competitive elections have ostentatiously distanced themselves from Mr Trump. And he has received only a handful of endorsements from Republicans in Congress, while numerous party bigwigs have denounced him as a dangerous charlatan.

But the party base has overruled them, and the establishment now faces a set of unpalatable choices.

Three factions are already emerging.

The largest group will grit their teeth and support Mr Trump out of party loyalty, distaste for Democrats and, most of all, in hopes of power and patronage. New Jersey governor Chris Christie pioneered this latest incarnation of the world’s oldest profession.

The second will do as little as possible, try to stay home, keep a low profile, and go through pro forma motions.

The third, and unfortunately probably much the smallest, emerging Republican establishment faction will be those who have the self-respect, patriotism and common decency to openly oppose Mr Trump and what he stands for.

Only those principled Republican leaders who reject Trumpery – as it should certainly be called – will emerge with their reputations intact. It is they who will have to rebuild and repair the Republican Party once the Trump fiasco has, as it must and surely will, becomes a bizarre, though disturbing, historical footnote.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/in-truth-the-us-hasnt-given-up-on-the-gulf

Marshall McLuhan’s famous observation that sometimes “the medium is the message” perfectly describes the substance of last week’s US-GCC summit. The meeting itself, especially its now-confirmed annual status, is the biggest takeaway for both sides.

For the United States, an annual leadership summit is one of the main things it could do to reaffirm its partnership with the Gulf states. After all, the American military presence in the region, especially given the absence of a major combat mission, is already historically high, as are weapon sales, financial investments, diplomatic interchange and civil society interaction.

Despite the impression in Gulf societies that the United States has been disengaging, the reality is that, at a practical level, there’s not that much more that could be done to increase US engagement.

What the United States had left to offer that is politically possible is what Barack Obama referred to as “institutionalised communication” with the Gulf states. The annual summits give the Gulf states very unusual regular access to American decision-making at the highest possible level. It’s a format rather than a substantial takeaway, but that doesn’t lessen its practical and symbolic value.

The institutionalisation of an annual US-GCC Summit confirms the strength of the partnership and the extent to which, no matter what the doubts and tensions on both sides might be, the two sides still need each other because they lack alternatives.

They came together out of mutual interests, not shared values or love. And they are sticking together because those interests remain substantially unchanged. Both sides have plainly been considering their options in recent years, but, in reality, there are no alternatives to each other given what Arab and American interests really are.

Mr Obama, predictably, did a creditable job in downplaying tensions in the relationship, dismissing them as “tactical differences” for achieving common strategic goals. To some extent that’s true, on issues such as Iran and Syria in particular, but some of his personal opinions remain problematic.

When Mr Obama speaks, as he did during the summit, as president, his words reflect US policy and are therefore almost entirely unobjectionable because US policy is sound. However, as is well known, some of his personal views have created great anxiety among US Gulf partners.

However, Mr Obama’s personal opinions, such as the ideas that the Gulf Arab states are “free riders” in the relationship, or that they should “share” the Middle East with Iran, or that the United States should “pivot to Asia”, are precisely that: his private views. They are not American policy.

No one’s opinions are more important than those of the US president in shaping American policy. But the American president is not a king or a dictator, and US policy is made gradually and with many inputs. Almost none of Mr Obama’s problematic opinions are reflected in either American conduct or policy documents.

Therefore, it’s not surprising that the Obama who showed up in Saudi Arabia comes across as a very different person from the one depicted in Jeffrey Goldberg’s recent article The Obama Doctrine. The first was the US president, representing the country’s policies and interests. The second was an individual with personal and often idiosyncratic views.

The private man says the partnership with Saudi Arabia is complicated. The American president says: “the strain was overblown” and “friendship and cooperation has been consistent for decades”.

Mr. Obama’s former Middle East coordinator, Philip Gordon, confirmed this dichotomy in a recent interview, saying: “Whatever the president might think of Saudi Arabia … personally, he is following a decades-old policy of pursuing strong relations in the Gulf region” because there are no “good alternatives to our partnership”.

Sometimes the roles merge, as when Mr Obama insisted that “we are not naive” about Iran. There is no doubt he specifically denied this accusation because he had been hearing it from his Arab interlocutors from the moment he landed, if not before.

Here all three of Mr Obama’s personas meld seamlessly: the individual person he always is, the American president in which capacity he temporarily acts, and the American policy for which he speaks, are all, he insists, not naive about Iran.

Continued American sanctions against Iran are annoying both Iranians and Europeans hoping to invest in that country, but are primarily harming US businesses. The United States is literally paying a significant price for continued vigilance against Tehran. Given these sanctions, and the sustained efforts to repair relations with Gulf partners, the rejection of charges of naivety need to be taken seriously.

American policy, including the nuclear deal, isn’t naie about Iran. The American president hasn’t adopted naive positions on Iran. And even if Mr Obama has personally expressed what could be described as some naive opinions about the Middle East, that’s not really as big a deal as some think.

The reality is the United States is still plainly at odds with Iran and, despite claims to the contrary, still has a strong partnership with the Gulf Arab states. That’s the message embedded in the medium of the annual US-GCC summits.

http://www.agsiw.org/what-to-expect-from-the-u-s-gcc-summit/

When President Barack Obama visits Saudi Arabia on April 20-21 and meets with Gulf Cooperation Council leaders, he will be tackling one of the most important, but deeply strained, U.S. international relationships. Although some Americans, including Obama, have questioned how strategically important the Middle East remains to the United States, both U.S. policy and interests continue to reflect a strong engagement in and commitment to the region in general, and the Gulf area in particular. Yet the trust of some Middle Eastern partners has been frayed, specifically among the Arab Gulf states. In these societies, anxieties are widespread that the United States may have abandoned these countries to their fate in a region they fear is being increasingly dominated by an ascendant Iran. These concerns form the immediate backdrop in which the U.S.-GCC dialogue and relationship will continue to develop, and the primary task for both sides is finding ways to offset them.

The Summit’s Context

While some important work was done at the Camp David summit in May 2015, when the GCC endorsed the Iran nuclear negotiations, and the Doha foreign ministerial meeting in August 2015, when the GCC endorsed the Iran nuclear deal, doubts about U.S. intentions have recently been exacerbated by some of the president’s remarks, particularly in a series of interviews summarized in The Atlantic by Jeffrey Goldberg. Obama once again expressed skepticism about some U.S. Arab allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, characterizing them as “free riders.” He also suggested they should “share” the Middle East with Iran, and reiterated his endorsement of a still aspirational “pivot to Asia.” Such rhetoric, combined with administration policies such as efforts to establish a new relationship with Iran including the nuclear agreement and the lack of a robust response to the conflict in Syria, prompts continued Arab doubts about the strength of the U.S. commitment to the partnership with the GCC states. For their part, many Americans share some of Obama’s concerns about being militarily and financially overburdened by European and Middle Eastern allies and about how political and social repression in some Arab societies may contribute to the rise of extremist organizations. So, doubts about aspects of the relationship, although they may be stronger on the Arab side, exist, in very different forms, on both sides.

The new summit comes at an important moment in the relationship. It will be the last major opportunity for Obama to repair the fraying of the partnership that has developed during his two terms in office. Moreover, whatever hopes may have been harbored that the nuclear agreement might lay the basis for a broader restructuring of the relationship with Iran, Tehran’s behavior thus far into the implementation phase suggests that traditional alliances with Arab countries will remain essential to securing U.S. interests in the region. Iran has not modified its aggressive regional policies, especially the use of proxies, destabilization, and even terrorism, to expand its influence in the Middle East.

The Continued Importance of the U.S.-GCC Relationship

Iran remains opposed to almost all long-term U.S. strategic goals in the region, and is still acting as a revanchist power, and as much as an international revolutionary movement as a state. This is particularly evident through its use of destabilizing proxy nonstate organizations such as Hizballah (a State Department-designated terrorist organization). Iran’s recent missile tests, which were in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions as well as international expectations, and the spirit, if not the letter, of the nuclear agreement, further underscore Tehran’s continued aggressive approach. Added to these deeds are the categorical statements by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other Iranian officials that there will be no further negotiations, and hence no more compromises, with the United States on any issues beyond the nuclear file. There is little reason to expect that Tehran will moderate its behavior over the next few years when it has not done so in the aftermath of the nuclear agreement. This would probably require a dramatic political transformation inside Iran, which is not anticipated.

Even though the United States is making significant progress toward energy independence, and relies much less for its own oil consumption on Gulf petroleum, as long as the United States wishes to remain a global power, the Middle East will continue to be strategically vital to its interests. Other major global economies – and key U.S. trading partners – particularly in South and East Asia, are still dependent on the oil reserves of the Gulf region and the petroleum shipped through Gulf waters. Other vital U.S. interests include counterterrorism and counterradicalization, a wide range of European strategic concerns, Israeli security, and a range of important issues arising from the fact that the Middle East is the geographic hub linking Africa, Asia, and Europe. With rare exceptions – Obama’s arguments among them – most foreign policy arguments that assert the emerging irrelevance of the Middle East to U.S. foreign policy prove to be neo-isolationist.

The restoration of trust between Washington and its Arab Gulf partners is therefore essential. The ongoing U.S. interest in this region is reflected in the high level of U.S. engagement, which refutes Gulf anxieties and some of Obama’s assertions. Although not as extensive as during times of war, the U.S. military presence in the Gulf region is historically very high, and certainly greater than pre-9/11 levels. U.S. investment and diplomatic and cultural engagement are also as robust as ever. This commitment is also reflected in key open-source U.S. policy documents, all of which reflect the strong U.S. interest in the region and commitment to its stability and security.

Moreover, despite talk of seeking alternative sources of international support and their efforts to develop more independent, proactive security policies (initiatives that are largely welcomed in Washington, which advocates greater “burden sharing” in the relationship), the Gulf states don’t have viable alternatives to U.S. support and leadership. Their military and intelligence equipment, training, and leadership structures are largely American. Additionally, while the Gulf states have pursued some diversification of arms suppliers, a wholesale switch to Russian, Chinese, or European alternatives, assuming they exist, would be prohibitively time consuming and costly. No other global power can begin to match the United States militarily or economically, and the U.S. presence in the region is uniquely robust. Moreover, while Iran and its allies form a fairly cohesive and coordinated bloc, the forces opposed to Tehran are disparate and often disunited. Only the United States is capable of providing a unifying orbit for the range of actors – including Arab states as well as Turkey and Israel – in the region that, often for very different reasons, seek to block the expansion of Iranian power.

The dissonance between the reality of strong U.S. engagement in, and commitment to, the Gulf region versus a perception of disengagement and disregard undermines the interests of both sides. It’s not difficult to track how these misunderstandings developed over recent years, and the questions on both sides are understandable and rational. But the upcoming summit is a vital opportunity to remind each other how important they remain to their respective interests.

What Can Be Accomplished at the Summit

Before his visit was announced, Obama was not widely expected to be planning another major trip to the Gulf region before the end of his second term. These meetings are therefore indications that his administration understands the depth and importance of the U.S.-GCC relationship. There is no specific reported agenda for Obama’s meeting with Saudi Arabia’s King Salman on Wednesday, but the U.S.-GCC summit on Thursday will be broken into three sections. The first will deal with the overall question of regional stability; the second will focus on the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and counterterrorism more broadly; and the third will specifically address countering Iran’s destabilizing regional activities. This agenda reflects a balance between U.S. and Arab priorities, which further suggests that the parties are not as far apart as they, and others, sometimes suggest.

Obama is expected to stress several key points. First, he will certainly reiterate the U.S. commitment to Gulf security and stability. But this language is very familiar, and, at least in bilateral terms, is unlikely to go beyond the formulations in the joint statements after the crucial Camp David and Doha meetings in 2015. Second, he will undoubtedly address the need for social and political reforms in the Gulf states, an idea to which he is deeply attached, not least because he thinks it is a key to counterterrorism and counterradicalization. Third, Obama will join GCC leaders in reiterating opposition to Iran’s destabilizing regional policies and support for terrorism. In this case, the language may be noticeably stronger because of Iran’s intensified pursuit of these activities. However, the main opening for tougher language aimed at Iran comes from Tehran’s ongoing missile development and testing program, which is a source of mutual concern, especially for the Gulf states.

Both sides have an articulated stake in robust counterterrorism cooperation to combat threats including Iranian-sponsored extremists like Hizballah and Sunni militants like ISIL or al-Qaeda. But the United States is likely to focus on two regional conflicts as incubators of an increased terrorist threat. The Obama administration will probably press Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners engaged in Yemen to shift the conflict with the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and their allies loyal to former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to a political process and concentrate military efforts on countering Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). While the coalition-Houthi war rages, AQAP has reportedly expanded its presence and capabilities in Yemen. This is deeply alarming to the United States and the rest of the West because AQAP is one of the few al-Qaeda affiliates operating that appears to have the capability of striking in the West, as demonstrated by several recent terrorist attacks in Europe.

A cease-fire in Yemen that went into effect April 10 is under stress but still holding. Moreover, the United Arab Emirates and increasingly Saudi Arabia appear to be interested in shifting the focus of combat to counterterrorism against AQAP. The United States is reportedly considering supporting a planned UAE offensive against AQAP in Yemen. Washington sees a political resolution of the Yemen conflict as essential for several reasons, particularly in order to reverse recent gains by AQAP. The coalition appears responsive to these concerns, but as long as the Houthis continue to hold large swaths of territory, fighting is likely to persist, particularly as the rebels seem intent on provoking the coalition and have a long history of breaking cease-fires.

Another regional conflict Obama is likely to raise is the anarchic situation in Libya, in which ISIL is beginning to thrive even as it is being degraded in Syria and Iraq. The new unity Libyan government, formed almost four months ago specifically to counter the rise of ISIL, appears stalled and mired in internal squabbles and divisions. It also does not appear to have received the level of international support it had anticipated. The United States is reportedly considering a range of military options in Libya, including bombing attacks and even limited forms of intervention on the ground. Washington will likely request GCC support for, and participation in, efforts to roll back the troubling expansion of ISIL in Libya.

Both sides can be expected to press each other on Syria policy, but a major breakthrough establishing a coordinated, comprehensive approach is unlikely given their contrasting stances on several issues. Even though both sides agree that President Bashar al-Assad should have no role in the long-term future of Syria, disagreements over how this goal should be pursued probably preclude any comprehensive coordination. Recent reports that the United States is preparing to work with its regional partners to increase the sophistication of weapons provided to moderate opposition groups if the current cease-fire in Syria collapses, as it seems to be, will be warmly welcomed by most Gulf states. But even that may not be sufficient to bring the two sides completely into agreement. Obama will also almost certainly raise the issue of Syrian refugees, urging the Gulf states to accept more of them (beyond those who qualify already as “guest workers”). In response, Gulf states almost certainly will point out that the United States, too, could do much more for the refugees. But these differences over Syria are not likely to be publicly aired.

It’s important that deliverables beyond rhetoric are secured at the summit. These could consist of further military technology transfers and weapons sales, including the confirmation of several outstanding fighter jet contracts for a number of Gulf states. Political opposition to some weapons sales, particularly to Saudi Arabia because of the war in Yemen, is emerging in the Senate, and may be an inhibiting factor. Beyond weapons purchases, several Gulf states, including the UAE, have in the past reportedly expressed a desire for some kind of strengthened formal alliance or treaty relationship with the United States. This has been effectively ruled out, because few Americans support embracing new binding military commitments in the Middle East. However, Secretary of State John Kerry recently suggested that a stronger formalized relationship between NATO and the GCC ought to be carefully considered. Further progress on this suggestion, even merely the establishment of a structure for investigating how such a relationship might work in practice, could be very helpful.

Following last year’s Camp David summit, one of the main takeaways for the Gulf states was the establishment of working groups, some of which were already in place, to coordinate cooperation on a range of issues, as well as a number of steps that gave the conversation with the United States greater chronological and thematic structure. It reassured them that the relationship with Washington would not be characterized by ad hoc communications but would rather be systematic. Something similar might be developed with NATO to begin to explore deeper cooperation, possibly leading to a more formal relationship.

But an actual NATO-GCC alliance will be difficult to establish. It may come with various conditions that will be difficult for the Gulf states to embrace, possibly involving compromises on sovereign prerogatives that they have thus far resisted. Washington has long championed the idea of an integrated ballistic missile defense shield for the Gulf states. This has proved implausible in practice because it would require the establishment of streamlined, integrated, and interoperable systems that involve the surrender of certain sovereign prerogatives to a joint command. (The time frame involving a response to incoming missiles being measured in seconds, and at most, minutes, requires such a structure). The Gulf states have not indicated a real willingness to make such compromises. The Obama administration apparently feels it may be making progress toward getting the Gulf states to begin making practical plans for developing such a system. The United States will press this issue at the summit.

Moreover, the Peninsula Shield force notwithstanding, the GCC is not a military alliance. It’s unclear, therefore, what the precise nature of the relationship with NATO, which is entirely a military alliance, would be. A similar issue arose when the United States authorized the sale of military equipment to the GCC as an organization. That may have been intended as a gesture of support to encourage greater military integration by the Gulf states, but it was, and remains, practically meaningless because the GCC does not function as an integrated military alliance or entity that purchases weapons. All sales, and related services and joint programs, therefore, have remained bilateral with individual Gulf states. Nonetheless, pursuing the idea of a more formal relationship between the GCC and NATO could serve as a significant rhetorical and political gesture. Since the fraying of trust has been largely perceptual, the management of “optics” could be central to repairing it.

Obama and his GCC interlocutors can be sure that every word arising from the summit will be carefully scrutinized. But that provides as many opportunities for progress as it does challenges. Last year the mood among Gulf leaders reportedly significantly improved after both the Camp David and Doha meetings, in spite of their doubts about the Iran nuclear negotiations and agreement. Under the current circumstances – particularly Tehran’s continued aggressive policies, which should bring the two sides closer together – opportunities for an even greater degree of mutual reassurance, based on both language and deliverables, seems likely.

There’s every reason to expect a generally positive, if not particularly dramatic, outcome to the summit and for that, in turn, to set the stage for a slow but steady recuperation of trust. The back-to-back summits are apparently intended to set a precedent, which is particularly welcome among the Gulf states, for an annual U.S.-GCC heads-of-state meeting. White House Middle East Coordinator Robert Malley recently told reporters these meetings “hopefully… will take place every year between the U.S. and the GCC at the leaders level.” That, alone, would go a long way toward solidifying the partnership into the foreseeable future. Nothing else, after all, makes sense for either side.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/us-gulf-ties-have-frayed-but-are-not-beyond-repair


My visit to the UAE last week strongly reinforced for me that negative misperceptions about Gulf relations with the United States, which in fact remain very strong, are deeply felt and widespread.

The sources and context of friction in the relationship are no mystery, especially persistent questions about the Obama administration’s intentions behind the nuclear agreement with Iran. More surprising was the extent to which these anxieties have become so entrenched they actually resist reassurances and evidence to the contrary.

Time and again my Gulf interlocutors, with few exceptions, pushed back strongly against efforts to point out that the fundamentals of the relationship remain very strong.

The American military presence in the region, while of course not as sizeable as during the Iraq war in 2003, or even the First Gulf War in 1991, is nonetheless historically very high and impressive by any standards. Diplomatic traffic is as robust as ever. Investments are also very strong, and in some sectors at historic highs.

These facts are not debated or denied. Yet the misgivings persist.

Pointing out the strength of these objective fundamental indicators of engagement and commitment proved, in most cases, insufficient to dispel the sense that Washington either has, or is preparing to, essentially abandon the Gulf states to their fate, particularly regarding an ascendant Iran.

It’s not about the core realities. It’s about perceptions.

Plainly, trust has been frayed. What’s required therefore, particularly in the run-up to Barack Obama’s upcoming trip to Saudi Arabia and meeting with the GCC leaderships, is serious attention to repairing that basic sense of confidence in each other.

Much of the concern is rooted in statements by the American president, not in speeches or policy statements given in his official capacity, but rather in a series of interviews reflecting his personal views with journalists such as David Remnick, Thomas Friedman and, most recently, notably and damaging, Jeffrey Goldberg.

In these interviews, Mr Obama has implied a sceptical attitude towards US Arab allies, especially Saudi Arabia, held Iran to a much laxer standard regarding human and women’s rights, suggested the Middle East is no longer as important to American interests as it once was, and strongly endorsed some kind of “pivot to Asia”.

Given these comments, and question marks that have arisen over the nuclear deal with Iran, the lack of a robust US response to the war in Syria, and other real and perceived policy issues, concern in the Gulf is understandable.

But not only are the fundamentals of the relationship still sound. Mr Obama’s personal views as expressed in these interviews don’t define and characterise US policy, because the American president is not a king or a dictator and policy is developed and transformed over many years with numerous inputs.

Words matter. But it’s important that words are weighed equally, and the words that are alarming are not given undue emphasis.

Much of what Mr Obama has said, for example regarding Iran’s misbehaviour and sponsorship of terrorism, should be reassuring but passes almost unnoticed.

Moreover, words have contexts that structure their relative significance. Campaign rhetoric, such as we have seen in the Democratic and Republican primary debates, is often not to be taken seriously, as when candidates promise to “tear up” the nuclear agreement with Iran, which will be over a year into implementation when the next president takes office.

Personal musings by political leaders are more serious than campaign rhetoric, but still need to be understood as individual thoughts. This is especially in contrast to formal policy speeches or official statements given as president, cabinet minister or such. There words acquire a much deeper significance than comments in personal interviews.

But by far the most important words are those in the official directives, national intelligence estimates and other core documents that instruct the apparatus of the US government and its officials precisely what policy is and how it should be implemented. These are the words that really define what the United States is doing or not.

There is nothing in these key documents other than a strong American commitment to Gulf security, clear intention to maintain a robust military, diplomatic and economic presence in the region, and a strong opposition to Iran’s aggressive regional policies. Any “pivot to Asia” remains entirely aspirational.

Questions in the Gulf about American policies are understandable.

But the reality on the ground reflects a robust relationship, characterised by American engagement across the board. And so do the primary relevant American policy documents.

Asking questions is reasonable. But one should be ready to take yes for an answer. In this case the answer is a fairly unequivocal yes.

Rebuilding trust is essential, but it’s going to require some fairly heavy lifting in both word and deed on both sides.

In his forthcoming visit to the region Mr Obama should, and no doubt will, emphasise that the United States remains committed to the security and interests of its Gulf allies. But he should have no illusions about the level of doubt he will face, both personally and as president of the United States.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/obama-and-gcc-leaders-have-a-lot-to-talk-about

The US-GCC summit meeting in Saudi Arabia next Thursday should prove an important milestone in the relationship, especially since it is intended to set the precedent of an annual head- of-state level summit into the foreseeable future.

Last May, US president Barack Obama invited GCC leaders to Camp David, although not all of them attended. The most important development from that summit for the Gulf states was the chronological and thematic structure established for conversations with Washington.

Various structures outlined what was going to be talked about, and when, dispelling the idea that US-GCC meetings would be ad hoc affairs designed to placate Arab concerns.

White House Middle East coordinator Rob Malley said on Friday that last year’s summit was designed not to “be a one-off event” or “a meeting for the sake of a meeting, but to launch a process in order to deepen the partnership”. He said that meetings will “be a hopefully regular process that will take place every year”.

It’s hard to overstate the importance of an annual leaders ‘summit between the US and the GCC for ensuring that Gulf concerns are heard in Washington at the highest level and on a regular basis. It will be much harder under such circumstances to feel isolated, ignored or abandoned by the United States, particularly given the actual scope of the continuing American presence in the Gulf region.

At this week’s summit, the ­Arab side will press for a stronger American commitment to battle Iranian misconduct in the region. The scope for an intensification of language on Iran, beyond last year’s statements after the Camp David summit and the Doha foreign ministerial meeting in August, arises mainly from Tehran’s recent aggressive ballistic missile tests. Moreover, countering Iran is one of three specific topics to be addressed at the summit, the other two being regional security and counterterrorism.

Gulf states may also receive confirmation of contracts for fighter jets and other military technology, and further steps to expedite weapons sales (which is proving resistant to streamlining).

Mr Obama will undoubtedly raise the issue of domestic social and political reforms in Gulf societies, which he views as essential to regional stability and stemming the rise of extremist groups.

He will also press for a shift of focus in Yemen away from combating the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and their allies loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh, and concentrating instead on combating Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Washington is reportedly considering backing a planned offensive in Yemen against AQAP, an initiative which is only the most recent indication that the coalition is preparing precisely such a shift of military focus in Yemen towards counterterrorism.

Washington will also be seeking Gulf support for anti-ISIL efforts in Libya, where the extremist group has reportedly doubled its fighter strength in the past year as it has been degraded in Syria and Iraq.

The United States is reportedly considering a range of military options against ISIL in Libya and will be seeking GCC support for, and participation in, those efforts.

Several Gulf states have, in the past, pressed for a treaty-based relationship with the United States, a formalised alliance beyond mere partnership. This has been ruled out because most Americans oppose any further binding military commitments in the Middle East. However, secretary of state John Kerry recently suggested that Nato, rather than the United States, might enter into some kind of formal arrangement with the GCC.

This might be difficult to establish in practice, because, the Peninsula Shield force notwithstanding, the GCC is not a military alliance as such, while Nato is strictly a military alliance. The exact nature of what the two sides could offer each other isn’t clear.

Indeed, the most that can be anticipated at this stage is a statement of intention to study the problem more closely, and perhaps a ministerial framework or dialogue structure in order to pursue the question.

Nonetheless, because the frayed trust between the two sides has been largely a matter of perceptions, given that the actual fundamentals of the relationship remain very strong – the American military presence, investments, diplomatic traffic and civil society engagement in the Gulf region are all at historically high levels – even such a gesture that is largely symbolic could prove highly significant to restoring confidence.

And even though there are serious, practical matters to be addressed and resolved at such summit meetings, their main value is precisely at the all-important political and diplomatic optical register.

Mr Obama’s damaging comments about Arab allies being “free riders” who need to “share” the Middle East with Iran, and his continued endorsement of a thus-far nonexistent “pivot to Asia” have exacerbated Arab doubts about American intentions arising from the nuclear deal with Tehran and the lack of a strong US policy on Syria.

Mr Obama now has a golden opportunity to clarify the actual strength of Washington’s continued commitment to the security and interests of its Gulf allies, and he surely will. Expect a successful meeting, and a genuinely important precedent, but no dramatic breakthroughs.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/warhols-celebrity-culture-explains-rise-of-trump

The faux-naïve pop-art trickster Andy Warhol saw deeper into his own time, and ours, than any other public figure of the late 20th century. Though no intellectual, Warhol channeled most of the groundbreaking artistic, cultural and commercial trends around him like a human antenna. And in his banal blankness, he reflected them back at us, often blindingly, in an avalanche of artistic and cultural artifacts.

He also anticipated and helped shape a consumerist “celebrity” culture, which has culminated in, among other things, “reality television”. No surprise, then, that Warhol is an important touchstone in explaining the horrifying rise of Donald Trump in American politics.

Mr Trump is a Warholian figure par excellence, although the two could hardly be more different. Warhol specialized in posing as a baffling cipher. He deftly avoided questions, throwing them back at the interviewer and refusing to engage seriously. He understood the richness of ambiguity, and his surface-level, immediately identifiable pop art couldn’t survive verbal articulation, let alone pomposity.

By contrast, Mr Trump spews categorical pontifications at any opportunity, relishing his own contradictions and inanities. Yet, because he believes in nothing other than himself, he too can serve as a mirror for his audience. This explains why evangelical Christians are flocking to vote for him although he has proudly flouted many of their core principles, and why right-wing ideologues like Rush Limbaugh embrace him though he is the least “conservative” Republican presidential candidate in memory.

Curator Henry Geldzahler summarized Warhol’s public persona thus: “He’s a voyeur sadist, and he needs exhibitionist-masochists”, adding that obviously any given “exhibitionist-masochist is not going to last very long.” This twisted interpersonal dynamic was most famously enacted with the heiress Edie Sedgwick, as mercilessly lampooned and condemned in Bob Dylan’s classic song “Like a Rolling Stone”.

Mr. Trump is neither of these types. Instead he is a full-blown sadistic narcissist. But he doesn’t feed off of willing individual masochists like Warhol, recording their excruciating, prolonged meltdowns in ecstatic fascination. Mr Trump rather casts his net far and wide across entire groups with which he has nothing to do. Immigrants and Muslims have been his chief targets of late, but any “outsiders” would plainly do.

This is why Warhol, for all of his faults, is an infinitely more attractive figure. His nickname in the 60s — coined by the scintillating, haunted speed-freak and self-appointed “Pope of Greenwich Village”,  Bob Olivo, AKA “Ondine” — was “Drella”, a portmanteau brilliantly conflating “Cinderella” and “Dracula”. His entourage knew that, if they let him, Warhol was capable of sucking the life out of them.

Nobody has signed up in the same way, least of all consciously, for Mr Trump’s narcissistic sadism. Yet he targets millions of innocents with a vengeance, and in a vapid quest for personal power and glory. There is no “Cinderella” in him at all, and even “Dracula” seems too generous (certainly too glamorous). Instead this boorish charlatan simply embodies a petty, malevolent self-regard which feeds off of the promotion of fear and hatred.

Warhol famously encountered a very different full-blown narcissist when he undertook to paint the great boxer Mohammed Ali. As Warhol snapped his requisite Polaroids, the champ unleashed an extended diatribe of random and categorical pronouncements on a vast range of topics.

Warhol was shocked. He asked, “How can he say that,” amazed at Ali’s self-righteousness. For Warhol, almost everything could be seen as beautiful, or at least interesting. Despite Warhol’s profoundly devout Byzantine Catholicism, he rejected most, at least conventional, moral judgments. Yet he remained captivated by Ali’s fame, if nothing else.

Warhol was in many ways a self-conscious, and arguably intentional, founder of our current celebrity culture, while Mr Trump is one of its main products. Warhol’s “Interview” magazine was the direct precursor to “People” magazine and its ilk, and his TV work, and parts of his life, clearly anticipated “reality” shows.

Mr Trump has lumbered out of a Warholian dream, or nightmare, in which fame, wealth and power are ends in themselves and, ultimately, self-validating.

Imagine the painting: hundreds of Trumps cascading across the canvas with gaudy eyes, rich lips, and Warhol’s other primary color emphases, fading in and out like a “Marilyn Diptych”. Or, if you dare, a single Trump, immovable and relentless, like Warhol’s celebrity portraits of the 70s and 80s.

Few public figures have “hair” as instantly identifying as Warhol’s bizarre, garish silver wigs. Mr. Trump’s elaborate do, though, comes close. But if we can’t believe the hair on his head, why would we take a word he says seriously? Warhol never asked us to, and playfully endorsed the harshest criticisms of his work as superficial and meaningless. Mr. Trump does.

An open letter from his former strategist Stephanie Cegielski reveals that, when he planned his campaign, Mr Trump was just on an ego trip with no intention of winning. But now, he can’t stop because “Trump is about Trump”.  He’s never wrong and he never fails.

Warhol famously imagined everyone being “world famous for at least 15 minutes”. The quixotic quest for narcissistic publicity is the essence of the celebrity, consumer culture simulacrum that is the Trump campaign. It’s flat as a Campbell’s Soup painting and empty as a plywood Brillo Box.