Monthly Archives: January 2016

If Saudi-Iranian tensions are to ease, proper dialogue is needed

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/if-tensions-are-to-ease-off-proper-dialogue-is-needed

For those hoping for greater stability in the Middle East, this has
been a discouraging week. The intensified standoff between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, backed by their regional allies, is one of the most
ominous developments in many months. This is not only a severe fault
line between two major regional powers. It also intensifies the
sectarianism that increasingly defines regional dynamics and
identities, and which threatens to divide the Muslims of the Middle
East into bitterly antagonistic rival camps into the foreseeable
future.

This current wave of intensification was kicked off by the Saudi
execution of a dissident Shia cleric, Nimr Al Nimr, who has repeatedly
called for the secession of the oil-rich Eastern Province and was
accused of promoting violence in that cause. Nimr was arrested in 2012
and sentenced to death in 2014, but was only executed last week.

The Saudi authorities must have known that this execution would
provoke a significant backlash from Iran and many Shia organisations
and constituencies in the Arab world.

Moreover, it seems to contradict a number of gestures towards
conciliation, including the restoration of full diplomatic relations
with Iraq, preparations to send a new ambassador to Iran and
substantive discussions with the Iranian officials on the fringes of
the Syrian peace talks.

It’s likely that the proximate cause for the execution of Nimr and
three other Shiite activists was the simultaneous mass execution of
more than 40 Sunni extremists associated with Al Qaeda.

Those executions also come in the context of the formation of a
Saudi-led antiterrorism alliance and other measures aimed primarily at
Sunni radicals such as ISIL and Al Qaeda. The inclusion of a small
number of radical Shias in the execution list may well have been an
effort to appear “even-handed”, particularly to domestic political
constituencies.

Although some claim that Saudi Arabia was acting in a “panicked”
manner because many of its policies seem to be going badly, and its
economy is in the doldrums, the real message appears to be one of
determination and defiance.

Riyadh appears to be telling both Sunni and Shia radicals that they
will find little space to operate within the kingdom. Iran and its
clients are being put on notice that Saudi Arabia and its allies are
not only ready to meet any challenge, but are even prepared to raise
the stakes. And the US is being reminded that, given the perceived
absence of American leadership, Saudi Arabia is prepared to define its
own security measures and pursue its national interests with a much
greater degree of independence from Washington.

Many observers, particularly in the West, have reacted angrily to the
Saudi move, decrying an apparent sectarian provocation that could only
have had the effect of exacerbating Sunni-Shiite tensions. And,
indeed, this is what has, predictably, occurred. But what’s missing
from this analysis is that Riyadh is merely playing catch-up to
Tehran.

Iran’s sectarian regional politics are so deeply entrenched that no
one notices them anymore. They appear to be “normal”. But, of course,
they are not. Iran worked for decades to unite Shia and quasi-Shia
communities across the Middle East in its orbit, drawing in the Syrian
regime, Hizbollah in Lebanon, many of the Shiite parties in Iraq, the
Houthis in Yemen and so forth.

Hamas was once the exception that proved the rule, being a Muslim
Brotherhood party that was also a part of the pro-Iranian alliance.

However, after the outbreak of the conflict in Syria, Hamas was forced
by Damascus and Tehran to choose sides, and it could not remain
aligned with what was clearly a sectarian Shia coalition. It was, in
effect, expelled from the Iranian alliance because of its opposition
to the Bashar Al Assad regime once the Syrian uprising really caught
fire.

While it might be fair to decry the exploitation of sectarian
sensibilities by both countries, it’s preposterous to imply that Saudi
Arabia is exacerbating religious divisions without acknowledging that
this has been Iran’s modus operandi for decades, since at least the
outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, if not from the very outset of the
Islamic Republic.

Yet the situation is alarming and dangerous, and there are faults on both sides.

While it is extremely unlikely that there will be a direct military
confrontation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, both countries are now
involved in directly combating each other’s clients.

In Yemen, Saudi Arabia and its allies are directly confronting the
Iranian-backed Houthi rebels, while in Syria, Iranian forces have
joined with Syrian government, Russian, Hizbollah and even Iraqi
militia forces in combating Saudi-backed Syrian rebels.

With the breaking of diplomatic relations with Iran and the suspension
of even trade links by Saudi Arabia, following the outrageous attack
by government-backed Iranian mobs against the Saudi embassy in Tehran,
tensions have reached a new high.

It’s in everyone’s interests that the parties pull back and resume
efforts to create a constructive dialogue. But for that to happen,
enlightened self-interest and responsible behaviour are going to have
to replace the current atmosphere of mutual fear, suspicion and
loathing. Right now, that seems a tall order indeed.

What’s Behind the Saudi-Iranian Flare-up?

http://www.agsiw.org/whats-behind-the-saudi-iranian-flareup/

The January 2 execution by Saudi Arabia of 47 people on terrorism charges and the backlash it provoked have sent shockwaves through the diplomatic and political landscape of the Middle East. Forty-three of the condemned were Sunni extremists, mostly associated with al-Qaeda. However, four were Shia activists, including the prominent dissident cleric, Nimr al-Nimr, who had emerged over the past few years as a leader of the protest movement among Saudi Shias in the restive and oil-rich Eastern Province. Nimr’s execution has significantly inflamed the already volatile sectarian tensions throughout the region, and led to a diplomatic crisis between Saudi Arabia and Iran – each backed by their allies – that will almost certainly prove difficult to repair and possibly even contain.

The Iranian response to Nimr’s execution was as predictable as it was irresponsible. The Saudi embassy in Tehran was sacked and burned by mobs clearly acting with the acquiescence, if not the approval, of the Iranian government. Targeting foreign embassies has been a favored way of expressing dismay by the Iranian regime since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, beginning with the targeting of the American embassy and its staff. Since then, there have been numerous instances in which Iran has expressed its objections to the actions or policies of other states by attacking their embassies in Tehran. So it’s not surprising that the Saudi embassy met the same fate over the weekend, although there are reports that Iran, which is seeking greater international acceptance, has apologized for the attack and promised the UN Security Council that diplomatic missions will not be targeted in the future.

The Saudi response – breaking diplomatic relations with Iran – raises the stakes even further. Long-time regional rivals, there had been recent signs of some thawing of tensions between Riyadh and Tehran. The two sides were beginning to talk to each other about a substantive issue of grave disagreement for the first time in years on the periphery of Syrian peace talks. Moreover, Saudi Arabia was preparing to send a new ambassador to Iran, and had just dispatched an ambassador to Iraq after some 25 years of prolonged estrangement.

All of that apparent progress has been overtaken by events of recent days. From the American perspective, a whole series of complications now arises, involving not only the search for peace in Syria, but also the campaign against ISIL, efforts to end the conflict in Yemen, and important diplomacy on issues in Iraq, Lebanon, and elsewhere in the region.

The timing of the executions isn’t easy to explain. But several crucial factors are clear. The most important is that Saudi Arabia almost certainly acted with an awareness of the potential implications the execution of Nimr was likely to have among Shias throughout the region. The messages Saudi Arabia appears to be trying to send to multiple audiences are therefore intelligible.

First, Iran and its allies have once again, and perhaps more starkly than ever, been put on notice that Saudi Arabia is not only prepared for region-wide standoff, but is even willing to raise the stakes. It is a defiant gesture by Riyadh, and in keeping with a policy initiative being pursued by King Salman since his ascendancy that emphasizes greater Saudi resistance towards Tehran and its regional ambitions. It is significant that Nimr was arrested in 2012 and sentenced to death in 2014 under the reign of Salman’s predecessor, King Abdullah, but was not executed. This is, therefore, another example of a change in policy driven by the new king, seemingly with the support of Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef and, one must assume, his son Mohammed bin Salman, the youthful but hawkish defense minister and deputy crown prince.

Second, Shia dissidents in the Gulf Arab states, including in Saudi Arabia itself, as well as Bahrain and elsewhere, are being clearly told that there are strict limits to how much dissent will be tolerated. Joseph Braude has explained the Saudi government’s attitude towards Nimr, and its perception of him as a dangerous and violent subversive, which helps explain why he was executed despite the predictably negative consequences. A different, and also useful, perspective on the rise of Nimr to prominence was recounted in the now-defunct “Riyadh bureau” website. Both perspectives are worth considering, along with others. Nimr aside, the status of Shias in Saudi Arabia must be addressed or it will remain a source of instability in the Kingdom for the foreseeable future.

Third, the vast majority of those executed were Sunni extremists associated with al-Qaeda. The message to Sunni extremists and self-described “jihadists” is a familiar one: their activities inside Saudi Arabia will be met with the harshest penalties. ISIL, too, is a target, since the execution of Shia activists, including Nimr, will have the effect, even if unintended, of undermining the group’s claims to be a Sunni “vanguard” against Shia assertiveness in the region. The blow to Sunni terrorists is therefore two-pronged: first is the fact of the executions themselves and all that they imply about the willingness of the Saudi authorities to crack down on extremists; second is a political attack on the sectarian claims of the terrorists.

One possible explanation for the decision to execute Nimr and other Shia activists at this time is that the Saudi government did not want to be perceived as simply targeting Sunni extremists by executing 43 al-Qaeda members. By executing Nimr and the other three Shia activists, Riyadh may have been attempting to appear “evenhanded.” This is especially plausible given the recent establishment of an Islamic antiterrorism alliance, and other Saudi-led initiatives targeting ISIL and al-Qaeda. But if so, the attempt at balance may have only succeeded in the narrowest possible domestic context, while regionally and internationally the execution of Nimr overshadows all other aspects of the event.

Fourth, the United States is once again being reminded that Saudi Arabia has concluded that American leadership is lacking and that it will pursue its internal security and regional interests in a more proactive and independent manner than it has in the past. Although there were many warnings in recent weeks that a wide-scale Saudi execution was in the works, most Western diplomats and multinational organizations did not expect Saudi Arabia to put Nimr to death. Washington is likely to move quickly to try to ascertain what Saudi Arabia is hoping to accomplish through this action and to begin to repair the perceived damage done to the key American foreign policy concerns cited above. No one should be surprised if Secretary of State John Kerry personally visits Riyadh in the very near future, since this is both his leadership style and would clearly be warranted by the gravity of the diplomatic and political crisis and its impact on the efforts to begin negotiations on Syria.

Saudi Arabia faces significant problems on multiple fronts, including new and serious domestic and foreign policy concerns. Its economy is suffering considerably from the low cost of petroleum, which, for complex reasons, Riyadh itself is helping to maintain. Current tensions with Iran don’t bode well for stability of oil pricing either. This economic pressure on the Saudi social and political system may help to explain the timing of the executions. The Saudi government faces a period of unprecedented belt-tightening, with unavoidable cuts in public services, amenities, subsidies, and other social benefits that the citizenry has come to expect over recent decades. Potential domestic discontent over this new period of quasi-austerity in Saudi Arabia cannot be allowed to spill over into challenges to the system. Therefore, the government may have been prompted to send a clear signal at this moment to Sunni extremists and Shia dissidents alike that any efforts to take advantage of the developing economic and social challenges will not be tolerated. Moreover, the Saudi-led Arab intervention in Yemen appears bogged down, even as reports surface that the Saudi-backed Jaysh al-Islam opposition group in Syria has suffered a series of recent setbacks since the killing of its leader, Zahran Alloush, apparently by a Russian airstrike in December.

Yet the Saudi attitude, as expressed in the executions and subsequent policy decisions, appears to be highly confident, if not brash. Other states have joined Saudi Arabia in breaking ties with Tehran, including Sudan and Bahrain. The United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, however, merely downgraded their ties to Iran – a move that is easily reversible – while fully maintaining trade links. And, as a useful reminder of the diversity within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Oman publicly criticized the Saudi move.

Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia may come to welcome American engagement (if it materializes) on these issues in the coming weeks, especially if Riyadh begins to feel that the consequences of its actions are less manageable than it had anticipated. The complete severing of diplomatic ties with Iran leaves Riyadh little wiggle room to resume high-level diplomacy without some kind of public explanation of what has changed. That could prove politically awkward even if it becomes desirable as policy. The internal blowback within Saudi Arabia is already problematic, with at least one Shia protester killed in Qatif in clashes with the authorities. The White House says it warned Saudi Arabia about the consequences of executing Nimr. Should Riyadh be persuaded that Washington is prepared to reengage in these issues with the Kingdom’s best interests in mind, this could reduce the current level of tension in U.S.-Saudi relations and perhaps repair whatever damage has been done to prospects for greater regional stability.

2015 was Quietly Decisive on Many Key Mideast Issues

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/as-obama-looked-for-an-exit-putin-seized-his-chance

Appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, 2015 was a decisive year and even a turning point on several of the most pressing issues facing the Middle East. What looks like chaos and confusion has actually forced clarity on the key players.

It may well be remembered as the year in which the United States, perhaps irrevocably, abandoned its role as the guarantor of the Middle Eastern political order. It’s still true that the US remains the most powerful military force in the region. But the impression that Washington is very reluctant to use its power to try to shape Middle Eastern realities, except under the most extreme circumstances, has become almost universal.

In the magazine Foreign Affairs, Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson argue that the end of the “pax Americana” in the Middle East is both rational, given the supposedly dwindling importance of the region, and a restoration of the traditional policy that had been temporarily abandoned by the George W Bush administration. But current policies can hardly be simultaneously both a restoration of tradition and a response to new developments. In fact, they are an overcorrection whereby Washington is behaving as if it had much less power and influence than it actually does or it could have.

Russia’s intervention in Syria was a dramatic demonstration of how this is playing out. It may have appeared sudden, but Vladimir Putin has spent the past few years taking the measure of American determination, and testing the waters globally in Ukraine and elsewhere. He also carefully watched the growing role in Syria of Iran, Hizbollah and Iraqi Shia militias. From all this, he correctly concluded that he could intervene in Syria without any serious pushback from Washington.

American officials have been quoted recently as saying that they believe the Russian intervention has been quite successful. The official US response has amounted to little more than a shrug.

Russia’s actual military and economic power is dwarfed by that of the US. But Russia has the will to act and to try to shape outcomes to suit its purposes while, at least in Syria, the US does not. It’s going to be extremely difficult for any future American administration to reverse, let alone fully correct, the impression created recently, especially in 2015, that the US has lost, or voluntarily surrendered, much of its regional influence.

Last year was also decisive for the Arab confrontation with the transnational terrorist movement that has arisen on the fringes of its own societies. The rise and spread of ISIL over the past year has emerged as a such a clear-cut, unmistakable and universal threat that it’s now or never for the Arab world.

Many Arab states have mobilised with some success against extremists within their own societies. But what is required – and is now being attempted by initiatives such as the Saudi-led antiterrorism alliance – is a collective effort operating simultaneously on the military, law-enforcement, ideological and religious fronts. Piecemeal, individual efforts by dozens of Arab and Muslim states can only go so far.

Yet there is a long history of failed efforts to create functional Arab and Muslim security alliances, so scepticism is inevitable. If the present threat isn’t sufficient to produce such unprecedented cooperation, it’s hard to imagine what would be. So the real question is whether or not these societies are capable of coordinated security approaches that involve mutual trust and the surrender of some sovereign authority. This vital, and potentially existential, question has been posed over the past year, and will be answered in the coming ones.

Relations between the Arab states and Iran may also have reached a quietly decisive moment in 2015. The international nuclear agreement effectively means the diplomatic rehabilitation of Tehran, at least in the eyes of the West. The choice now is clearly one between open-ended confrontation for the foreseeable future or a gradual move towards accommodation.

The conflict in Syria looks like the template for endless discord, but at least Riyadh and Tehran are once again speaking to each other on the margins of the Vienna process on Syrian peace.

The outlines of an accommodation began to emerge clearly in 2015. Iran will play a greater role in the Arab world than most Arabs have traditionally been comfortable with, particularly in countries such as Iraq and Lebanon. But Iran’s role in Syria in particular, as well as Yemen and other Arab states, cannot continue as it is now. It basically means the Arab states agreeing to an Iranian sphere of influence that includes parts of the Arab world, but Iran accepting some pullback from the status quo.

Such an arrangement is theoretically workable, and the outlines of such an understanding have been defined with considerable specificity over the past 12 months. Whether it can be mutually acceptable and implemented will only be answered by future choices.

The past year provided a great deal of clarity about some of the most important decisions facing the main players in the Middle East. For a region that has often been opaque, such precision should be welcome and refreshing. But that requires the responsible parties to choose wisely.