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On Friday, the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution on Syria, calling for a ceasefire and negotiations between the government and the mainstream opposition groups. This resolution retroactively gives the highest level of international diplomatic endorsement and legal credibility to the Vienna process and its conclusions thus far. But, even as that process continues to develop and gain momentum, several things must happen before any serious progress on the ground becomes a realistic possibility.
Diplomacy on Syria has moved farther and faster than almost anyone anticipated. Between a series of meetings in October and November in Vienna, the newly-established International Syria Support Group has laid out a series of measures, now endorsed by the Security Council, to begin the political transition in Syria.
The group includes not only the key global players such as Russia and the United States, but also the leading regional players, including the most significant supporters of the opposition – Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar – as well as pro-regime stalwarts, Iran.
It seems the main global actors in Syria are keen on finding an agreement to de-escalate this incredibly destabilising conflict. However, some of the most important regional powers may not be quite as ready. And as for the local Syrian parties, thus far they show no sign of really being willing to seriously negotiate an end to their conflict.
Moscow and Washington still must come to an understanding regarding the future of Bashar Al Assad. This is not impossible. Russia could almost certainly secure its primary interests, especially its military assets in the country, and above all its priceless warm water port in Tartus, through a government not led by Mr Al Assad.
The US, after years of insisting that he has “lost all credibility” and “must go”, has recently taken the rather strange position that, although his departure remains essential, “it doesn’t have to be on day one or month one” but rather be negotiated.
Last week, secretary of state John Kerry went even further, saying that “the US and our partners are not seeking so-called regime change, as it is known, in Syria”, but that, “what we have said is that we don’t believe that Assad himself has the ability to lead the future Syria”.
Given that Russia can almost certainly do without Mr Al Assad personally, and the US appears to be losing interest in seeing the back of him right away, the two parties are not that far apart. Still, the Americans and Russians would have to find a formula on Mr Al Assad’s future that is sellable to the Syrian opposition if it wants an agreement to end the fighting.
The regional powers, however, remain very far apart. Hizbollah, and probably Iran too, cannot do without Mr Al Assad. They will undoubtedly fight tooth and nail to preserve his rule and his personal, physical presence in office. They just can’t trust anybody else to maintain the same level of commitment to their much more complex and detailed interests.
Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, on the other hand, remain absolutely committed to an outcome that not only doesn’t include Mr Al Assad, but that doesn’t subject the country to a “transition period” that he could use to manoeuvre his way out of any anticipated departure.
Moreover, neither the regional supporters nor the opponents of the regime are likely, at this stage, to voluntarily go along with any Russian-American compromise on Mr Al Assad. They either want him to stay or to go, end of story. It’s hard to imagine what would shift their thinking, given the stakes they believe are in play, both in Syria itself and because of the effect the outcome of the conflict will have on the regional balance of power.
Yet, on the sidelines of the Vienna process, Saudi Arabia and Iran are talking again. That might one day prove its biggest accomplishment.
The Syrian calculation is even starker when it comes to local forces. Mr Al Assad says he wants negotiations, but won’t talk to terrorists, and “anyone who has a machine-gun is a terrorist”. The opposition regards him as the ultimate terrorist, and morally and legally responsible for the hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of displacements caused by the conflict.
The regime and its supporters in Syria can’t imagine the country in any other hands, whereas the opposition can only imagine Mr Al Assad’s future as being in the dock at an international criminal tribunal.
The bottom line is this: because of developments in 2015, both the government and the opposition think they could strengthen their hands through further fighting. They may both be kidding themselves, but that’s clearly the hope. And under such circumstances, they are going to continue fighting no matter what their regional patrons, and still less their global supporters, have to say.
The development of an international framework for transition towards peace in Syria can only be a useful thing. But until the global players can find a formula for Mr Al Assad’s future that is acceptable to the key regional powers, and the local forces realise that ending the conflict is in their interests, the fighting in Syria is, alas, bound to continue.