http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/trump-taps-into-the-rage-of-anxious-american-men#full

Christmas Day finds the US Republican Party more than ever in the grip of Donald Trump and all that he represents. A few weeks away from the Iowa caucus, and then the first primary in New Hampshire, his lead in the opinion polls is wider than ever. He leads the latest CNN poll with a whopping 39 per cent of Republican and Republican-leaning registered voters, more than double his nearest rival. The Trump phenomenon is no longer an aberration. It is now of historical significance.

A series of incredibly offensive comments, blatant falsehoods, cringe-inducing braggadocio, mind-boggling flip-flops, and juvenile outbursts have only strengthened his position. Moreover, the pushback against him by other Republicans has been timid and totally ineffective. It’s clear to everyone that he is tapping into something profound on the American political right.

But what would that be? The unstated, but unmistakable, unifying theme of his campaign is anger. Many of his supporters don’t consciously recognise this. They find his “Make America Great Again!” motif inspiring and even Reagan-esque. But unconsciously it inspires the question of what – and, more importantly, who – damaged the United States such that it needs repairing. The answer is almost always the wrong kind of people.

Immigrants – legal and illegal – are the main target for Mr Trump. He is playing on a raw, visceral nativism that laments the loss of a normative America defined by English-speaking, white and middle-class citizens. He is appealing to those who can no longer recognise the country they once knew, and who feel marginalised and excluded, as if immigrants, African Americans and other minorities have hijacked their USA.

Mr Trump especially appeals to those white American males who feel blamed, collectively, for all the ills of society, and that they, alone, can be vilified not only without restraint, but also usually with applause. This narrative insists that, in reality, it is actually these middle-class white American males who are being unfairly economically disadvantaged. Mr Trump, the billionaire, is cleverly exploiting the anger of those who feel, often with complete justification, that they are inexorably slipping from the middle class into the bulging ranks of the working poor.

Immigrants and other minorities could not have accomplished this grand theft without the connivance of traitorous “liberal elites”. Money-grubbing corporations, the mainstream media, academic snobs, arrogant intellectuals and the hated federal government bureaucracy are the core of the liberal cabal that betrayed “real Americans” for ideological or selfish reasons, and consciously and cynically degraded the country. This imaginary grand betrayal is at the centre of Trumpian rage.

The Republican Party establishment is seen as part of the problem. It is either too weak or compromised by corporate and other interests to effectively defend the country. Only – or even especially – someone unquestionably outside of the thoroughly corrupted system can possibly hope to rehabilitate it.

Narratives about radical, emergency measures needed to reverse national devastation caused by parasitical minorities empowered by back-stabbing elites must be immediately recognisable as the stuff of fascism. Yet it’s not clear what, if anything, Mr Trump actually believes. He hardly seems a would-be dictator. His campaign most often comes across as a gigantic ego trip, and sometimes even an incredibly elaborate practical joke.

But what explains the eagerness with which his lies, fabrications and reversals are championed by his supporters? It somehow doesn’t matter that his wild claims about blacks being responsible for most murders of whites, or thousands of Muslims in New Jersey celebrating the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, or Barack Obama not having been born in the United States, are demonstrably and incontrovertibly false.

The facts aren’t relevant. All that’s important is the sentiment, even if expressed through evident lies. The emotional “truths” they articulate are much more meaningful than the claims themselves, and therefore their veracity is incidental. It’s true anyway, even if it’s false – truer than the truth, indeed all the more true for being a lie.

Mr Trump promotes a mentality that is bitterly hostile to inconvenient facts, which are dismissed as “political correctness”, and enthusiastically embraces comforting inversions of reality over painful truths. Yet Mr Trump – unquestionably the most brazen liar in modern American national political campaigns – is consistently lauded by his supporters for his courageous “honesty”. They insist that he, alone among politicians, tells the truth, while in fact he has set a new standard for shameless dishonesty. Some of his enthusiasts even assert that he is “humble”.

But the grim reality is that his preposterous fantasies are promoting fear and hatred of immigrants, of minorities, of “liberal elites” and of others who are supposedly destroying the country and who therefore, by unmistakable implication, must themselves be confronted and destroyed.

Mr Trump is playing with fire. It may be that doesn’t fully realise the potential destructive power of the rage his rhetoric is fuelling. Even if he does, he certainly doesn’t seem to care.

This Pied Piper of paranoia and chauvinism surely won’t end up as president, and maybe not even the Republican nominee. But his breathtakingly irresponsible demagoguery has already done profound damage to both his party and American political culture.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/peace-remains-a-distant-elusive-prospect-in-syria

On Friday, the UN Security Council passed a unanimous resolution on Syria, calling for a ceasefire and negotiations between the government and the mainstream opposition groups. This resolution retroactively gives the highest level of international diplomatic endorsement and legal credibility to the Vienna process and its conclusions thus far. But, even as that process continues to develop and gain momentum, several things must happen before any serious progress on the ground becomes a realistic possibility.

Diplomacy on Syria has moved farther and faster than almost anyone anticipated. Between a series of meetings in October and November in Vienna, the newly-established International Syria Support Group has laid out a series of measures, now endorsed by the Security Council, to begin the political transition in Syria.

The group includes not only the key global players such as Russia and the United States, but also the leading regional players, including the most significant supporters of the opposition – Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar – as well as pro-regime stalwarts, Iran.

It seems the main global actors in Syria are keen on finding an agreement to de-escalate this incredibly destabilising conflict. However, some of the most important regional powers may not be quite as ready. And as for the local Syrian parties, thus far they show no sign of really being willing to seriously negotiate an end to their conflict.

Moscow and Washington still must come to an understanding regarding the future of Bashar Al Assad. This is not impossible. Russia could almost certainly secure its primary interests, especially its military assets in the country, and above all its priceless warm water port in Tartus, through a government not led by Mr Al Assad.

The US, after years of insisting that he has “lost all credibility” and “must go”, has recently taken the rather strange position that, although his departure remains essential, “it doesn’t have to be on day one or month one” but rather be negotiated.

Last week, secretary of state John Kerry went even further, saying that “the US and our partners are not seeking so-called regime change, as it is known, in Syria”, but that, “what we have said is that we don’t believe that Assad himself has the ability to lead the future Syria”.

Given that Russia can almost certainly do without Mr Al Assad personally, and the US appears to be losing interest in seeing the back of him right away, the two parties are not that far apart. Still, the Americans and Russians would have to find a formula on Mr Al Assad’s future that is sellable to the Syrian opposition if it wants an agreement to end the fighting.

The regional powers, however, remain very far apart. Hizbollah, and probably Iran too, cannot do without Mr Al Assad. They will undoubtedly fight tooth and nail to preserve his rule and his personal, physical presence in office. They just can’t trust anybody else to maintain the same level of commitment to their much more complex and detailed interests.

Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar, on the other hand, remain absolutely committed to an outcome that not only doesn’t include Mr Al Assad, but that doesn’t subject the country to a “transition period” that he could use to manoeuvre his way out of any anticipated departure.

Moreover, neither the regional supporters nor the opponents of the regime are likely, at this stage, to voluntarily go along with any Russian-American compromise on Mr Al Assad. They either want him to stay or to go, end of story. It’s hard to imagine what would shift their thinking, given the stakes they believe are in play, both in Syria itself and because of the effect the outcome of the conflict will have on the regional balance of power.

Yet, on the sidelines of the Vienna process, Saudi Arabia and Iran are talking again. That might one day prove its biggest accomplishment.

The Syrian calculation is even starker when it comes to local forces. Mr Al Assad says he wants negotiations, but won’t talk to terrorists, and “anyone who has a machine-gun is a terrorist”. The opposition regards him as the ultimate terrorist, and morally and legally responsible for the hundreds of thousands of deaths and millions of displacements caused by the conflict.

The regime and its supporters in Syria can’t imagine the country in any other hands, whereas the opposition can only imagine Mr Al Assad’s future as being in the dock at an international criminal tribunal.

The bottom line is this: because of developments in 2015, both the government and the opposition think they could strengthen their hands through further fighting. They may both be kidding themselves, but that’s clearly the hope. And under such circumstances, they are going to continue fighting no matter what their regional patrons, and still less their global supporters, have to say.

The development of an international framework for transition towards peace in Syria can only be a useful thing. But until the global players can find a formula for Mr Al Assad’s future that is acceptable to the key regional powers, and the local forces realise that ending the conflict is in their interests, the fighting in Syria is, alas, bound to continue.

http://www.agsiw.org/what-to-expect-from-riyadhs-new-islamic-counterterrorism-alliance/

The announcement in Paris on Tuesday that Saudi Arabia has taken the initiative to form a 34-member “Islamic military alliance” is, in theory at least, one of the most dramatic international counterterrorism moves in many years. The coming together of so many Muslim countries to combat terrorism — not only through military action, but also through “stopping the flow of funds” to violent radicals and “confronting the ideology of extremism” — ought to be enormously important.

Only time will tell whether this initiative has a real impact on stemming the rise of terrorist groups or proves, for one reason or another, to be essentially ineffective, or even counterproductive. It is, of course, high time that Muslim states band together to confront the radicals that threaten them all. But there are numerous pitfalls that could bedevil the formation and operation of such an alliance.

It seems clear from statements by Saudi officials such as Deputy Crown Prince and Defense Minister Mohammed bin Salman, who appears to have been the key figure in its formation, that the new alliance will operate essentially as was anticipated for a much-ballyhooed, but as yet unrealized, Arab League joint military command. The Arab League’s participating states in both alliances would have the prerogative of requesting various forms of assistance from the alliance in the case of a crisis.

In other words, the alliance wouldn’t act unless it was specifically asked to do so by the state in whose territory the terrorist activity is taking place. Many countries may be reluctant to ask for help. This core organizing structure ensures that if a government, for its own domestic political reasons or some other concerns, insists on pretending that there isn’t a problem or that it is contained, or that they do not need external aid. The alliance then would not intervene no matter how worrisome the situation becomes.

Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir said that such assistance will be provided on a “case-by-case basis,” with each government making its own decisions regarding asking for, or providing, this kind of support, which could include “military training or equipment or… technical assistance in terms of messaging… to counter the ideology of violent extremism.” The available help includes, by implication, everything up to and including direct foreign military intervention.

Therefore, the activities of the new alliance, as they are presently conceptualized, are so broad, vague, and contingent on so many variables, that they might be difficult to implement in a meaningful way. It won’t be easy to translate this broad, aspirational language into kinetic action on the ground. Yet rapid and decisive action by this alliance will ultimately be the sine qua non of its worth as a counterterrorism initiative.

There are significant grounds to wonder whether or not this alliance can become a significant military and political force. Arab states have unsuccessfully pursued military alliances among themselves for many decades, and, as noted above, recent efforts to create a joint Arab League, and even just a joint Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) command, have yet to move beyond the planning phases. This new grouping is even larger, and, on that basis, as well as because of its broad, expansive mission, arguably more difficult to implement. Can this new plan work when simpler efforts along similar lines have failed so consistently in the past?

The costs of launching an initiative that proves practically ineffective could be steep. It could damage these countries’ credibility (particularly Saudi Arabia’s), strengthen the confidence of extremists, dismay moderates, and convince others in the international community, especially in the West, that this is “yet another” instance of Arab and Muslim states vowing to take action against terrorism but proving unable to do so in a truly effective way. The whole thing could be dismissed as an exercise in public diplomacy, or even “spin,” following the Paris and San Bernardino massacres.

Issues are also raised by what countries have been left, or opted, out of the new alliance. For instance, one noteworthy absence is Algeria, one of the Arab states that has been most experienced and successful in combating Islamist terrorism, with a large and very well-equipped military. Algeria has a long-established go-it-alone attitude, and therefore, might have been expected to at least take a wait-and-see approach to this new alliance. But its absence leaves an obvious gap in the group, to be sure.

There are also questions raised by the fact that the new alliance is almost entirely a Sunni affair. Missing from the group are Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Lebanon was initially listed among the participants but apparently Beirut will not be involved, presumably due to the heavy influence Hezbollah has in its national government. Bahrain, a Gulf Arab state with a Shia majority but Sunni ruling family, is a member, reflecting its government’s close ties to Riyadh. But it is very much the exception that proves the rule. Other Gulf Arab states such as Oman apparently declined to join the group, preferring, as is its general practice, to avoid broad alliances, especially on counterterrorism, and to maintain an independent foreign policy within the general context of the GCC.

There is an obvious argument in defense of the “Sunni character” of the new alliance: its primary targets must and will be radical Sunni Islamist terrorist groups. Therefore, the inclusion of Iran and any of its allies, or other clear-cut Shia powers, could render the organization ineffective and even counterproductive in gaining the support of the constituencies it is trying to address.

However, this “Sunni identity” of the new alliance means that it could end up reinforcing some of the most problematic fault-lines in the region, both within and between states. Shia powers and societies could feel excluded and even targeted. However, given that the terrorist groups that will be the primary targets of this new alliance are radical Sunni and are a mortal threat to Shias, should be a source of reassurance to Shia powers.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/opinion/who-is-a-muslim.html?ref=opinion

WASHINGTON — Donald J. Trump’s scandalous proposal that the United States bar entry to all Muslims — though he later clarified his view that American citizens and a few others might be allowed in — raises two fundamental but largely unaddressed questions: Who and what is a “Muslim”?

Mr. Trump presupposes that the government could create an immigration policy that discriminates against Muslims. But implementing such a policy would be completely impossible under the current circumstances.

How would consular or immigration officials determine who is, and is not, a Muslim? This is the most obvious question, but almost no one is asking it. Instead, the debate churns on as if this problem does not exist.

Would the definition of a Muslim be based on family heritage, personal beliefs or both? How would that be codified in practice? On what basis could the government categorize people as Muslims? We have no legal definition or database of religious beliefs, and the First Amendment would almost certainly render any such enforced categorization unconstitutional.

My own case is instructive. I am a citizen of the United States but born in a Muslim-majority country (Lebanon), and, on my father’s side, into a clearly Muslim family. Moreover, my first name, Hussein, is one of a few in Arabic that is practically exclusive to Muslims (Arab Christians and Jews are not given this name).

While my father was a devout Sunni Muslim, my mother remains a devout Anglican Christian. So, despite my name and place of birth being clear indicators of a “Muslim origin,” the reality is more complex.

Moreover, I never embraced either religion, and had agnostic tendencies even as a child. Yet I identify with the Muslim-American community for social, cultural and political reasons. I am part of, and from, the Muslim community, but in terms of belief I am not and never have been a Muslim. So, how would I be categorized?

What if someone isn’t telling the truth about his beliefs? What about a sudden conversion? How would the government distinguish among Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and others from the myriad mixed societies around the world? Even a database of names wouldn’t help, since so many names are shared among different cultures and faiths. Therefore, Mr. Trump’s policy is totally impracticable, especially since would-be terrorists and criminals would be the first to embrace all forms of deception.

Beyond the complexities of determining “who is a Muslim,” an even deeper problem is the widely held delusions about “what is a Muslim.” An overwhelming majority of commentators on all sides, ranging from the most vicious Islamophobes to the most radical Islamists, wrongly assume that we all know, or can easily discover, what Muslims do and think that distinguishes them from other people.

The reality is that the range of peoples and societies that practice some form of Islam is so broad that it includes virtually any aspect of the human experience one can identify. Nearly one-quarter of the world’s population consider themselves Muslim, and Islam has been one of the largest religions in the world for over 1,000 years.

Seen in this light, the range of Muslim beliefs and behaviors is more or less indistinguishable from that of the rest of humanity. The word “Muslim,” without any further qualification, and the word “person,” are, for practical purposes, synonymous. One doesn’t actually tell you anything meaningful beyond what is already suggested by the other.

Both now and historically, one can find almost any recognizable human behavior being openly and systematically practiced among some Muslims, including those that are supposedly “prohibited by Islam”: alcohol drinking, homosexuality, lending at interest, occult practices and so forth. Muslim purists say these are cultural distortions, and not Islamic. But Muslims have no pope or global leader with the spiritual or political authority to compel or demand obedience to their doctrinal views.

Islamophobes describe bloodthirsty, violent and intolerant fanatics. Muslim activists depict devout, socially conservative people peacefully at prayer. Although the first group is minuscule compared with the second, Muslims of both descriptions can be readily identified. But so can a vast range of other ways of being Muslim the world over.

Anyone interested in exploring the intricacies and complexities of Islam as a religion, philosophical system and social text should study the new book “What Is Islam?” by the Harvard professor Shahab Ahmed. Professor Ahmed — who died at the age of 48 shortly before this book, his life’s work, was published a few months ago — carefully guides the reader through a detailed critique of the numerous received understandings of Islam. In their place, he proposes a subtle but accessible new framework for apprehending what Islam is and has really been, in all its multiplicity and endless complexity.

His book is a perfect antidote to our present discourse, which is trapped in false, dangerous binaries, about these two crucial questions: Who, and what, is a Muslim? Those like Mr. Trump and others who imply they know the answers are announcing with the utmost clarity that they actually have no idea what they’re talking about.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/riyadh-was-an-important-step-for-the-syrian-crisis#full

The meeting of Syrian opposition groups in Saudi Arabia last week was neither an unqualified success nor, as some claim, a “fiasco”. The complex task of trying to organise the fractious Syrian opposition was certainly advanced, but was akin to herding cats.

The Riyadh meeting comes primarily in the context of several international meetings in Vienna that transformed the diplomatic landscape on Syria by outlining an ambitious framework for peace. It calls for an immediate ceasefire and UN-brokered talks between the regime and the opposition to begin by January 1, followed by elections within 18 months. The Americans supported the expedited timetable to emphasise the need for action.

Moreover, Washington reversed its demand that Iran agree to the 2012 “Geneva communiqué”. Iran never did, but was invited to Vienna anyway.

All of this added urgency to an existing Saudi plan to create an opposition umbrella. Planning for the conference had been in the works for almost a year. But Vienna added pressure and created a make-or-break atmosphere. Either the meeting would show that progress towards opposition unity is possible or demonstrate that it’s practically impossible.

In the event, the Riyadh conference did succeed in producing a joint platform agreed by almost all of the participants, which is what many observers had identified as the essential test for success or failure.

It calls for Bashar Al Assad to step down at the start of a negotiated “transitional period”, which will produce a “democratic mechanism through a pluralistic regime that represents all sectors of the Syrian people”.

The mere fact that this incredibly disparate bunch was able to agree to any common language at all is itself something of an achievement. No one expected them to fully come together after one short meeting. Washington, for instance, welcomed its “positive outcome”.

Unfortunately, even the vagueness of the joint statement, and the fact that the Syrian opposition is still enormously divided, aren’t the biggest problems.

The ultraconservative Ahrar Al Sham militia, which is one of the larger armed rebel groups, was always going to be the biggest headache at the meeting, and for all serious efforts to unite the opposition under the current circumstances. The group’s attendance was in some doubt, because of its radical agenda. It insists on the establishment of an “Islamic” state in Syria, which none of the other main factions believe is essential. Worse, it has frequently co-operated with the Al Qaeda franchise in Syria, Jabhat Al Nusra.

Its association with Al Qaeda, naturally, makes Ahrar Al Sham unacceptable to the US and very unpalatable to Saudi Arabia and the other key opposition sponsors, Turkey and Qatar.

The organisation is under heavy pressure from other rebel groups and, especially, the US and Saudi Arabia, to either break with Jabhat Al Nusra or convince that group to break with Al Qaeda. On the ground, of course, Ahrar Al Sham finds itself under heavy counterpressure from Jabhat Al Nusra to forget about the international community and join their “jihad.” “Choose” is the word that has frequently been launched at Ahrar Al Sham by Al Qaeda sympathisers in Syria in recent weeks.

The good news is that Ahrar Al Sham showed up at the Riyadh conference, because without them, the opposition would have been missing too many armed constituencies.

The bad news is that the group’s representatives at first angrily denounced the joint statement and walked out of the meeting in a huff. This was somewhat ameliorated by the announcement that the group had changed its mind and now endorses the joint statement.

This, of course, suggests that Ahrar Al Sham is itself badly divided, with some factions wanting to cooperate with the Saudi-led and US-supported political agenda, and others seeing this all as a sell-out. What the group will ultimately decide to do remains a huge question mark, and the fortunes of the opposition may depend on it. But bringing them on board, one way or another, is central to creating a political umbrella representative enough of the opposition fighting forces on the ground to be politically credible in negotiations.

Perhaps the most surprising development was the announcement by the able Saudi chair of the meeting, Abdulaziz Al Sager, that the Syrian opposition plans to meet regime officials on January 10. Before anyone gets carried away, Mr Al Assad declared in reaction to the meeting that he would not negotiate with “terrorists” and that “everyone who holds a machine-gun is a terrorist”.

The bottom line is that both the regime and many of the mainstream rebel groups believe that they might well be able to strengthen their hands through additional fighting. That means that, despite the wishes of the US and Russia, the local forces in Syria – and probably many of their regional backers as well – aren’t yet ready to calculate the price they’re willing to pay at peace talks.

For now, alas, the fighting will continue. But the Riyadh meeting was an important, albeit limited, step forward in creating the integrated political umbrella necessary for the opposition to ultimately join an agreement to end the Syrian conflict.

ttp://www.agsiw.org/can-riyadh-broker-a-syrian-opposition-coalition/

The meeting of Syrian rebel groups in Saudi Arabia, beginning today and running through December 10, marks a major step forward in efforts to create a coherent political front for the opposition as international mediation efforts gain steam. By hosting the meeting, Riyadh, with strong support from Doha, is taking a lead in efforts to politically unify the opposition for participation in the diplomacy that might ultimately determine the future of the country, and in clarifying what opposition groups will, and will not, be part of the process. It’s a tall order. The challenge is to create an umbrella organization large enough to be politically representative of as much of the opposition as possible, but without alienating the United States or Turkey, and able to ultimately engage with Russia and Iran.

The Diplomatic Background

The opposition meeting comes in the immediate context of unexpected progress at the recent international Syrian peace meetings in Vienna. On October 30, the participating parties issued a “Final Declaration,” which established a framework that could provide the basis of a broader agreement. This agenda is extremely ambitious. It calls for U.N.-brokered talks between the regime and the opposition (which is undefined, except for the exclusion of “ISIL, and other terrorist groups, as designated by the U.N. Security Council”, which “must be defeated”) to begin by January 1, 2016. A subsequent meeting on November 14 called for an immediate cease fire and urged elections within 18 months. It added the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, to the specified list of terrorist groups to be “defeated,” but left undecided what might constitute “other terrorist groups.” Jordan was designated to broker a “common understanding of groups and individuals” to be designated for exclusion and “defeat.”

Creating an effective opposition political umbrella will be difficult, but the effort is now unavoidable for Saudi Arabia and Qatar because of the diplomatic momentum, and since the Vienna process now includes Iran. The United States had previously insisted that Iran needed to change its policies and agree to the earlier Geneva communiqué, especially regarding the future of the Assad regime, in order to participate. In October, however, Washington simply reversed its policy and Iran was invited to the Vienna meetings. If there is no effective opposition political front to participate in future negotiations, one side will be fully represented at the table while much of the other side will be excluded; none of the Syrian opposition groups were directly represented at either Vienna meeting.

The Immediate Challenges

The Riyadh meeting will be attended by most of the major opposition factions. They include a Western-supported political umbrella group, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, which is based in Turkey and is supportive of efforts by international negotiators. Also attending will be opposition groups based in Syria that do not have a particularly hostile relationship with the regime, including the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change. Armed rebel groups at the meeting will include the Western-supported Southern Front Group, the Islamist coalition Jaysh al-Islam, and others.

The big question mark is over the participation of Ahrar ash-Sham, a powerful group of about 20,000 fighters that seeks to establish an “Islamic” state in Syria and that has often cooperated with Jabhat al-Nusra, which, as noted above, is affiliated with al-Qaeda. Much will depend on whether this organization actually attends the meeting in Riyadh, and what it decides to do. Its cooperation with al-Qaeda makes it unacceptable to the United States. The regional supporters of the Syrian opposition—Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar—are also uncomfortable with this connection. Ahrar ash-Sham’s efforts to reassure Americans, such as through a moderately-phrased Washington Post op-ed in July, have been ineffective, since the group has persisted in cooperating with Jabhat al-Nusra.

The highly negative American attitude towards Ahrar Ash-Sham was starkly demonstrated by the arrest last week of a naturalized U.S. citizen in the Washington, DC area on charges related to shipping military-related items (although not weapons) to the group. He was not charged with material support for terrorism, but the indictment notes that Ahrar ash-Sham seeks to establish an “Islamic state” in Syria and “frequently fights alongside” Jabhat al-Nusra, strongly suggesting a connection between the group’s ideology and his prosecution.

There are three obvious ways of squaring this circle. First, Ahrar ash-Sham could break with Jabhat al-Nusra, and demonstrate that in both word and deed. Second, Jabhat al-Nusra could break with al-Qaeda, and similarly demonstrate that in practice. In recent months, Jabhat al-Nusra has been attempting to re-brand itself as “moderate,” but this simply will not fly, especially in the United States, until there is a clear break of relations with Al Qaeda. Third, significant portions of Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra could break away from their existing affiliations and form either one or two new organizations that have no relationship with al-Qaeda.

The Kurdish Factor

These conundrums are further complicated by the absence, both in Riyadh and Vienna, of the major Kurdish armed group currently fighting in Syria, the People’s Protection Units (YPG). This militia is closely associated with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which, in turn, has exceptionally close links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish rebel group that has been fighting a decades-long conflict with Turkey and is widely considered a terrorist organization. The YPG problem is highly complex and multifaceted.

Because they are not included in the Riyadh talks or in the formation of an opposition alliance, Syrian Kurdish groups would constitute a major and very effective territory-holding political and armed force outside of the process. These Kurdish groups have established a quasi-independent mini-state called Rojava in northern Syria, along much of the border with Turkey. Like their Kurdish brethren in Iraq, they have been among the most effective fighters on the ground against ISIL, particularly in their own Kurdish-majority territory and the immediate environs. They have received considerable American support, including air cover, and are said to be “the center” of the U.S. campaign against ISIL in Syria.

In another blow to opposition unity, in recent days Turkish-supported factions of the Free Syrian Army have been battling American-supported YPG fighters over control of areas contested between Arab and Kurdish Syrians. However, the PKK has been on the State Department’s list of designated foreign terrorist organizations since it was first issued in 1997. This relationship complicates the American position regarding Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat al- Nusra, even though it would be easy to make the case that the PKK is not the moral or political equivalent to al-Qaeda. Nonetheless, the PKK is a designated terrorist organization, and the United States, in pursuit of its priority of attacking ISIL, is essentially overlooking the extremely close YPG-PKK relationship, just as some of the Middle Eastern supporters of the Syrian rebels have been willing to turn a blind eye to the on-the-ground partnership between Ahrar ash-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra. Yet Turkey cannot accept the participation of the YPG in the opposition coalition as long as it is closely tied to the PKK, just as the United States cannot accept that of Ahrar ash-Sham as long as it is closely tied to Jabhat al-Nusra and Al Qaeda.

The Importance of a Unified Opposition

None of these difficulties are likely to be resolved at the first meeting in Riyadh. However, sooner rather than later, some answer will have to be found to cope with the potentially crippling role of Jabhat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda, and to some extent also the YPG’s ties to the PKK. Otherwise, the pro-regime coalition, despite its many contradictions and differences, will continue to be relatively united, both militarily and politically, while the menagerie of actors opposed to the regime will remain fractious and disunited.

Supporters of the regime have demonstrated an ability to coordinate across various registers, from the global (Russia), to the regional (Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi groups), to the local (the Assad regime and its armed groups). By contrast the opponents of the regime (globally, the United States; regionally, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar; locally, various Syrian opposition groups) have shown an uncanny and persistent ability to be on different pages despite having a supposedly common goal.

Riyadh and its partners on Syria, including Washington, are going to have to be at their most politically and diplomatically adroit and imaginative to resolve these conundrums. The prospects for a negotiated end to the carnage in Syria depend on it.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/an-explosion-is-inevitable-in-the-occupied-lands

The Palestinian issue may have never been so utterly eclipsed. Even much Arab attention has shifted to larger and more apparently “urgent” problems such as the wars in Syria, Yemen, Iraq and Libya. The peace process with Israel has utterly collapsed. Even the United States appears to have moved on, with the two-state solution seemingly tossed aside like a banana peel, now that it no longer interests Israel’s government.

Yet, counterintuitively, now is precisely the time when everyone who is serious needs to pay the closest attention to what is going on between Israel and the Palestinians. What will happen in the medium-term is exactly being determined by what is happening and not happening, so quietly and almost behind the scenes, in the immediate context.

Headlines are still generated, of course. Stabbings and other apparently random acts of Palestinian violence against Israelis, and violent attacks against Palestinians by Israelis, especially settlers, or the Israeli military, get reported by the international media.

But such dramatic snippets, sheared of their context, as if occurring in a vacuum or without any broader narrative or interpretive structure, except the most tiresome clichés and prejudices in favour of one party or the other, are not only meaningless, they are actually misleading. That’s because they tend to reinforce preconceived notions that are, almost invariably, little more than emotional fairy tales designed to make people feel better or to rationalise what is otherwise indefensible.

The grim truth is that what is happening is almost certainly the gestation of an enormous explosion of violence, far worse than anything we have seen in the history of this conflict. When it finally does erupt, it will be too late to do anything about it. No one will be able to control or reverse it.

Such an explosion might be “planned” by some group or other, but if an attempt to generate it actually succeeds, that will be a coincidence.

What is being nurtured under the current circumstances will be, essentially, an organic phenomenon. The ideological veneer it takes on, from both sides, will have many profound political impacts, but will that not be a causal or determining factor. What is brewing lies far beneath the register of ideology, and is taking place at the level of lived human experiences far beyond rhetoric.

The basic equation has nothing to do with Israeli and Palestinian, or Arab and Jewish, identities or cultures, or religious beliefs or political ideologies. It is a fundamental human equation that transcends all of these. On one side are millions of people who have lived for decades without any kind of citizenship, enfranchisement or political and human rights. On the other side are millions more who are either dismissive or terrified of this reality, or both. Either way, everyone is trapped.

There is no process, formula or mechanism available to alter this equation, even a little, at its fundamentals. Yet, if it persists – and that seems inevitable because there is no mechanism at the moment for generating any positive change – it can only produce one outcome: violence.

It doesn’t matter that most Palestinians either remember the disastrous second intifada, or are exhausted, or are wise enough to see that violence has always been counterproductive. As the wave of violence, mostly by teenagers, indicates, a new generation is emerging that is simply enraged and finds nothing which they can believe in or identify with. Their attitude, even towards Israeli civilians, seems to be “you can always take one with you”.

What is there in the current witches’ brew in Palestine that can prevent this from becoming a normative attitude? What argument and alternative is left to counter it? Trust your leadership? Have faith in diplomacy? Become the change you want to see happen? Everything is for the best in this, the best of all possible worlds?

No, the only thing left is a completely rational, completely correct appeal to personal and family interests. Make the most of your life under the current circumstances as best you can, and so on. The problem is, this has no aspect of social and political consciousness, except in the most indirect way. It won’t work.

Violence against civilians is never justifiable or reasonable. But in this situation, reason and justice are not only absent, they have been rendered absurdities, creating a nihilistic vacuum in which brutal self-assertion carries a terrible appeal.

Months ago I argued that the current round of violence would become a “new normal” between Israel and the Palestinians. Sadly, that’s been fully vindicated. What’s crucial to recognise now is that this horrifying “new normal” is almost certainly a mere foretaste of what’s to come.

The status quo, to which Israel clings so desperately, and to which the Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, and Hamas have either reconciled themselves, or have no answers for, all but guarantees the unprecedented explosion quietly building up in the pressure cooker of the occupied territories. This is as close to the inevitable as political life gets. The only way to prevent it is to somehow change the equation on the ground before the volcano erupts. Otherwise, you know what to expect.