http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/anti-muslim-bigotry-has-no-place-in-united-states

After several days of rhetorical flailing, Ben Carson, a physician running for the Republican Party nomination for US president, finally settled on his rationalisation for opposing a Muslim American president. Having first said that he “absolutely would not agree” with the prospect, Mr Carson explained that what he is actually opposed to is theocracy. “If you’re a Christian and you’re running for president and you want to make this into a theocracy, I’m not going to support you,” he insisted.

Mr Carson now claims his stigmatising of Muslims as uniquely ineligible for chief executive was a boilerplate defence of political secularism that would be embraced by an overwhelming majority of Americans. Had he simply taken a clear stance against theocracy from the outset, there would have been no controversy. Almost no one in the US favours establishing a theocracy, and Mr Carson’s opposition to that is about as unobjectionable as anything in American political culture.

Indeed, Article VI of the constitution as originally drafted stated that “no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States”. Some of its opponents at the time openly fretted that, because of this clause, “Mahometans might obtain offices among us, and that the senators and representatives might all be pagans”, or that it might “open a door for Jews, Turks and infidels”. Nonetheless, the US constitution was ratified and Article VI has never been challenged, either legally or politically. At least in theory.

In practice, of course, all American presidents to date, with one exception, have been Protestant Christians (and all, again with one exception, have been white males). When John F Kennedy was running for the presidency in 1960, he had to overcome the same kind of vicious anti-Catholic bigotry that helped sink the 1928 Democratic nominee, Al Smith.

Both Smith and Kennedy were the target of dark insinuations, and sometimes overt accusations, that a Catholic could not be trusted to make decisions as president from an independent, American point of view. They would always be subordinate to the church, the clergy and, particularly, the Pope. Any real Catholic, true to his religion, the bigots argued, would have no choice but to defer to the divinely ordained authorities they follow as a matter of faith.

To be a good American, or at least a good American president, this pseudo-logic held, required one to be a bad Catholic. A Catholic president would have to choose between his country and his church. They would at least govern theocratically, if not directly try to impose a theocracy.

Smith let the issue linger too long, and addressed it ineffectively. Anti-Catholic bigotry was so strong that there is no doubt his religious affiliation significantly contributed to his overwhelming defeat at the hands of Herbert Hoover. Kennedy, by contrast, tackled the issue directly and convinced the public that his religious identity would not influence his decision-making as the president of a secular republic “that is officially neither Catholic, Protestant nor Jewish”.

Mr Carson’s remarks spring from a now-familiar Islamophobic discourse that suggests that Muslims, similarly, cannot have an independent political identity or agenda and must be driven entirely by religious motivations. This discourse is based on a caricature of mainstream Islam which holds, among other things – as both Mr Carson and his senior campaign officials have recently insisted – that Islam commands that all people of other faiths must be killed and that lying is a religious duty.

The essential claim, previously levelled routinely at Catholics and Jews, is that one can be either a bad Muslim and a good American, or a good Muslim and a bad American, but not a good American and a good Muslim. Ironically, Mr Carson’s intolerant outburst has been supported by a small group of prominent Catholic Americans like Pat Buchanan and Bill O’Reilly.

Moreover, if there is a genuine constituency in the United States that actually yearns for the creation of a theocracy, it’s not among Muslim Americans. It’s on the Republican Christian religious right, exactly where Mr Carson has his own political base. “Christian Dominionists”, as they are called by their advocates seek an America governed exclusively by Christians ruling according to religious law, and are a small but significant, and apparently growing, factor in the Republican Party.

Mr Carson himself appears to hold some suggestive religious views. He condemns scientific discoveries about the Big Bang and evolution, implying they are “satanic” in origin. He recently, and indefensibly, characterised the United States as “a Judeo-Christian nation”, whatever that might be. That comment alone brings him perilously close to his own standard for ineligibility.

Almost all Americans, undoubtedly including a large majority of Muslim Americans, would agree that anyone seeking to replace the constitution with a theocracy is unfit to be president. Mr Carson may not be a full-blown Christian Dominionist, but he’s far too close for the comfort of anyone who truly values government that is neutral on religious matters. His anti-Muslim bigotry alone hardly promises neutrality. If Mr Carson’s argument undermine anyone’s candidacy, it’s surely his own.

http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/22/opinion/a-saudi-american-reset.html?ref=international&_r=0

WASHINGTON — After more than two years of perceived slights and supposed snubs, the new contours of a revitalized but evolving partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia are beginning to take shape. This month’s visit to Washington by King Salman solidified the defense and security aspects of this new version of an old relationship. The Saudis are also strongly pushing an economic agenda as the centerpiece of what King Salman identified as a “new strategic alliance for the 21st century.”

Last May, when President Obama hosted leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council for a summit meeting at Camp David, the Saudi monarch was conspicuously absent. The talk then of a “snub” missed two crucial points. First, the Saudis were trying to ensure that the Camp David meeting was the beginning, not the end, of a new conversation. Second, King Salman did not want to share center stage in his first major trip abroad as king with figures like the deputy prime minister of Oman.

The Persian Gulf states’ primary concerns in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal were that a windfall of income from sanctions relief, as well as the diplomatic legitimacy conferred by the agreement, could empower and embolden Tehran. But when it became clear that they had obtained all the assurances they were likely to get from Washington, and that the agreement was going to be implemented no matter what they said, the gulf states endorsed the Iran nuclear agreement in a joint statement issued with Secretary of State John Kerry on Aug. 3.

Now that it’s clear that the nuclear agreement will be implemented, both the United States and Iran are forced to consider one another’s policies on issues beyond the nuclear question. This brings American perspectives much more in line with the Saudi government’s views.

In a Sept. 2 letter to Congress, Mr. Kerry strongly condemned Iran’s regional behavior and said that the United States had “no illusion that this behavior will change.” He added that America’s partnership with the gulf states “will remain at the core of our regional security strategy,” and is “our most effective tool.”

But there is a new hierarchy of values at work in the security component of the partnership. Saudi Arabia has adopted a more independent and assertive regional posture, most visibly expressed in the Arab intervention in Yemen, which recently claimed the lives of 45 Emirati, 10 Saudi and five Bahraini soldiers.

The United States has been supportive of the intervention, though quietly concerned about its long-term ramifications and the humanitarian impact. Despite misgivings, the United States ispreparing to resupply Saudi Arabia with thousands of precision-guided munitions to replenish stocks exhausted by the Yemen campaign. The Pentagon recently approved the sale of 600 Patriot defense missiles, valued at $5.4 billion.

Deals are also being finalized on two Lockheed Martin frigates, priced at over $1 billion, and 10 MH-60R helicopters, at $1.9 billion. This is all on top of a 20-year arms-sales agreement, sealed in 2010 and worth $60 billion.

Saudi Arabia seeks to add a new major economic component to the relationship. The main new initiative in the recent Washington visit was a road map for greater American involvement in the Saudi economy. The Saudi Economic and Development Council, led by the deputy crown prince (who is also the king’s son), presented detailed proposals for investments in mining, oil and gas, retail sales, entertainment, housing, infrastructure, banking and technical services, all including incentives and concessions for American companies, and valued at many hundreds of billions of dollars over the next five years.

In this new relationship, however, new wrinkles are inevitably emerging.

The newfound independence of Saudi security doctrine is simultaneously reassuring and worrying to Washington. Under the rubric of burden sharing, it is warmly welcomed. But more autonomous Saudi decision making makes Washington uneasy, particularly since, when things go wrong, the United States will still have to deal with the fallout.

Saudi Arabia remains dismayed by the lack of American engagement on Syria. Riyadh is likely to intensify efforts to influence events in Syria, particularly as Iran and Russia step up their support for President Bashar al-Assad. As the United States seeks more Saudi support in the battle against the Islamic State, Saudi Arabia will argue that the brutality of the Assad dictatorship drives support for the terrorists. They will push for a strategy of confronting both simultaneously, however difficult that may be.

The Saudis have already been acting independently in Syria. If they now perceive their Yemen campaign to be a success and the United States to be trapped by inaction, they may be prepared to take bolder, more risky action against Mr. Assad in the coming year.

But if Syria remains a source of tension, that is because the United States and Saudi Arabia ultimately need each other’s cooperation. The former Saudi foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal, described the partnership as a “Muslim marriage,” meaning that while the two are committed to each other, the relationship is not necessarily exclusive. The limitations of that approach became apparent during the recent period of relative estrangement.

Saudi Arabia can flirt with countries like Russia, China and France, but, as they have recognized, Washington is indispensable. And despite the perseverance of arguments that Riyadh is a greater source of extremism than Tehran — something no serving American official ever discusses — Saudi Arabia remains a crucial American ally in opposing both Iran and regional extremists like the Islamic State.

This is hardly the first time the American-Saudi alliance has been strained. And this time, the basis of the partnership has been modified. Both sides have clearly found there’s no plausible alternative and have come home to each other again.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/tit-for-tat-violence-is-new-normal-in-occupied-territory

The ongoing surge of violence among Palestinians in the occupied territories, particularly East Jerusalem, is leaderless, spontaneous and concentrated among youths. It was unanticipated, in that no one predicted the specific time, place or nature of the spasm. But it’s hardly surprising.

The context is the utter desperation of the Palestinian cause. Palestinians are convinced that Israel has abandoned any notion of a two-state solution, if it ever genuinely considered it in the first place (which most Palestinians very much doubt). Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government seems determined to expand the occupation and the settlements, and to be adamantly opposed to Palestinian statehood.

Palestinians, especially the youth, have also despaired about their own leadership. They don’t believe negotiations can succeed. And they have learnt that United Nations or International Criminal Court initiatives don’t change anything on the ground, or, at best, will yield results over many years but have no immediate impact.

They also understand that the Hamas approach of conflict only yields greater suffering, and that in any violent confrontation Palestinians invariably suffer more than Israelis. And they are convinced that the United States lacks the will to confront Israel over the occupation in general and settlements in particular. Finally, they understand that most other Arab societies are wrapped up in urgent crises such as Syria, Iraq and Libya, and the fight against ISIL. Their cause may not be abandoned, but Palestinians know it is very much on the Arab back burner.

Palestinians have rarely felt so isolated and bereft of options. The era when economic and social progress might have compensated for slow progress towards independence and an end to the occupation has passed. Former prime minister Salam Fayyad was ousted and his state and institution building programme abandoned by the Palestinian Authority and international community.

Palestinians would be wise to resurrect Mr Fayyad’s policies, as many lecture them to do. But the Israeli and western cut-off of aid to the PA after the UN initiatives was crucial to discrediting and ultimately destroying his constructive policies and forcing Mr Fayyad’s resignation. Moreover, that programme was always a parallel track to diplomatic and political progress towards independence. His bottom-up approach was never considered to be a substitute for top-down efforts to end the occupation, as Mr Fayyad himself always emphasised.

The current combination of political paralysis, diplomatic impasse, intensifying occupation, international disengagement, and social and economic dysfunctionality means that many, especially young, Palestinians have a keen sense of nothing left to lose.

Most Palestinians no longer feel like stakeholders in almost any aspect of the status quo. All that most Palestinians can really believe in these days is their own nuclear family, and, perhaps, their extended family or village community. Palestinians don’t, and just can’t, believe in their discredited national leadership, extremist groups like Hamas, or any other broader social or political grouping.

The Israeli message to Palestinians is: “You are defeated and subjugated, now accept your lot.” Palestinian political parties are essentially saying: “We are your champions, but we have no idea how to make your lives better or what to do to advance your national agenda.”

The world community is basically saying: “We will get back to you when Israel seems interested in diplomacy, otherwise here are some palliative words and minimal aid.” The Arab world has no real message for the Palestinians, being profoundly wrapped up in other matters.

All of this explains why Israelis and Palestinians might be on the verge of either another explosion of violence, or, more probably, a “new normal” characterised by tit-for-tat violence that does not constitute a gigantic eruption but a new daily grind of reciprocal brutality.

The occupation essentially is a system of discipline and control of millions of disenfranchised people by a foreign army whose main task is to facilitate and protect a predatory programme of ongoing and illegal colonisation. This reality is ugly, and many westerners recoil from acknowledging it. But it is a fact. For most Palestinians living under the occupation, this core reality now defines everything, since there is no longer anything to offset the violence built into the occupation.

Consequently, violence – whether from Palestinian youths, militant groups like Hamas, settler vigilantes or Israel’s army – almost exclusively characterises the relationship between these two peoples at almost every register. The occupation is inherently violent. It is impossible to imagine a “peaceful” settlement project. The settlements depend on a social order defined by the constant threat of violence.

The emerging “new normal” – characterised on the Palestinian side by spontaneous acts of violence mainly by youths, and on the Israeli side by settler vigilantes and trigger-happy soldiers – is yet another reminder that the status quo is neither manageable nor containable.

In the absence of any framework or timeline for ending it, this violent occupation will inevitably erupt into ever more dangerous spasms of physical confrontation with potentially devastating consequences for the region and the world.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/obama-must-start-leading-and-stop-dithering-in-syria

The awful truth about American policy towards the war in Syria – the most dangerous, destabilising and tragic conflict in the world – was summed up last week by the astounding revelation that there are only nine American-trained rebels currently fighting in Syria.

Last week in these pages, I noted that Russia is getting a free pass in much of the Arab world for sponsoring and enabling Bashar Al Assad, who is primarily responsible for the hundreds of thousands of dead, and millions of displaced, Syrian civilians, and the destruction of much of the country. Russia’s criminal culpability as the primary handmaiden of the destruction of Syria even outstrips Iran’s far more widely recognised malfeasance.

America’s Syria policy, exemplified by the single-digit numbers of US-trained fighters on the ground, is in no sense a comparable tragedy. But it is certainly a farce.

The paltry amount of $500 million was allocated by the US congress for the training. fifty four rebels were selected, with nine now reportedly fighting in Syria under the terms of the programme. Forget about The Six Million Dollar Man of 1970s TV fame, each of these fighters cost more than $55 million.

It’s not just embarrassing, worse than useless, and a gigantic waste of money. It’s incontrovertible evidence of a policy in desperate free fall.

From the outset, American inaction has ensured that the wrong-headed idea that there is no one to work with on the ground in Syria has increasingly become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It’s still not too late to build such a force, but it grows ever more difficult to achieve, particularly given the depth of this recent failure.

Obama administration policy, which emphasises the need to avoid the collapse of governance institutions in Syria, such as they are, militates against any confrontation with the Assad regime. Never mind that it is formal US policy that he has lost all legitimacy and must go.

Perhaps a sham programme that pretends to be training people to influence events on the ground while actually attempting no such thing is the perfect embodiment of a policy that purports to oppose the continuation of a government when it actually does not wish to see it go, at least just yet. If Mr Al Assad were the only issue, this tragicomedy might actually be comprehensible.

But the United States has a stated policy of seeking to “degrade and ultimately defeat” ISIL. American and international attention to the menace of ISIL was captured when the organisation rampaged through Iraq in 2014. Washington clearly has an “Iraq-first” policy when it comes to ISIL.

But ISIL’s base and headquarters are in Syria. It cannot be defeated in Iraq alone, and the “Iraq-first” approach all but guarantees it will survive as a potent force. ISIL might even be driven out of most of Iraq, but spread into new areas from its Syrian base. Indeed, ISIL’s regional influence is expanding, while the effort to drive it out of Iraq is making a little headway.

Obviously ISIL has to be confronted in Syria, even if the real goal is some form of containment. Air power alone will do little to “degrade”, let alone “defeat”, these fanatics. Ground forces are indisputably essential. And all honest observers admit any use of forces perceived to be supporting the Assad regime will only strengthen ISIL’s hand and drive more Syrian Sunnis into their camp.

These incontrovertible facts led to the training programme that has just been exposed as a combination of cynical fraud and embarrassing fiasco.

Sadly this is all a continuation of the approach that led to the shameful backtracking over Barack Obama’s chemical weapons “red line” in 2013. After repeated instances of chemical attacks on civilians by the regime, instead of being punished, Mr Al Assad was actually rewarded with an agreement in which he promised to relinquish and destroy all of his chemical weapons.

He suddenly emerged as a partner with the United States in the accord, with all the diplomatic legitimacy that implies, and the agreement clearly required him to keep control of all the areas of the country necessary to implement it.

Now there is considerable evidence Mr Al Assad has been again using chlorine bombs. Washington’s mighty response? Quietly suggesting a UN inquiry.

Russia has defended its policies in Syria as open and honest. Indeed, Moscow makes no pretence of doing anything other than funding and supporting its Syrian client’s mass murder and mass displacement, though it preposterously rationalises it as counterterrorism.

The United States, by contrast, has no meaningful policy in Syria. Any doubts about that, even after the chemical weapons travesty, have surely been dispelled by this parody of a training programme.

American apathy has continuously made matters worse and limited Washington’s own options. But it’s never too late. History doesn’t stop and events continue to unfold. People will always respond to carrots and sticks.

The trouble is that a coherent policy requires a desired outcome, and the United States doesn’t seem to know what, within the realm of the possible, it wants to see happen in Syria. This inexplicable and inexcusable confusion is the proximate cause of America’s Syria policy crisis. Washington, and the world, cannot afford any more of this self-defeating dithering.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/how-long-will-russia-be-given-a-free-hand-in-syria#full

As the Syrian regime totters and begins to show signs of cracking, it’s no surprise that its allies are intensifying their commitment to maintaining the dictatorship at all costs. As Russian and Iranian forces begin to play an increasingly direct role in the Syrian conflict, several straightforward truths about that war, and its international ramifications, are becoming painfully obvious.

The extent of the direct involvement of Russian forces is unclear. Some maintain that Russian advisers are merely in Syria to train Syrian government forces. But others suggest that, at the very least, Russia is preparing to defend key areas of strategic interest to itself, particularly related to its naval base at the Mediterranean port of Tartus.

It is the last remaining Russian base outside the former Soviet Union, and is the warm water port that was a valued Russian prize since the time of the tsars. There are also strong indications that Russia is preparing a military airbase south of the port city of Latakia, a major stronghold of Bashar Al Assad. Moreover, Russian troops may already have been involved in some of the fighting.

American intelligence believes that Russia is preparing to deploy Mikoyan MiG 31 and Sukhoi Su-25 fighter planes to the Latakia area.

Russia has said that it has Iranian permission for military overflights to Syria, after being denied such privileges by Bulgaria, which had come under American pressure to say no to Moscow.

Iran is also reportedly increasingly involved in the fighting on the ground in Syria, with Israeli and other sources saying that hundreds of Iranian Revolutionary Guards have been deployed recently in support of Hizbollah fighters. These forces are key elements in the struggle for the area around Zabadani near the Lebanese border.

The regime now controls about a quarter of the territory of Syria. Mr Al Assad still holds most areas crucial to his regime: the Lebanese border, a corridor leading north to and through Damascus, and all the way to the Alawite coastal area.

But the stepped-up international intervention on behalf of Mr Al Assad clearly demonstrates the extent to which he is losing. For most of the past four years, American inaction has been predicated on not wishing to see the collapse of governance institutions in the country, as if they were somehow separable from the regime itself. But given that the regime has been reduced to operating in a small part of the country, this logic has long since broken down.

The Russian and Iranian interventions also demonstrate that the supporters of the Syrian dictatorship are much more committed to maintaining their ally and securing the necessary outcome than Mr Al Assad’s international opponents have been. We can safely assume this is just the beginning of their increased commitment.

Russia claims it is surprised by the international outcry, pointing out that it has made no secret of arming and supporting the dictatorship throughout the entire conflict. In a sense, that’s fair: Russia has indeed been blatant in its support for a government that has waged an unrelenting war on its own people for the sake of power, and has suffered no international consequences for doing so.

Iran, too, has made it clear from the outset that it was prepared to stop at nothing, including risking the political and military well-being of its key proxy group, Hizbollah in Lebanon, in a major intervention in the Syrian conflict that has been going on for several years. It was only a matter of time before Iran’s Revolutionary Guards themselves began fighting on the ground, and for Russian advisers, pilots and special forces to also act decisively in defence of their ally.

It is extraordinary that Russia has received a free pass in all of this, particularly in parts of the Arab world. The bitterness displayed towards American policy, which indeed has been misguided and counterproductive, is quite unmatched by anything similar directly towards Russia, which is infinitely more culpable. American “sins” in Syria are those of omission. Russia has been guilty of innumerable crimes of commission, and has been a direct partner in the Syrian calamity.

Russia is attempting to frame its intervention in terms of “counterterrorism” and the international campaign against ISIL. This is laughably hypocritical, because Mr Al Assad and ISIL enjoy a symbiotic relationship in which they need each other to thrive and survive. Yet there are disturbing signs that several European states, anxious about refugees and other spillover effects of the Syrian conflict, may be moving in the direction of seeing the dictatorship not as a cause of terrorism, which it is, but as a potential counterweight. That would be a tragic error.

The forces that have brought us the Syrian calamity, including the rise of ISIL, are intensifying their intervention and their determination to shape the future of that country. The question for everybody else is whether they will continue to have a relatively free hand. Or will they finally face concerted, coordinated opposition that, at the very least, forces them to accept a political compromise that involves the end of a brutal dictatorship that has been willing to crucify its own society in the name of raw power?

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/yemen-losses-will-bolster-regions-determination

The Arab intervention in Yemen has reached a critical point. The loss of 45 Emirati, 10 Saudi and five Bahraini soldiers in rebel attacks only underscores how high the stakes have become. It will surely redouble the commitment to restore stability and political legitimacy to Yemen. But it’s essential that the Arab states proceed with clarity and caution as well as determination.

These casualties come in the context of a series of victories that have confounded critics. Yemeni government and allied Arab forces have rid most of the south of Houthi control. They are now moving towards the capital, Sanaa, in a pincer-like formation. Other key areas have also either been recovered or may well be soon. The essential outlines of a viable endgame scenario are starting to emerge.

These successes fly in the face of received wisdom, particularly in the West. From the outset of the intervention until very recently, and even in some quarters to this day, the ability of the Gulf states to act militarily in their own defence has been dismissed. Within a few weeks, Yemen was already being labelled a “quagmire” with no potential endgame and no prospect of significant Arab gains.

The dangers attending the intervention, however, have also increased.

It’s not just a matter of painful and, for the UAE, unprecedented battlefield losses of fallen soldiers. The political implications of the fighting are also exceptionally complex.

One of the most important strategic aims of the coalition from the outset was surely to break the alliance between the Houthis and Yemeni forces loyal to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. This is essential to politically isolate and militarily weaken the Houthis.

Such a rupture, more than anything else, would induce the Houthis to come to reasonable terms in an agreement. Without it, even despite their recent setbacks, the Houthis will probably continue to be able to operate successfully outside their base areas. As long as that alliance is intact, a stalemate remains plausible. So Mr Saleh must be given something. But that remains totally unresolved.

Yemeni government and Arab forces may be closing in on the capital, but actually taking Sanaa is a challenge of a very different magnitude.

Because of the alliance with Mr Saleh, and several other factors, the Houthis have significant support in and around Sanaa. The cost of a protracted urban conflict there is both militarily and politically prohibitive. The same applies to the prospect of a siege.

One of the greatest pitfalls of the conflict so far has been the suffering it has caused, or exacerbated, for the civilian population. Even though most observers concede that there are faults on all sides, nobody expects the Houthis to pay attention to humanitarian considerations.

These concerns intensify when it comes to how to liberate Sanaa. Unless there is a workable strategy for a quick victory, the future of Sanaa, much like Yemen itself, will ultimately require a political resolution.

As pressure builds on the Houthis and their pro-Saleh allies, and until that affiliation is finally broken, the potential for southern political autonomy, if not independence, is likely to increase. The Al Hirak forces may be an implausible mishmash, but they agree on the need for a separate future for the South.

Given the setbacks experienced by the Houthis in recent weeks, the ability of Al Hirak to argue that only southern secession can prevent pro-Iranian domination of all of Yemen has evaporated. But that doesn’t mean that the issue is resolved.

On the contrary, if the south is relatively stable and most of the fighting takes place in the north, particularly with no end in sight, the impulse to break away may actually become stronger than ever.

The degree to which the conflict has strengthened Al Qaeda in Yemen is exaggerated in some quarters. However, extremist groups have taken advantage of the chaos and sectarian tensions, and, over time, there is a distinct danger that Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula could become emboldened.

So the pitfalls facing the Arab coalition in Yemen include empowered extremists and secessionists, prospects of a stalemate, increasing humanitarian concerns, and the considerable difficulties of crafting a political formula that is acceptable to all parties.

But the loss of troops in the field is likely to redouble the determination to summon the diplomatic finesse that will be required to complement military effectiveness.