http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/no-victory-at-un-unless-palestinian-unity-is-the-result#full

The recent conflict between Israel and Hamas significantly recontextualised the request by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) for an upgrade from the United Nations General Assembly to “non-member observer state” status. How all parties react to the upgrade will have a significant effect on the balance of power within Palestinian society, and strongly influence future regional developments.

The PLO had left itself – and was offered by Israel and the United States – few options. With Hamas riding a wave of popularity, PLO leaders became even more determined to seek a UN upgrade. They calculate a largely symbolic diplomatic victory can offset Hamas’s illusory victory on the battlefield.

Hamas has meanwhile achieved diplomatic breakthroughs of its own, with visits from the emir of Qatar, the prime minister of Egypt, the foreign ministers of Tunisia and Turkey, and more to come. Hamas is so flush with “victory” that it even reversed its position opposing the UN initiative, hoping to take some of the credit.

Now, more than ever, it makes no sense for Israel and the West to “punish the PLO” by making it harder for the Palestinian Authority to govern in the West Bank and handing Hamas yet another unearned and undeserved victory.

Hamas has undoubtedly gained, as it always does, a bump in popularity based on the euphoria produced by any conflict with Israel. In 2009, the bump deflated quickly because the PA was moving forward with Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s highly successful institution-building programme while the people of Gaza began to soberly assess the massive and lasting damage done by “Operation Cast Lead”.

The PA requires at least $1 billion annually to augment its budget and cannot perform its most basic functions without such aid. The most fundamental is meeting the public employee payroll in both the West Bank and Gaza. A huge percentage of the Palestinian population is directly dependent on these salaries.

But following the 2011 UN bid, aid from the two biggest PA donors – the United States and the European Union – was reduced to about half of its previous levels. And for 2012, the American half of that half – $200 million – remains on congressional holds. And the Arab states that have encouraged the PLO in all their UN initiatives have failed to make up that shortfall.

This time, however, the PA cannot respond by pointing to gains created by its strategy of institution building. The cupboard is bare. And that creates the opportunity for Hamas to build much more sustained political gains among Palestinians everywhere, even though they yet again recklessly brought calamity, or near calamity, to the hapless people of Gaza.

The “breakthroughs” in easing the blockade Hamas says Israel agreed to, but which Israel denies – extending fishing access from three to six nautical miles off the coast, and easing passage through crossings and access to the “barrier area” – are minor and may never even materialise. They certainly don’t change the fundamental situation for the people of Gaza.

It ought to be easy for the PA and the PLO to make the case for diplomacy and institution-building. However, the confrontations at the UN and elsewhere have left the PA with little to point to other than deferred salary payments.

It seems that all parties understood that the new situation called for restraint. There is nothing in the resolution that specifically precludes the PLO from seeking membership in various multilateral agencies. But PLO diplomats have reportedly assured the West that they will not move to join the Assembly of States Parties at the International Criminal Court, which could be a prelude for seeking charges against Israeli officials, or other sensitive multilateral bodies.

The PLO appears to have been successful in winning over several swing European Union states, including, France and Spain. This support should help reassure Israel. Israel must recognise that, unless it prefers dealing with Hamas militarily, it also has a huge stake in rescuing the PA from the political and financial doldrums.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas ought to vigorously pursue his offer of resuming negotiations with Israel without preconditions, which means dropping the settlement-freeze demand. The West should reciprocate by restoring financial aid to the PA and other efforts aimed at improving the situation on the ground in the West Bank. And Israel should cooperate in those efforts and abandon the policy of punishing the PLO by degrading the ability of the PA to effectively govern in the West Bank.

Washington warned Israel not to “retaliate” against the Palestinians, for example by building in the hypersensitive E-1 corridor in the occupied West Bank or withholding Palestinian revenues. Israel is apparently prepared to heed such warnings and understands the political context in which any of its actions will be perceived.

All of Hamas’s purported rivals and antagonists must work together to restore the formerly obvious contrast between the positive benefits of Ramallah’s approaches with the dire consequences of Hamas’s bellicose policies in Gaza.

Otherwise, they will be wittingly or unwittingly conspiring to move Hamas far closer to the realisation of its actual primary goal: uncontested dominance of the Palestinian national movement.

This is obviously not in the interests of the West or Israel. For the Palestinians it would be an unmitigated disaster. The conflict in Gaza, and its political aftermath, should serve as a clear wake-up call for everyone who does not want a Hamas-dominated Palestinian national agenda to act urgently and cooperate to prevent that from emerging.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/29/the-death-of-israel-s-qualitative-minority.html

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=460765

“Article VI: The President may take the necessary actions and measures to protect the country and the goals of the revolution.” Read that aloud slowly, and let the words roll around your tongue as they ooze out like dark, thick molasses.

It’s the centerpiece of Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi’s recent “Constitutional Declaration,” accruing to himself powers and authority—at least on paper—undreamt of by his autocratic predecessors Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.

Anyone surprised by this naked and extremely aggressive power grab by the Muslim Brotherhood was either woefully naïve or grossly misinformed about its deep-seated authoritarian orientation and agenda. It is inevitable that it will attempt, if it can, to impose a dictatorship in Egypt more oppressive and thoroughgoing than anything in the past, as the declaration demonstrates.

Brokering the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas in Gaza gave Morsi the domestic and international space to act decisively. He has proven, if nothing else, a ruthless political butcher, wasting no opportunity to bring the knife down whenever he can.

The Brotherhood is trying to mollify Egyptians with two extremely unconvincing sleights of hand.

First, attention is being directed to other, far more specific, articles. Some measures will be popular, such as replacing the widely reviled prosecutor-general and reopening or retrying cases involving abuses by members of the former regime despite the double jeopardy involved.

More alarm was caused by Article II, which makes all of Morsi’s decisions since he took office “final and binding.” It forbids any form of judicial review or legal challenge, including retroactively annulling any rulings already issued against them.

It is Article VI, however, that really establishes a new and unprecedentedly arbitrary dictatorship in Egypt, giving Morsi virtually unfettered powers. It’s hard to imagine any executive action or decree whatsoever that couldn’t be justified as “protecting the country and the goals of the revolution.” At least in his own opinion, and that’s the only one that counts, because, remember, his decisions are not subject to any checks, balances, lawsuits or other form of challenge whatsoever.

His word, quite literally, is law. In Egypt now, at least according to his declaration, there is no recourse at all.

The second sleight-of-hand the Brotherhood is using to try to mollify Egyptians is the idea that this is all simply “temporary,” to be rescinded once there is a new Constitution in place and a new parliament elected. CK MacLeod reminded me of Carl Schmitt’s observation that emergency decrees or temporary suspensions of the law are often the norm in political modernity, not the exception. Hitler, for example, never rescinded the Weimar Republic Constitution. He merely suspended it every four years following the Reichstag fire, until the Soviet army overran Berlin.

It’s an apt point. Almost every autocratic Arab state has used “temporary” or “emergency” laws to justify dictatorial rule and human rights abuses. Israel, too, relies on “emergency” laws promulgated by the British mandatory authorities in 1945, particularly in the occupied Palestinian territories. So why should Muslim Brotherhood-ruled Egypt be any different? The tediously predictable answer is, left on its own, it won’t be. It will be, if anything, more oppressive than the (also “temporary”) nationalist one-party dictatorship that preceded it.

Morsy and the Muslim Brotherhood will not relinquish these unprecedented dictatorial powers unless they are forced to. Even then, they will cling onto as much as possible. It’s going to be up to the Egyptian opposition to unite and force their hands. It will be very difficult — but the way things are going not impossible and possibly even not neccessary — for Morsi’s government to block new parliamentary and presidential elections supposed to take place in the foreseeable future.

If the Egyptian people are to avoid new and even worse dictatorship than they just overthrew, they must avoid political domination by the Muslim Brotherhood. But in order to achieve that, the opposition is going to have to unite and provide an alternative which they can support, not a morass of bickering.

The government and the Brotherhood have reacted to the protests against the declaration with a combination of violence and nonchalance. They clearly think this is a temporary storm they can weather, with the already secured support of their Salafist “frienemies.” In terms of the fundamental state stability, they’re probably right. Street protests probably won’t be enough at this stage to undo the damage.

Protests and criticism at all levels, and as much litigation as possible, should be focused on discrediting or even undoing Morsi’s declaration of dictatorship. But real hopes for Egyptian democracy in the long run depend on removing from power, presumably by the ballot box, the person and party brazen, power-mad and tyrannical enough to promulgate Article VI.

Assuming, of course, that there ever is another election in Egypt.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/26/the-palestinian-choice-and-ours.html

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=458733

Who can fail to weep for the long-suffering people of Gaza, who again find themselves under Israeli attack? Over 100 have already been killed, at least half civilians and many children. Spare a thought, too, for Israelis with legitimate concerns they might be among the extremely unfortunate few to be struck by an unguided rocket from Gaza not intercepted by “Iron Dome.”

But surely among the most politically forlorn figures in the world are the Palestinian leaders in Ramallah. They seem less defeated than lost. They don’t appear to have any strategy other than quixotic diplomatic efforts at the United Nations that are almost entirely symbolic and carry an enormous price. And they don’t seem to know what, if anything, to do next.

In September 2011, President Mahmoud Abbas made a huge splash by formally requesting full UN membership for Palestine from the Security Council, and delivering a fairly impressive speech in which he laid out the unimpeachable Palestinian case for freedom and independence. The initiative failed spectacularly, as everyone knew it would. It did not even garner enough council votes to necessitate the promised American veto. But it least it got the world’s attention.

Unfortunately, the 2011 effort was also bound to poison relations between the Palestinian Authority and its main donor base, the United States and the European Union. It took some time for the full impact of this to take effect, but during the second half of this year, as the external Western funding dried up, the PA became unable to meet public employee salary payroll.

The institution-building program led by Prime Minister Salam Fayyad—which had already made significant practical progress on the ground toward statehood and held such promise for so much more—was effectively paralyzed by diplomatic miscalculations.

Earlier this fall, public anger erupted. The grievances were mainly economic: In an effort to offset Western economic punishment against the PA, the government had raised taxes and certain commodity prices, and was tardy in paying salaries. Unions were enraged. Small businesses closed. And without funding, the economic hope Fayyad’s institution-building program had instilled in Palestinian-ruled areas of the occupied West Bank evaporated, leaving people helpless, hopeless and without any sense of agency.

All of this is exacerbated by the fact that Palestinians have not had national elections since 2006. This is mainly the fault of Hamas, which even boycotted the West Bank municipal elections this year. And though they were only opposed by independents, Fatah still fared poorly. But given their own dreadful record, Hamas has been justifiably terrified of Palestinian voters. Nonetheless, lack of elections means political legitimacy among Palestinians remains unresolved.

With the American election over, the Palestine Liberation Organization has decided to pursue a November 29 request to the UN General Assembly for a Palestinian mission upgrade to “non-member observer state status.” The change itself wouldn’t do much to alter the prerogatives of the mission. It might allow Palestine to join the Assembly of Parties at the International Criminal Court. But even then, prospects for an investigation, let alone an indictment, of Israeli officials by the ICC are extremely remote.

So this year’s effort is much less ambitious, impressive or spectacular than last year’s, even though it will certainly succeed if such a resolution is presented to the UNGA. Its primary effect will be to further infuriate the Western donor base and impoverish the PA. At the September meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee of donors, PA Finance Minister Nabil Kassis bluntly told the group that without desperately needed funds, both the peace process and the future of the PA were in grave peril. He apparently returned to Ramallah empty-handed.

The PLO strategy seems to be to achieve a symbolic victory at the UN in November, and then try to undo the damage this will probably cause with Western donors by offering immediate negotiations with Israel without preconditions. This means, in effect, dropping the demand for a settlement freeze.

It’s going to take a great deal more than a vague offer of renewed negotiations for Abbas and the PLO leadership to repair relations with Washington and the West, though this is certainly their primary challenge. The West, too, must give Ramallah real options. Otherwise the US and its allies will be deliberately and consciously choosing to empower and then deal with Hamas or other Islamists.

In a vainglorious assertion of authority, Hamas has cynically dragged the people of Gaza into another disastrous conflict. In its refusal to compromise, Israel’s government appears ideologically determined to drag its own society into an unmanageable future of endless occupation and conflict.

The Palestinian leadership in Ramallah, by contrast, is simply limping along, aimless, friendless, penniless, seemingly without any real strategy or new ideas. It looks, in every sense of the word, lost.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/20/demonization-and-its-discontents.html

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/19/talk-like-an-egyptian.html

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/11/14/operation_cast_lead_20?page=full

Israel’s assassination of Hamas military commander Ahmed al-Jaabari in a missile attack has shattered the short-lived and fragile calm in the Gaza Strip, and could be another step in the transformation of the basic balance of power within Hamas — and even the broader Palestinian national movement. The attack is the most significant escalation since Operation Cast Lead, the offensive Israel launched in Gaza in December 2008, and which cost an estimated 1,400 Palestinian and 13 Israeli lives.

It is impossible to know how the conflict will unfold in the days ahead, but what is clear is that the outbreak of violence is the result of a swirl of events that are reshaping power structures within Hamas and its relationships with regional forces, including with Israel and the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that Jaabari’s killing was the first strike in “a widespread campaign” to “protect Israeli civilians and to cripple the terrorist infrastructure” — and indeed, the IDF hit a number of targets across Gaza in the hours that followed, killing at least eight Palestinians. It’s possible that these developments are laying prelude to another Israeli ground intervention in Gaza. On Nov. 11, Israel’s Home Front Defense Minister Avi Dichter declared, “Israel must perform a reformatting of Gaza, and rearrange it” — but gave no indication of what that dire-sounding phrase might mean in practice.

During most of the period since Cast Lead, the Hamas rulers in Gaza have refrained from attacks against Israel and tried to prevent other militant groups from launching attacks as well. But as 2012 has progressed, that policy has changed — largely due to internal transformations within the group itself.

The internal dynamic of Hamas has traditionally been that leaders in its Politburo, which is based almost entirely in neighboring Arab countries, were more militant than their compatriots inside Gaza. It was the leaders in exile who maintained close relations with the radical regimes in Iran and Syria, while the Hamas government in Gaza was more restrained because it had more to lose from violence with Israel.

That calculation has been inverted in recent months as Hamas’s foreign alliances have undergone a dramatic transformation and its domestic wing has made a bold attempt to assert its primacy. Hamas’s relationship with Damascus completely collapsed when the group came out in opposition to President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The Politburo had to abandon its Damascus headquarters, and is now scattered in capitals throughout the Arab world. This has also created enormous strains with Iran, which is apparently supplying much less funding and material to Hamas than before.

Hamas leaders in Gaza, meanwhile, have increasingly been making the case that the Politburo does not represent the organization’s paramount leadership — but rather its diplomatic wing, whose main role is to secure aid and support from foreign governments. It is the Hamas government and paramilitary force in Gaza, they argue, that are in the driver’s seat, because they are actually involved in fighting Israel.

The desire to be the tip of the spear against Israel explains why Hamas involved itself in rocket attacks against Israel earlier this year, and has done much less to prevent other groups from launching attacks in recent weeks. The attacks are part of the case for the transfer of paramount leadership away from the exiles and to the Hamas political and military leadership in Gaza, which portrays itself as doing the ruling and the fighting.

This internal struggle has been given renewed urgency by the September announcement from the group’s current head, Khaled Meshaal, that he would step down. The two contenders for the top spot are Hamas’s de facto leader in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, and the present Politburo number two, the Cairo-based Musa Abu Marzook. A Haniyeh victory would cement the transfer of power within Hamas to Gaza, while Abu Marzook represents continued hopes that Hamas’s fortunes hinge on benefiting from the region-wide “Islamic Awakening” — the group’s interpretation of what others call the Arab Spring.

These rocket attacks don’t just come at a time of intense internal wrangling within Hamas, but also Israel’s upcoming election in January. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his government have been under enormous pressure to forcefully respond to the continued rocket fire — more than 800 rockets so far this year, according to Israeli officials — and Jaabari’s assassination sends the most powerful of messages. Netanyahu has made his political career on security issues, but even if he hopes to limit the conflagration, it could spiral out of everyone’s control.

The third vital context for Wednesday’s offensive is the upcoming initiative by the Palestine Liberation Organization to formally request an upgrade at the U.N. General Assembly to “non-member observer state status.” Israel is vehemently opposed to this resolution, which is certain to win a majority if it is submitted. Jerusalem has reacted with a series of dire threats — including cutting off the tax revenues it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority, declaring the Oslo Agreements “null and void,” overthrowing Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, greatly expanding settlement activity, or even unilaterally annexing parts of the occupied West Bank.

Israel has also been marshaling U.S. and European opposition to the PLO’s statehood bid, apparently with a great deal of success. Together, they have been able to paint the move as “unilateral” and provocative, setting the stage for retaliatory measures. But the Israelis must be aware that any further financial, diplomatic, or political blows to the badly ailing Palestinian Authority — which is currently unable to meet the public employee payroll, on which the majority of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza depend — can only strengthen Hamas.

During last year’s PLO initiative at the United Nations, Hamas was in such disarray from its growing crisis with Syria and Iran that it was in no condition to exploit Israeli “punishment” of the PLO. This time, however, Hamas is in an entirely different position: It appears to be on the brink of achieving considerable regional and international legitimacy. The emir of Qatar recently visited Gaza, becoming the first head of state to do so, and promised $400 million in reconstruction aid to the de facto Hamas government there. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is also reportedly considering a formal visit to Gaza. Egypt, too, is vying for Hamas’s affections, although President Mohammed Morsy’s government has done little to practically help the group.

Hamas can claim, for the first time in many years, to have a vision for the future, reliable patrons, and regional momentum as the primary beneficiaries of a wave of Islamist political victories across the Middle East. The PLO, Hamas can argue, has no money, no friends, no vision, and no future.

If the PLO goes forward with its initiative at the United Nations and Israel and the West react with significant punitive measures, Hamas is better positioned than ever to be the direct political beneficiary. Indeed, it will never have been closer to its cherished aim of seizing control of the Palestinian national movement — and possibly even the PLO itself — from its secular nationalist rivals.

The people of Israel will not find peace and security through endless wars with an ever-evolving array of Palestinian militants — the inevitable consequence of the lack of a peace agreement. For all its death and destruction, Operation Cast Lead failed to solve any of Israel’s security issues and did nothing to weaken Hamas’s grip on power in Gaza. But it did expose Israel to unprecedented international condemnation regarding its targeting of civilian and non-military targets, alleged war crimes, and excessive use of force. Those who fire rockets from Gaza, or countenance such attacks must also be held responsible for what they know full well will be the Israeli response — the price of which will, as always, be primarily paid by ordinary, innocent Palestinians.

Make no mistake: Jaabari’s assassination is a major blow to Hamas’s military wing, which lost its long-standing leader. And even if this is the beginning of a “reformatting” of Gaza, Israel could once again end up winning the battle but losing the war: If it is not careful, developments on the Gaza battlefield could end up strengthening rather than weakening Hamas. Worse still, it could empower extreme, new Palestinian jihadist organizations that have begun to crop up in Gaza. The potential for miscalculation on all sides — bringing another round of mayhem that only makes matters worse for everyone — is grave.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/11/15/morsi-s-gaza-challenge.html

http://www.nowlebanon.com/NewsArticleDetails.aspx?ID=456131

Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamists and Salafists in contemporary Arab politics can only be described as “frienemies.” In its more nuanced form, this word describes the relationship of those who are simultaneously, for different purposes, both valued allies and deadly rivals.

This is particularly true in post-dictatorship Egypt and Tunisia. Salafists and Muslim Brothers disagree about much, but stand in common opposition to secularists, liberals and progressives. Ultimately, each would prefer to live under systems dominated by their Islamist rivals than any form of secularism. There is obviously a huge range among the Islamist, and especially Salafist, groups. Any quick overview like this is bound to be reductive. But its general outlines are accurate.

Islamists often, but not always, unite against secularists or remnants of the old dictatorships. In Egypt, the Salafist Al-Nour party courted former Mubarak-era Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq when it appeared he might win the presidency. And there have been numerous other instances in which various Islamists have tried to leverage temporary alliances of convenience with non-Islamist parties against each other.

Insofar as Muslim Brotherhood-inspired parties now dominate the Egyptian and Tunisian governments, Salafist agitation almost invariably undermines their rule. The long-term Salafist goal of unseating the Brotherhood as the vanguard Islamist movement is obvious. They do this by continuously attempting to upstage the Brotherhood on “Islamic” piety.

One of the silliest instances of this was at the outset of the first post-Mubarak Egyptian parliament, when a Salafist MP rose in the middle of opening proceedings and began shouting out the Muslim call to prayer. The Muslim Brotherhood parliament speaker admonished him that there was a mosque nearby, and this was Parliament, not a house of prayer. To everybody else it looked completely ridiculous, but from the Salafist point of view, mission accomplished.

Salafist riots in Tunisia against “un-Islamic” cultural expressions such as art galleries and cinemas proved deeply embarrassing, and even destabilizing, to An-Nahda. Salafist TV preachers in Tunisia urged their young cadres to engage in street battles with An-Nahda toughs. And over the past few weeks, Egyptian Salafists have been staging large and angry protests against the Muhammad Morsi government, as have their Tunisian brethren against the An-Nahda-led troika coalition.

The two sides in Egypt are wrangling over, among other things, Article Two of the draft Constitution. The Brotherhood appears prepared to live with the traditional reference to “principles of Sharia Law” as the main source of legislation, a vague wording with limited legal impact. The Salafists, however, are demanding the removal of the word “principles,” theoretically making Sharia the direct source of legislation.

With Brotherhood parties now leading governments that have to be responsible for actual policies rather than mere rhetoric, they find themselves open to an endless series of accusations of impiety or hypocrisy from their Salafist rivals.

When ideologues seriously vie for power, they typically find their slogans often don’t match their interests or imperatives. The new Egyptian government, for example, has been borrowing and lending money at large amounts of interest, performing extraordinary feats of theological and rhetorical contortions to explain how this does not constitute some form of “usury.” The Salafists themselves had for decades denounced politics, government and, above all, voting, as sinful and “worldly,” only to form parties and stand for elections the minute the opportunity presented itself.

To make matters worse, there is a crucial difference in political perception at play. In Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere, there is every indication that the Brotherhood feels deeply vulnerable in spite of its apparent strength. They seem to fear they may have peaked too early, and won’t be able to replicate their strong victories in future elections. And they appear to recognize that while they may have secured the cooperation of, they have not yet gained control over, the greatest sources of government power: the military and police.

This is what An-Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi was trying, apparently in vain, to explain to Tunisian Salafists in his embarrassing video comments urging them to be patient while his party worked to seize control of the army and security forces to forestall “a secularist comeback.” Ghannouchi says he fears that if Salafists push the Islamist agenda too far or too quickly, they could experience a repeat of the bloody backlash against them in Algeria in the 1990s. It’s hyperbole, perhaps, but indicative of the different attitudes that stem from power and opposition, and a thinly-veiled threat as well.

Salafist and Brotherhood preachers inveigh against secularists on television and from the pulpit in unison, and sometimes in seeming coordination. On that much, they agree. But they also regularly accuse each other of any manner of misdeeds and frequently leverage alliances with the very secularists they both detest.

At one register they are the strongest of allies, while at another the bitterest of enemies. They are the closest of frienemies.