The brutality that the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has employed in crushing rebel forces and attacking civilians in Homs is yet another crucial indicator of the extent to which civil conflict in Syria has developed its own inexorable momentum. In the United States, however, the debate continues to focus on ways of avoiding facing this ugly reality and dealing with it proactively.

The policy of the Obama administration and much of the discourse within the American foreign policy establishment reflect symptoms of neurotic denial. The reality that hasn’t been fully accepted in Washington yet is that the Rubicon of civil conflict has long since been crossed and there’s no going back.
The stark choice facing the United States, and all external actors, is whether or not they care to be involved in shaping the nature and the outcome of that conflict, or prefer to remain largely passive observers and then deal with the consequences.

The loudest voices in the American conversation are still those counseling the need for a political solution to the crisis. This idea is rooted in two indefensible fantasies: first, that the present regime might be willing to cut a deal rather than pursue a military solution; and second, that there is a way to avoid the further intensification of conflict on the ground.

Built into this wishful thinking is a paradox. In theory, it might be possible to shift the calculations of some elements in the present regime toward cutting a deal with the opposition. However, the only way to achieve such a radical shift is by transforming the equation on the ground. And the only way to do that is to proactively engage in the conflict that already exists and is going to intensify—whether or not outside parties intervene directly or indirectly.

Most aspects of the American policy conversation that acknowledge the need to engage with events on the ground in Syria have focused on the humanitarian calamity and the principle of Responsibility to Protect. A respected former US official, Anne-Marie Slaughter, has proposed creating “no-kill zones” and safe havens for refugees, and even supplying arms to rebel groups “for defensive purposes” only.

Even when packaged as a humanitarian intervention, such measures would have clear strategic implications, and the idea that arms could function only in a “defensive” manner in such a conflict is, frankly, inconceivable. Meanwhile, Republican Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham have simply advocated arming rebels, and this sentiment is growing.

Even though most in the Obama administration continue to maintain a risk-averse attitude toward Syria, it’s becoming ever clearer that entirely opting out of an ongoing conflict that cannot be reversed simply leaves the field to others. Over the weekend, US officials said they had evidence that Iran was more heavily involved in the repression than had been previously believed. They also said that the increased use of improvised explosive devices by rebels suggested “outside support” and that the conflict was therefore likely to expand.

While the capabilities of the Syrian rebel forces have been much derided, New York Times photographer Tyler Hicks, who also covered the Libya conflict, recently wrote that his strong impression was that “The Free Syrian Army is much more organized than the rebel fighters in Libya. Because of the growing number of defectors, there’s a stock of able, trained soldiers and officers mounting in Syria… but they don’t yet have the weapons to put up a realistic fight.”

Changing the equation on the ground to help create that “realistic fight” and force the regime to begin to deploy its largely Sunni military rank-and-file rather than its largely Alawite elite forces could prove a crucial turning point. It could unleash mass defections, with at least some heavy weapons presumably.

Hicks had been traveling in Syria with the late New York Times correspondent Anthony Shadid. In an interview with local activists taped a few hours before his death, Shadid opined that he thought the regime would eventually fall, but that it would take a long time. This evaluation seems entirely justified and has two vital implications.

First, the less foreign intervention there is, of whatever kind, on the side of the opposition, the longer it will take, the messier it will be, and the more people will die. Second, there is a huge opportunity for outside forces to help shape the nature and even the identity of the opposition that will eventually depose the regime. If the United States wants to leave that role to others such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar or Islamist groups, it can hardly complain about the outcome.

The Obama administration, which seeks to reconcile American values and interests, has a major opportunity to do so in this case. Persisting with policies based on wishing things in Syria weren’t as they are fails both humanitarian values and strategic interests.