https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/will_south_sudan_be_a_wake-up_call_for_the_arabs

This weekend’s independence of the Republic of South Sudan should be an urgent wake-up call to the Arab world at large.

The loss of a large, formerly integral and oil-rich part of an important Arab state is obviously a huge blow to Sudan. Moreover, it may prove a significant blow to the Arab world as a whole, since South Sudan’s relationship with the Arabs in general is still in question. It has been offered Arab League membership, but whether it will accept that, or even the alternative of observer status, remains unclear. Meanwhile, it is cultivating strong ties to sub-Saharan African states, the West and Israel.

The reality is that if northern Sudanese and other Arabs are distressed at this development, as they reasonably might be, they have no one to blame but themselves. The almost unanimous yes vote in the secession referendum reflects the grim and bitter treatment of the southern provinces by Khartoum for many decades.

The north gave the southern Sudanese no reason whatsoever to wish to remain part of the united Sudan and every incentive to embrace independence at the soonest possible date. This history is by no means exclusive to Sudan, but reflects a broader problem throughout the Arab world of ignoring peripheral regions, oppressing ethnic and sectarian minorities, and utterly failing to produce societies inclusive of their heterogeneous populations.

Of course the same may prove true of South Sudan, which itself is made up of a myriad of ethnic, tribal and sectarian groups that are presently united mainly by their disdain for Khartoum. While it’s often seen in the West as “largely Christian,” and although its leadership tends to be drawn from that community, most of its peoples adhere to traditional religions and are strongly defined by tribal and ethnic identities.

But that is South Sudan’s problem. The Arabs ought to take this opportunity to learn yet another bitter lesson about the dangers of chauvinism and intolerance, although there is no evidence that they are presently doing so.

The Arab world has a long tradition of ignoring peripheries, both within states and within the Arab world as a whole. The Arabs as a collectivity did little to prevent secessionist impulses in South Sudan, ignoring ongoing problems in that country and mainly moving to rally around Sudanese President Omar Bashir when he was indicted by the International Criminal Court.

It’s fair to observe that the South was virtually driven out, or at least away, by decades of intolerable behavior from Khartoum, although Bashir deserves at least some credit for enduring the indignity of attending the independence ceremony, at the John Garang Mausoleum no less.

Many other Arab societies need to take careful note of the consequences of oppressive behavior.

Probably the only reason that the Kurds of Iraq, for example, have not really pushed for full independence is that theirs would be a landlocked state surrounded by hostile powers and most likely unable to export its petroleum overland. South Sudan, by contrast, is surrounded by states that are likely to help it overcome its lack of direct access to the sea.

The Arab world isn’t only plagued by dominant intolerant majorities, but also by oppressive rule by minorities in some cases. The Syrian regime, dominated by the Alawite sect, and the minority Sunni-dominated monarchy in Bahrain, are cases in point. Even endemic tensions between native Jordanians and their Palestinian fellow citizens demonstrate a more attenuated version of the same problem.

The bottom line is that throughout the Arab world, governments and societies tend to look at their peoples through sectarian and ethnic lenses that dangerously cast populations primarily in terms of their narrower, sub-state identities rather than as citizens and individuals with inviolable rights that must be respected for both moral and political reasons.

Many Arabs may view Bahrain is an anomaly or South Sudan as a remote and essentially marginal area, but the problems they illustrate about citizenship and identity are endemic and almost universal.

Like most of the postcolonial world, many Arab states are indeed jerry-rigged conglomerations that don’t reflect sectarian, ethnic and even cultural homogeneity. But that’s no excuse for a prevailing attitude that pushes marginalized and minority regions and communities to reject or resist existing state formations and structures on the well-founded grounds that they do not seem capable of accommodating the basic rights of individuals and sub-national groups.

Blaming the West, Israel, Iran or other outside forces is an illusion. For these internal divisions, like the northern Sudanese, the Arabs in general have no one to blame but themselves, since they are largely at fault for the centrifugal forces pulling societies across the region apart. That other Middle Eastern societies, including Turkey, Israel and Iran all have the same problem is no excuse either.

The Arab world must urgently learn the lesson of the secession of South Sudan: Move quickly toward inclusive national politics that respect the rights of marginalized minorities and regions, or face the bitter consequences of inevitable strife and, at its most extreme, national disintegration.