http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/qatar-cannot-be-allowed-to-sabotage-the-region

Nowhere is the Trump effect being felt more strongly than in the Middle East. Following the recent Riyadh summit meetings, the Trump administration’s determination to create a powerful international coalition to combat terrorism and extremism, and roll back Iran’s regional hegemony, is already having serious political and strategic consequences.

One of the most important manifestations of this is the renewed campaign to get Qatar to finally cooperate with its Arab and American allies rather than continuing its dangerous ideological and diplomatic double-dealing.

The current controversy between Qatar and several of its key Gulf Cooperation Council allies has its proximate cause in remarks attributed to the emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim. According to reports carried on Qatari websites, he spoke respectfully of Iran, criticised US and GCC policies towards Tehran and suggested its regional ambitions should be accommodated, not opposed. He also reportedly boasted about Qatar’s good relations with Israel while praising Hamas and Hizbollah.

Qatar claims that he never said such things, and that its state-of-the-art cyber networks were “hacked” in a “fake news” frame-up. Not only does this seem technically far-fetched, the remarks precisely reflect Qatar’s practical foreign policies, leaving little reason to doubt their authenticity.

Additionally, in a telephone conversation with Iranian president Hassan Rouhani, Sheikh Tamim appeared to welcome Iran’s call for dialogue without mentioning the fundamental conditions laid out by the GCC in a January letter to Iran delivered by the Kuwaiti foreign minister: Tehran’s non-interference in other countries’ affairs, not trying to export the Iranian revolution and not claiming to represent Shia communities in GCC countries.

The broader context is long-standing Qatari efforts to have it both ways on multiple key issues at the expense of its partners. After years of Qatar supporting Muslim Brotherhood groups around the region, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain finally lost patience with Doha in March 2014, withdrawing their ambassadors. They only relented after Qatar agreed to scale back support for Islamist extremists, including the Brotherhood, and respect the sovereignty of its partners.

In recent years, Qatar has somewhat stepped back from exclusive support of Islamist groups and added a rather anachronistic left-wing Arab nationalist component to its formidable international soft power and propaganda arsenal. That’s a change, but it’s hardly an improvement.

Meanwhile, Doha’s support for violent extremist organisations such as Hamas, and fomenters of extremism such as Brotherhood preacher and Al Jazeera superstar Yusuf Qaradawi, was never really attenuated.

Moreover, while much of the rest of the Arab world is dismayed at recent changes in Turkish foreign policy, Qatar’s alignment, including a growing military alliance, with the Islamist regime in Ankara has intensified.

Worst of all, Qatar has consistently maintained a public position critical of Iran while quietly and practically pursuing a policy of appeasement. After all, Doha shares with Tehran the source of most of its revenues, the massive South Pars/North Dome natural gasfield.

Now, however, the walls are closing in on this unsustainable and indefensible duplicity.

As the Trump administration’s priorities of targeting both terrorism and Iranian hegemony became clear, the tolerance for these shenanigans started to dry up quickly.

In Washington, a major campaign, led by conservative and, especially, pro-Israel groups, to pressure Qatar over its ongoing support for radical Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, has been gaining steam for several months.

Sheikh Tamim’s impolitic frankness about his country’s actual, rather than usually stated, policies has prompted inevitable anger among Qatar’s GCC partners, who, like Washington, are growing weary of Doha’s deceit. Qatar probably feels hard done by, because it has indeed distanced itself somewhat from the Brotherhood of late, supported anti-Iranian rebel forces in Syria, and promised to stop interfering in its neighbours’ internal affairs. Doha undoubtedly believes those reflect some big concessions and is sure it has improved. But it’s an understatement to say this is nothing close to good enough.

Obviously there must eventually be Arab dialogue with Iran. The questions are: on whose terms and under what conditions? Qatar is in no position to define those, particularly when its financial health is dependent on maintaining a degree of cooperation with Tehran.

Plainly Qatar’s American and Gulf partners have had enough. Doha may indeed have a national interest in not provoking Iran too much. But with a mere 300,000 citizens and just 11,000 military personnel, it needs its partners’ good will – including the 10,000 American troops in Qatar – much more. Qatar has to start respecting, rather than undermining, its allies’ vital interests.

Nobody expects Doha to lead the campaign, which appears to be rapidly taking shape as a practical programme, to deal a crushing blow to violent Islamist extremist organisations and roll back Iran’s encroachments into the Arab world in Syria and beyond. But its key partners are now insisting that Qatar at least stop sabotaging these efforts.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/can-trump-afford-to-dump-so-called-american-values

Donald Trump is facing heavy criticism on human rights in the aftermath of his first international trip. The Trump administration has downplayed this issue more dramatically than any since Ronald Reagan’s first term. The implications of this shift are especially unclear because the administration has three distinct voices speaking simultaneously on human rights.

In 1981 Reagan took office determined to stop critiquing the domestic policies of Washington’s Cold War allies against the Soviet Union, even apartheid-era South Africa. This was rationalised on the grounds that right-wing dictators were “authoritarians” whose systems could evolve, whereas communist governments were “totalitarians” who foreclosed such transformations.

But during his second term Reagan shifted, recognising that there was a significant price to giving all anti-communist forces carte blanche on such international expectations. And, eventually, most of the communist states of Eastern Europe peacefully became more democratic, so the entire theory was decisively debunked.

Mr Trump goes even further.

He assures American partners they won’t be “lectured” and former tensions will not be continuing.

More significantly, Mr Trump extends this consideration to adversaries, downplaying concerns about human rights abuses by Russia, China and even North Korea, and praising their leaders personally for their supposed toughness and control.

For Mr Trump, these issues simply do not arise.

By contrast, secretary of state, Rex Tillerson distinguishes between “American values,” which he says are unchanging, and “policies”, which he says are ever-changing. “Policy”, which he casts as by definition pragmatic and amoral, in international relations must therefore always trump “values”, which are abstract or relevant only to US domestic affairs.

Rhetorically this goes beyond Kissingerian realism. But, practically, it strongly mirrors Barack Obama’s seemingly more anguished distinction between “values” and “interests”, most clearly articulated in his March 2011 speech on Libya, which he suggested was a rare instance when American values and interests coincided.

Like Mr Trump’s position, Mr Tillerson’s could be seen as squandering the laboriously accumulated American asset of international credibility on human rights and democracy. Yet on closer inspection there seems little meaningful difference between Mr Tillerson’s approach and Mr Obama’s, despite superficially distinct appearances.

Mr Tillerson is arguably just honestly articulating what, perforce, must practically be the essence of great power policymaking, the ideological orientations of its practitioners notwithstanding.

Yet, unlike Mr Trump, Mr Tillerson crucially retains space for transcendent “American values” and defines them similarly to Mr Obama, and both seem to accord them the same – highly limited – relationship to most immediate policies or interests.

Finally, UN ambassador Nikki Haley has her own approach to human rights, and perhaps overall foreign policy, even more divergent from Mr Trump’s. From her platform in New York – including during her April term as president of the UN Human Rights Council – she has thundered against abuses in Syria, Congo, North Korea, Burundi, Cuba and Iran, among others, and issued a scathing condemnation of “the situation in Venezuela”.

Yes, these are all governments that are essentially unfriendly to Washington, but one simply cannot imagine such rhetoric coming from either Mr Trump, who dismisses these issues, or Mr Tillerson, who quarantines them.

Ms Haley’s rhetoric seems more traditionally American, with human rights an important part of Washington’s lookout, but applied more stringently to foes than friends.

However, once these principles are acknowledged and incorporated into the equation, the genie is out of the bottle.

Either human rights are an issue or they are not. For Mr Trump, clearly they are not.

Mr Trump is being widely accused of selectivity for urging international unity in “isolating” and confronting Iran. But he didn’t do so on the basis of human rights.

Even when he spoke of the Iranian people’s “suffering”, “hardship and despair”, and wished for them a “just and righteous government”, it was precisely in the context of Tehran’s destabilising regional policies – especially support for terrorists and extremists, and promoting sectarianism – not its domestic conduct.

The unparalleled butchery in Syria, of which Iran is a principal author, is merely Exhibit A in this well-founded indictment.

The Trump administration – in two out of its three guises, at least – is clearly betting that dispensing with rhetoric about human rights and democracy will enhance other goals such as counterterrorism, burden-sharing and trade. But it may learn, as the Reagan administration did, that this major US asset – the “mother of all soft-power bombs” – was developed and maintained for good reason.

Of course interests and policies will often trump values. But American values are substantial, and they can’t be jettisoned without a surprisingly heavy price.

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/25/trumps-plan-for-middle-east-peace-could-actually-work/

But can he combine Let’s Make a Deal with The Price is Right?

During his visit to Israel this week, U.S. President Donald Trump made the strongest public link thus far between two important initiatives: reviving Israeli-Palestinian peace and creating an Israeli-Arab alliance to confront Iran. At his main event with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump ad-libbed about Saudi King Salman’s potential role in brokering a peace agreement, saying the monarch “would love to see peace with Israel and the Palestinians.”

At the heart of this agenda is the “outside-in” strategy for resuscitating Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The talks would be linked to the development of a broader Middle Eastern coalition to oppose Iran’s ongoing expansion of influence in the Middle East and prepare for the day of reckoning when the nuclear agreement expires.

The Trump administration’s big idea is reportedly that Sunni-majority Arab countries could form a NATO-like alliance. This grouping could then have a less formal but still highly cooperative relationship with Turkey. And, most importantly, it could engage in meaningful coordination and cooperation with Israel to form a united regional bloc against additional Iranian mischief and pursuit of hegemony.

A new strategic affiliation between the Arabs and Israel — one that offered the latter new regional legitimacy, recognition, and a key role in a united front against its mortal enemy, Iran — would be meant to provide Israel new incentive to come to terms with an independent Palestinian state. The Palestinians, in turn, would be provided by Israel and Arab nations with political cover, diplomatic support, and economic aid to help make the necessary compromises for a final peace deal.

In theory, this is a great idea. It’s the only approach that anyone has posited in many years that might break the deadlock, potentially offering a win-win-win scenario for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab states. And there is evidence that Israel, some key Arab countries, and the Palestinians might be open to such a dynamic — if it can ever get off the ground.

But would-be peacemakers should not be preparing for their photo on the White House lawn just yet. The diplomatic and political obstacles in the region remain at least as daunting as the gains are enticing.

The key challenge is who will go — or perhaps blink — first. Israel already has peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, so the crucial players on the Arab side are Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and any other Arab countries they can bring along. The most promising development is a draft “discussion paper” being circulated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE that describes a range of confidence-building measures between Israel and the Arab countries. These would involve gestures such as telecommunications and commercial and overflight relations with Israel in exchange for Israeli moves toward the Palestinians, such as restricting settlement activities or easing the blockade on Gaza.

The mainstream Arab position is still characterized by the “Arab Peace Initiative,” introduced by Saudi Arabia and unanimously adopted by the Arab League in 2002 and reconfirmed twice since then. It essentially promises Israel fully normalized diplomatic and trade relations with the Arab countries once they reach an agreement with the Palestinians. Israel has dismissed the proposal from its outset. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now signaling they are prepared to improve relations with Israel beyond the terms set by the initiative. Israel would be wise to recognize that the price for strategic cooperation with Arab countries and regional recognition of its de facto legitimacy have never been lower.

Israeli leaders might be tempted to believe that if they wait longer, the concessions required of them will drop still further still. That would be a mistake. The cost of normalized diplomatic ties is never going to be zero. These countries are constrained by both their long-standing diplomatic and political positions, genuine values, and honest assessment of the destabilizing political impact of the ongoing occupation that began in 1967 (and hence entering its 50th year with no end in sight).

In the past, major movement between Israel and Arab countries would have required a final status agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. For a number of reasons, particularly mutual alarm about Iran, that’s no longer the case. What’s required is progress that can breathe new life into the long-term prospects for a two-state solution. The more steps Israel takes, the more the Arab countries can do in return. Under current circumstances, the best-case scenario is probably some sort of interim accord that maintains Israel’s overall security control, while also limiting Israeli settlement activity and other aspects of the occupation and expanding Palestinian prerogatives and areas of authority.

Trump seems to realize that this sort of partial agreement is the most that can be secured, which is probably why he doesn’t bring up the two-state solution or Palestinian independence. If he’s really shooting for an interim agreement — which would actually be the first major progress since 1993 and hence no mean feat — calling it “peace” would be consistent with his “truthful hyperbole” style of branding by exaggeration.

For the Arab countries, such an agreement is hardly ideal, but it would surely be enough to allow for greater cooperation with Israel. Even the revival of the process itself, short of an interim agreement, might allow for some significant steps. For Palestinians, the prospect is more painful — but the choice is also starker.

None of this is what Palestinians want, which is an independent state in place of the occupation. Moreover, the prospect of an interim agreement presents them with a dreadful but familiar choice. This is completely understandable: 50 years of occupation and 24 years of Oslo, both of which were supposed to be temporary, feel extremely permanent. Yet as so often in the past, Palestinians may be presented with a very small and highly unsatisfactory set of limited gains, all of which come with a concomitant price. Or they can reject whatever is presented to them, and enjoy what they essentially have now, which amounts to nothing.

This is an infuriating conundrum. But it only has one rational answer, which is a grudging and resentful yes. Palestinians will be forced to compare the prospect of a deal with the situation they were in a few months ago. In recent years, they found themselves isolated, ignored, and deeply concerned that their issue had been discarded, not only by the international community but even by the Arab world. Now, suddenly, with Trump, they are back in the limelight, on the agenda and in the game.

For Abbas and his secular nationalist allies, this is all a political godsend. It not only revives their hopes that their diplomatic strategy can achieve tangible results, it also reaffirms their role on the international and regional stage. All that adds to the incentive to say yes — despite all the obvious reservations.

Shifting Israel might be more difficult. Netanyahu has expressed enthusiasm for stronger ties to Arab countries — but he’s notoriously skeptical about a broader agreement with Palestinians. Left on his own, the prospect of stronger ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE might entice him to make concessions. But some of his coalition partners, particularly Naftali Bennett of the ultra-right-wing Jewish Home Party, are waiting to pounce on any moves he makes toward the Palestinians. Bennett’s long-term prospects depend on challenging Netanyahu from his right, largely by denouncing him as compromising Israel’s ambitions and security in the occupied territories. Netanyahu’s strategy for preventing this has been to keep Bennett close within the cabinet — but if he wants to move in the direction in which Trump is nudging him, he would have to allow Bennett to leave the coalition in favor of center and center-left groups. The profoundly risk-averse Netanyahu might soon find himself with the unenviable choice of defying an American president who he hoped would be his strongest ally, or risk being outflanked on the right by powerful rivals.

This Israeli conundrum goes to the heart of why there is such an impasse in the peace process — and why the “outside-in” approach could work. Under current circumstances, most Israelis feel little pain from the status quo, and Palestinians lack any form of leverage to get them to consider compromising. It therefore seems a no-brainer for most Jewish Israelis and their politicians to take no risks politically or in terms of national security. Bringing in the Arab and regional component reminds Israelis of the broader context — including the threat from Iran and the myriad benefits that would come from greater cooperation with and recognition from the Arab world.

Perhaps the biggest challenge, though, amounts to a chicken-and-egg question: Which shall come first? Is Israel going to move into a serious process with the Palestinians, in hopes of stronger ties with the Arabs? Or will Arab countries start building more open and robust cooperation with Israel in hopes that the Israelis will be more cooperative on peace? Neither side is likely to move on spec.

Here’s where the Trump factor becomes potentially decisive. Washington could push both sides together, but it would involve some very heavy lifting. It would probably require both carrots and sticks for the Israelis, which could come at a political price at home, especially among Republicans. And to move the Arab states, the United States would probably have to demonstrate some real progress in rolling back Iran’s influence in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. It’s highly questionable if this is consistent with either Trump’s “America First” agenda, or the widespread aversion among Americans to getting sucked into additional Middle Eastern imbroglios.

To produce this blockbuster, Trump, the reality TV veteran, will need to craft a script for Israelis, Palestinians, and Arabs that somehow combines Let’s Make a Deal with The Price is Right. Even if he pulls it off, it still wouldn’t really be “the ultimate deal,” as he keeps calling it. But it’s close enough.

THE ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-israeli-palestinian-peace/528030/

We Can’t Predict Whether Trump Will Succeed in the Middle East
At this stage, a great start and a false start would both look much the same

President Trump’s visit to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories was long on rhetoric and optics but short on substance, particularly regarding the peace process. Trump is clearly determined to prioritize the Israeli-Palestinian issue and link it with broader regional concerns. But it’s impossible to judge whether we are headed in the right direction or charging headlong down the same old dead end. That’s because at this stage, a great start that ultimately produces tangible results and a false start that produces quixotic flailing at best or real harm at worst would both look much the same—and much like what we’ve been seeing.

On the positive side, Trump has salvaged the Israeli-Palestinian issue from the diplomatic dumpster of recent years. He’s owning the project, designating his son-in-law and chief adviser, Jared Kushner, as the nominal point-person, and his longtime attorney, Jason Greenblatt, as negotiator. Because this is now a White House undertaking closely associated with his own reputation, when the time comes, he might well be willing to leverage his personal and institutional credibility to pressure parties. That can’t be overestimated. Barack Obama’s second term shows what can happen when an American president walks away.

Moreover, both Trump and Greenblatt have established warm relations, not only with Israel, but also with the Palestinian leadership. That’s especially significant because it’s so unexpected. Many observers, particularly on the Israeli ultra-right, gathered from Trump’s campaign that he would embrace the Israeli settlement agenda, abandoning decades of international law and U.S. policy.

Nothing of the kind has happened. The campaign pledge, which continued into the interregnum before the inauguration, to move the U.S. Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, has been shelved. Trump has somewhat adjusted the (already attenuated) American position on Israeli settlements; he’s gone from saying that they are “unhelpful” to saying that they are “not good for peace.” And he’s urged Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to “hold off” on more settlements. The administration seems to have reached a tacit understanding with Israel roughly similar to one George W. Bush developed with Netanyahu on settlements, agreeing that they can be built “up but not out.” This means Israel can add housing units to existing settlements, but not expand them territorially or create new ones, especially in highly strategic areas that alter the political equation and further undermine prospects for a Palestinian state.

On several other crucial issues, Trump has maintained longstanding American policies based on international law, and has been willing to irk Israel in the process. His advisers made it clear that, when Trump visited occupied East Jerusalem, Netanyahu was not welcome to accompany him because it is “not your territory, it is part of the West Bank,” despite Israel’s claims to have annexed East Jerusalem and insistence that all of Jerusalem is its “eternal and undivided capital.” Israelis have been making much hay recently about payments by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to the families of Palestinians imprisoned in Israel, including those accused of terrorism. Trump may have alluded to the issue, very obliquely, during his press conference with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas Tuesday, and reportedly raised the subject, but without much emphasis, during their meetings at the White House and in Bethlehem.

Greenblatt is reportedly working on a series of economic initiatives to improve living conditions for Palestinians in the occupied West Bank, which should also help stabilize the Palestinian political situation. It’s no substitute for an actual peace process, but it’s an important step forward under difficult circumstances. And the political credibility of Abbas has been greatly enhanced by Trump’s embrace of his leadership, the Palestinian role in the process, and the resurrection of the issue. None of that will survive indefinitely in a diplomatic vacuum, but it’s all very helpful.

Meanwhile, Netanyahu is bending over backwards to shower praise on Trump, who, in turn, seems to have really won over most Jewish Israelis by heaping his own accolades on their country. And the biggest lovefest of all is taking place between Trump and Gulf Arab leaders, particularly those of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Trump wants to bring them and other Arab countries into the mix by adding a regional component to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. He is hoping that these countries can add an additional incentive to Israel through greater regional legitimacy and recognition, and forging a common front against Iran’s aggressive regional agenda (particularly with an eye to the expiration of the nuclear agreement). Saudi Arabia and the UAE seem willing, as demonstrated by a draft “discussion document” outlining proposed stronger ties to Israel in exchange for Israeli curbs on settlement activities and easing restrictions on Palestinians.

These personal relationships, and the accumulation of political credibility, can play a crucial role, but, history suggests, only in a limited way and at key moments in a process. Political considerations and national security imperatives are more likely to shape the choices leaders on all sides make. And that’s where grounds for doubt become daunting indeed.

The Palestinians are in the weakest and most exposed position of all.

Trump confronts in Netanyahu an Israeli leader whose instincts are risk-averse, who is extremely skeptical that an agreement with the Palestinians, however limited, is either achievable or desirable, and who is apparently convinced that regional instability makes significant compromises with the Palestinians out of the question. Moreover, in order to even make minimal concessions, he would almost certainly have to reshuffle his cabinet, most likely jettisoning the ultra-right-wing Jewish Home Party leader Naftali Bennett and replacing him with Labor Party leaders. That would open a very vulnerable flank on Netanyahu’s political extreme right, particularly given that the whole point of such a move would be to make some gestures toward the Palestinians in order to reach out to the Arabs, as Trump is urging.

The Arab leaders face an analogous conundrum. They, too, would like to forge a closer working relationship with Israel, mainly to form a united front against Iran, and, indeed, have already taken some significant, but very low-key, steps in that direction. But going further, especially more openly, would be exceptionally difficult for them unless there is a functional peace process that seems to be keeping the prospects of a two-state solution alive, if not leading directly to an end to the occupation. Without progress on the Palestinians, they can’t go much further toward Israel than they already have, which isn’t really all that far.

The Palestinians are in the weakest and most exposed position of all. They have almost no way of leveraging the Israelis, and, while they can always say no to any proposition, their national, economic, and political circumstances are so dire that there would be a serious temptation to consider almost any offer, as long as it’s not packaged as an “end of conflict and end of claims” final status agreement. Yet even while Abbas and company would probably want to take advantage of any opportunity to improve Palestinian lives, even modestly advance their national goals, and enhance their own political position, they would face massive opposition. Hamas surely would reject almost anything the PLO agrees to, but so might dissident factions within Fatah, who are currently jockeying for position to succeed the 82-year-old, ailing Abbas. So, even if it logically makes no sense for Palestinians to reject confidence-building measures, they still might feel constrained to do so politically.

The big danger is that Trump is raising expectations only to see them dashed because he lacks a real plan. This is a very dangerous game in the Israeli-Palestinian arena. Even with the best of intentions, miscalculations can cause enormous harm. During his first term, Obama, following the Roadmap of the Middle East Quartet, tried to secure a settlement freeze from Israel. Israel agreed to a temporary “freeze” with so many restrictions and caveats that actual settlement construction never really slowed. Then Israel refused an astonishingly generous package asking for a mere three-month extension of the agreement (which, at that point, would have seriously slowed settlement building). Obama walked away from the issue, leaving the Palestinians holding the settlement-freeze bag. Since then, we haven’t had any real negotiations, and Palestinians are still trying to figure out what to do with Obama’s unwelcome present.

Since Trump casts himself as the anti-Obama, he would do well to study this very carefully. In diplomacy in general, as in medicine, the starting point must be to first do no harm. Nowhere is this truer than between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

By paying close attention to the issue and injecting a novel and potentially fruitful regional approach into the mix, Trump may counterintuitively prove to be just the iconoclastic and innovative force that can shake up this moribund process and get it moving again, finally. Alternatively, this may be just another Trumpian boondoggle, a baseless and reckless gamble at everybody else’s expense. The problem is, under the current circumstances, no one can be sure which it is, because at this stage they’d both look pretty much like what we are currently seeing. Yes, in the Middle East, pessimists are usually proven right. But they never solve anything, and solutions are ultimately required.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/us-gulf-policy-symmetries-are-genuine-and-significant

Donald Trump flew into sunny Saudi Arabia pursued by some of the darkest clouds looming over Washington in decades. While the American capital is becoming increasingly inhospitable to the embattled new president, he was sure to be warmly received in Riyadh.

It makes perfect sense for Arabian Gulf countries to seize this important, and perhaps historic, opportunity to strengthen their crucial relationships with United States that frayed during the Barack Obama years.

It’s easy to understand this administration’s appeal to Gulf leaders. They’re telling them exactly what they want to hear. Rex Tillerson, US secretary of state, saying the message of the trip is “America is back” is music to the region’s ears.

Indeed, Gulf agendas probably dovetail better with Mr Trump’s than any other US allies, anywhere. The US president sees the region and America uniting to eliminate ISIL and Al Qaeda, terrorism financing and radical ideologies, while simultaneously confronting Iran’s destabilising agenda. Under Mr Trump, Washington seems set to no longer downplay Iran’s own terrorist proxies such as Hizbollah.

In addition, America is prepared to back the Islamic Military Alliance and a Nato-like Arab grouping.

Washington is also intent on strictly enforcing the nuclear agreement, including granting new sanctions relief in exchange for confirmed Iranian compliance, something that the Gulf has called for.

The news from Syria is even better. On Thursday, the United States launched its third attack in six weeks against forces loyal to Bashar Al Assad, in defence of US-backed rebel groups.

Good old-fashioned, but for once badly needed, American “mission creep” is evolving organically in Syria because Mr Trump is open to limited use of military force, and prioritises combating ISIL and Al Qaeda and rolling back Iranian dominance. Those goals simply can’t be accomplished without a stronger profile in Syria, because Syria is the centre of both.

Expanded trade and commerce, more Gulf investments in the United States and greater American investments in the Gulf are also on the table. Mr Trump wants to sell lots of American weapons. Gulf countries want to buy them. Moreover, as Gulf countries seek to diversify their economies, foreign direct investment in their new enterprises and their own investments overseas, including the United States, are indispensable.

Bringing Arab states into the Israeli-Palestinian peace process to advance ending the occupation and help to build a stronger coalition against Iran, including more cooperation with Israel based on such progress should prove a strategic win-win, especially if it helps secure maximum American engagement in containing and rolling back Tehran.

All this, and more, amply explains why Gulf leaders are so keen on Mr Trump and his agenda.

Moreover, many find Mr Trump’s personal and political style reassuringly familiar, such as his emphasis on individual relationships and blending of public and private interests. His reliance on a small circle of trusted advisers, particularly close family members mirrors the typical political culture of parts of the region.

I fully expect Mr Trump’s trip to Saudi Arabia to be a huge success and I sincerely hope it will be. All of the symmetries listed above are real and significant, and the opportunity to repair these vital relations is crucial.

However, some additional realities are worth considering.

No one should underestimate the political crisis, largely of his own making, that has enveloped Mr Trump.

His White House, mired in endless controversies, drowning in infighting, now faces an extremely formidable special counsel investigating ties to Russian intelligence and much more. The administration and its staff are lawyering up, attacking each other anonymously through the media and literally hiding in the bushes.

Even if Mr Trump can stabilise his political position, both sides could still disappoint each other’s high expectations.

Mr Trump talks tough but there’s little appetite among Americans for even limited military actions unless US interests are directly attacked.

And given the constraints imposed by the collapse of global energy prices, Mr Trump may find that there’s less cash available in the region than he hopes.

Gulf countries should certainly make the most of this opportunity to enhance relations with America as a whole. But when dealing with Mr Trump, Gulf leaders should take care to get it in writing. And they shouldn’t bet too heavily on his long-term political prospects.

To view the paper in full, click here.

In Search of a Trump Administration Middle East Policy

U.S. President Donald J. Trump is about to embark on his first overseas trip, with an emphasis on Middle East peace and security. His visit to the region raises the question of whether a definitive Trump administration Middle East policy may be starting to take shape, and how that process relates to both the policies and regional strategic circumstances that the new administration inherited from its immediate predecessor. There are several significant reasons to think a coherent new approach may be emerging, but also serious grounds – particularly given unprecedented unpredictability in U.S. Middle East policy – for doubting it. This paper seeks to identify and evaluate both perspectives, and provide a framework for appraising the ongoing evolution of U.S. Middle East policy under Trump.

Emerging key themes are:

• Rebuilding ties with traditional allies
• Countering Iran
• Engaging on Israeli-Palestinian peace
• Willingness to use military force
• “Quiet diplomacy” on human rights

Ongoing problems include:

• Policy incoherence
• An arguable lack of U.S. leadership
• Potential dangers of unrestrained rhetoric and ineffective military messaging
• Institutional weaknesses, especially in the U.S. Department of State
• Perils of sustained unpredictability for a status quo power

 

Trump’s Saudi Agenda: Advance Shared Goals and Change the Channel

U.S. President Donald J. Trump leaves Washington on Friday for his first overseas trip, under a mounting cloud of domestic controversy, beginning with a crucial visit to Saudi Arabia. Despite Trump’s widely-reported aversion to travel and an instinct to stay close to home to deal with perceptions that the administration is spinning out of control, the president may find himself welcoming an important and ambitious international journey that can allow him to build his global profile as a statesman and create a firmer imprint on U.S. Middle East policy.

The trip, which will also include visits to Israel, the occupied Palestinian territories, Belgium, and Italy, should afford Trump ample opportunity to advance U.S. interests in the region and continue to develop his own approach to Middle East policy. For Saudi Arabia and other Arab states, the visit comes at a propitious moment in relations with Washington. They, too, believe they have much to build on with Trump, given his stated determination to restore close ties with a range of traditional Middle Eastern partners. Saudi Arabia is so keen on the visit that it has launched a special, and impressive, bilingual website entirely devoted to promoting Trump’s visit to the kingdom under the heading “together we will prevail.”

The trip to Saudi Arabia is essentially structured into three parts, with ever-expanding concentric circles of engagement. The first day, May 20, will be largely spent on what will probably be the most important part of this leg of Trump’s journey: the bilateral U.S.-Saudi relationship. On May 21, the agenda expands to include a summit meeting with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, after which the president will meet with an even broader group of leaders from Arab and Muslim countries. This third meeting will be with the members of the Saudi-led anti-terrorism alliance, the Islamic Military Alliance (IMA), which will be receiving what amounts to an important diplomatic and political endorsement from Washington. Each phase of this unusually action-packed two days has its own purpose within the broader framework of what the United States and Saudi Arabia, and their various regional and international partners, seek to achieve through the meetings.

Trump will be promoting an already clearly defined set of priorities: more Arab support for counterterrorism efforts, confronting Iran, enhanced Gulf commerce with and investment in the U.S. economy including military procurements, encouraging Gulf Arab states’ engagement with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and countering perceptions that Trump or his administration is biased against Muslims or Islam. Gulf Arab countries and their allies will be looking to: secure more military technology and other support from Washington, enhance their own trade with the United States and promote investments in both directions, gain political and diplomatic heft from closer ties, provide Trump every opportunity to dispel negative impressions among Arabs and Muslims, and, above all, ensure maximum cooperation in confronting Iran’s regional agenda. The convergence of interests is so strong that the Saudi portion of Trump’s trip seems virtually assured of significant success. And if the president, a diplomatic novice but an undoubtedly talented performer, is seeking to “change the channel” away from domestic controversies and onto his new role as global statesman, this weekend’s agenda could hardly be better scripted.

Phase One: The Bilateral Relationship with Saudi Arabia

Although Trump will have other important elements of his trip to Saudi Arabia, the bilateral relationship between Washington and Riyadh will almost certainly be the most important and substantial. While many traditional U.S. partners in the Middle East – including other Gulf Arab countries, Egypt, and Israel – grew increasingly frustrated with former President Barack Obama during his second term and have welcomed the arrival of Trump in the White House, few have been more enthusiastic than Saudi Arabia. The Trump administration, too, has been extremely keen about enhancing the relationship, as evidenced by the March White House visit of Deputy Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). Following that meeting, which reportedly went much longer than originally scheduled, officials on both sides spoke glowingly about a historic “turning point,” and new era of closer cooperation between Washington and Riyadh.

There is a significant confluence of interests on both sides regarding key issues such as defense procurements, investments, and regional security strategy. Because of the strong compatibility of these parallel agendas, broad agreement on major agenda items in the bilateral relationship should be readily achievable. Trump’s priorities include counterterrorism, particularly against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and al-Qaeda, confronting Iran’s aggressive regional agenda, and ensuring that partners pay their “fair share” in defense expenditures and accept a range of burden sharing with Washington. All of these items fit quite well with the Saudi agenda, which is why such a strong, and possibly even exaggerated, sense of mutuality has almost instantly developed between the two governments.

Trump is highly sensitive about other countries failing to spend enough on their own defense needs, and during the presidential campaign he criticized Riyadh repeatedly on that score. Saudi Arabia is actively negotiating a massive defense procurement package from Washington, which should go a long way to addressing such concerns. In 2010, Saudi Arabia agreed to spend $60 billion on U.S. military procurements and services. The package being negotiated includes weapons sales agreed upon, but suspended, during the Obama administration, including the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system (THAAD), and a range of other weapons, systems, and services, which reportedly could total up to $350 billion over the next 10 years. A major announcement along these lines is reportedly being planned as one highlight of the trip.

Saudi Arabia spent more than 8 percent of its gross domestic product on defense in 2016 – in contrast to just over 3 percent spent by the United States and less than 2 percent spent by most NATO members – much of which goes to U.S. military goods and services. This defense spending has been reduced somewhat from over 12 percent of GDP in 2015, but the current expenditures, at a time of extreme budgetary pressure for Saudi Arabia given the collapse in global oil prices, nonetheless remain among the highest in the world, both in terms of GDP and per capita. In short, Saudi Arabia not only pays its fair share by any reasonable measure, it’s ready to dig deep and spend more, mainly on U.S. weapons and materiel.

At Trump’s March meeting with MbS, the Saudis reportedly suggested an investment package in the United States of up to $200 billion over the next four years, which could provide up to a million direct and an additional million indirect, U.S. jobs. An initial Saudi investment of $40 billion in infrastructure projects in the United States could be announced during the Trump visit. Such investments fit perfectly with Trump’s “America First” agenda and his own, thus far unrealized, promises for a major infrastructure spending program. They also serve the Saudi intention, as outlined in the National Transformation Program and Vision 2030 initiatives, to transform the kingdom’s economy, wean it off of dependence on petroleum revenue and diversify it, including through foreign direct investments. Riyadh will also undoubtedly seek Trump’s support for more U.S. investments in the Saudi economy, particularly in sectors slated for major development including defense industries, tourism, and entertainment. Dozens of senior U.S. business leaders are scheduled to follow Trump to Saudi Arabia in hopes of securing major deals that would benefit both sides and promote these commercial and political goals.

The administration may press Saudi Arabia to do more on confronting radical Islamists, including those viewed as propagating intolerance without openly advocating violence. Riyadh has a clear interest in combating not only violent extremists but also radical ideologues who threaten and attack mainstream Saudi society and its political system. The kingdom recently established the Ideological War Center to combat extremism as well as a new National Security Center. On May 7 Saudi Crown Prince and Interior Minister Mohammed bin Nayef hosted Trump’s Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly and Homeland Security Advisor Thomas Bossert to discuss counterterrorism and other security cooperation.

Saudi enthusiasm on counterterrorism will be additionally spurred because of the Trump administration’s apparent willingness to focus on challenging Iran’s regional agenda. The Obama administration seemed focused primarily on Iran’s nuclear program, for which it secured the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Whatever its merits, the agreement does directly address, and at the very least delay a reckoning of, the nuclear issue that is of paramount importance to the United States. From the point of view of Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab partners, however, achieving the nuclear agreement came at the expense of countering Iran’s destabilizing regional agenda.

Therefore, the renewed emphasis by the Trump administration on opposing Iran’s efforts to expand its influence in the Arab world is extremely welcome in Riyadh and beyond. Indeed, the sense of intensified U.S. support vis-à-vis Iran may have in part motivated some particularly sharp recent comments from MbS regarding Tehran’s ideology and intentions. If they become convinced that the United States is genuinely committed to halting and then reversing this expansion of Iranian influence in the region, Saudi Arabia and its partners could be incentivized to cooperate with Washington on a whole range of other, potentially difficult, issues.

For Saudi Arabia, the most important front in the campaign to confront and rollback Tehran’s influence is in Yemen, where it perceives the Houthi rebels as a dangerous Iranian proxy on its vulnerable southern border. Under Trump, the United States has greatly expanded its engagement in Yemen, particularly with air and drone attacks and the deployment of special forces, particularly in counterterrorism operations in coordination with the United Arab Emirates. Riyadh will certainly press for more U.S. support, some of which may be forthcoming. However, Washington will also push Riyadh toward a political settlement to end the conflict, which the administration has insisted is urgently needed. Riyadh appears to be increasingly looking for a way out of a conflict that seems stalemated and has spawned a humanitarian crisis.

Whatever Washington’s misgivings about the Yemen conflict may be, it nonetheless constitutes a clear instance of proactive military burden sharing by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, taking the lead in their own defense without an overreliance on the United States. For this reason alone, the Trump administration is likely to continue to support the effort as an illustration of the kind of self-reliance it wants to encourage from U.S. partners around the world.

Saudi Arabia will push Trump to develop a clearer and more engaged policy on Syria. The Tomahawk missile strike on a regime airbase following a chemical weapons attack against civilians was warmly welcomed by many U.S. allies in the Middle East, not least Riyadh. But Washington still does not have a clear or coherent Syria policy, and Saudi Arabia will press for one that seeks to rollback Iran’s and Hizballah’s influence and targets ISIL and al-Qaeda. This implies seeking the removal of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, an idea administration officials seemed to have abandoned and then readopted in recent weeks. Riyadh will have to be patient on Syria, and many other fronts, and prepared to hear that Washington may not be willing to go as far as it hopes. Yet the Saudis will strongly make the point that in order to successfully confront ISIL and al-Qaeda in Syria, it will also be necessary to confront Iran, Hizballah, and Assad. And while they are keen to see ISIL dealt a death blow in Syria, as well as Iraq, they have significant reservations about Washington’s plan to use Kurdish militias to lead the campaign to oust it from its de facto Syrian capital of Raqqa.

Phase Two: The GCC and the Regional Agenda

On May 21, the aperture widens considerably with a summit meeting between Trump and the governments of the six GCC countries. It will, in effect, be the third annual summit between a U.S. president and GCC leaders, although, for technical diplomatic reasons, it may be publicly billed as the 17th GCC summit with U.S. participation. Nonetheless, both sides seem keen to invigorate the U.S.-GCC working groups that were established at the 2015 Camp David summit and then expanded at the 2016 Riyadh summit.

Washington has had consistent expectations and requests for the GCC, particularly in terms of greater integration, interoperability, and intelligence sharing, however, they are mostly still unrealized. In particular, Washington has long sought to help develop an integrated Gulf regional missile defense system, mainly to protect against possible missile attacks from Iran. The purchase of THAAD by the UAE, and potentially Saudi Arabia, certainly helps, but Washington is likely to continue to press for movement toward greater integration.

The Trump administration is also seeking to re-engage on Israeli-Palestinian issues, and Trump will go from Saudi Arabia to Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. Part of the administration’s approach is the “outside-in” model that seeks to add a regional component, particularly involving Gulf Arab countries, to the peace process. The hope is that Gulf states – prompted in part by a shared desire to limit Iranian expansion in the Middle East and in part by U.S. encouragement – would provide Israel with the additional inducement of a broader and more open strategic engagement while giving the Palestinians political cover, diplomatic support, and badly needed economic assistance.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have reportedly circulated a “discussion paper” offering to expand telecommunications, commercial, and overflight ties to Israel in exchange for Israel limiting settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territories and easing restrictions on the flow of goods into the Gaza Strip. It is unclear whether this implies a formal offer to Israel, whether Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could politically accept it, where the process could go from there, and what the role of other Gulf or Arab countries might be. Nonetheless, the Trump administration and at least two of the key GCC countries seem to share a vision in which Gulf Arab countries could enhance their own strategic position vis-à-vis Iran by building stronger ties with Israel while simultaneously helping to stabilize, if not resolve, the variable of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Phase Three: The Broader Arab and Islamic Worlds

The third phase of the trip will be a meeting between Trump and approximately 55 leaders of Arab and Muslim countries. Billed as an “Arab-Islamic-American Summit,” it will mainly be with leaders of member states of the IMA that Riyadh created in December 2015. Former Pakistani Chief of Staff General (Ret.) Raheel Sharif was recently appointed its first commander in chief. Trump will deliver a major address to the group, in which he will, at least implicitly, give his blessing to the IMA, which is still primarily an information sharing and coordination group rather than a deployable force for military operations.

Trump will also reportedly press for what the administration is calling an “Arab NATO,” including key Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, along with other Arab countries such as Egypt and Jordan. The group would also, Washington hopes, cooperate and, to some extent, coordinate with Israel in the effort to block additional Iranian expansion. At the very least, Washington would like its traditional Sunni-majority Arab allies to create the framework for a more integrated military alliance to confront Iran, combat terrorism, and meet other urgent security requirements more effectively and without an overreliance on Washington.

While Trump’s meetings with the Saudis may yield meaningful deliverables, his speech to the broader Arab-Islamic group will mainly be a symbolic opportunity for both sides. Trump will seek to dispel any notions lingering from the presidential campaign or subsequently promoted by his travel banexecutive orders that he harbors Islamophobic attitudes or that bias against Muslims plays any role in shaping U.S. policies. Fulsome rhetoric about the importance of the broader relationship with Arab and Muslim states, and the explicit or implicit endorsement of the IMA, in the White House view, will help reframe the president in the eyes of many world leaders who may continue to question his intentions.

There is at least one looming potential embarrassment, however. Sudanese President Omar Bashir – who is facing indictment for alleged war crimes by the International Criminal Court, but has enjoyed something of a rapprochement with Riyadh in its efforts to forge the broadest possible coalition to counter Iran – has reportedly been invited to attend the meeting since Khartoum is a member of the IMA. While Trump has downplayed the role of human rights in his administration’s foreign policy, this could be a source of controversy and possible embarrassment. The likelihood, however, is that Riyadh’s invitation to Bashir came with a gentle caveat that he would not be greatly missed if he has prior commitments that ensure his absence from the meeting, especially since Washington has openly opposed his participation.

A Strong Likelihood of Success

Despite the complexity and ambition of the agenda, even in just the first part of Trump’s three-phase international trip, it should provide the president with an admirable opportunity to debut his role as a global statesman and solidify relationships with eager and willing partners in the Middle East, and especially the Gulf region. The voyage will not be without its potential pitfalls, however, especially for a president known for going off-script and off-message at times with diplomatic and political consequences. This is probably more of a danger in Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories, particularly East Jerusalem, than it is in the Gulf. But no one should be surprised by a presidential statement or action that is problematic and difficult to explain.

Finally, there is the danger of irrational exuberance on all sides. Given their financial difficulties, and despite their eagerness to diversify economically and bolster their defense capabilities, the Gulf countries may not in practice prove to be the cash bonanza that Trump, British Prime Minister Theresa May, and other Western leaders anticipate. Similarly, despite the tough talk against Iran, the Tomahawk missile strike in Syria, and strong pledges of support, Washington simply may not be willing to provide the kind of proactive, dynamic, and even kinetic leadership and engagement that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states may be anticipating and would certainly want.

An “America First” agenda may not herald a new dawn of neo-isolationism, or even prevent the United States from engaging more robustly in the Middle East. But that orientation, combined with a near consensus in the United States opposing involvement in Middle East conflicts, may mean that Washington will be practically more constrained in deploying military forces against extremist groups or Iran or its proxies than some of its allies may wish. And it certainly informs the strong emphasis by Trump on burden sharing by international partners, a broadly shared U.S. sentiment that is only likely to strengthen over time.

The robust overlap in agendas – including combatting violent extremist organizations, confronting Iran, promoting enhanced trade links and investments, strengthening Gulf military preparedness, and greater burden sharing – should make for a successful series of meetings in Saudi Arabia with announced deliverables, especially in the bilateral U.S.-Saudi relationship. Moreover, all the leaders, not least Trump himself, will have a major stake in the summits being perceived to be as successful as possible. Down the road, though, the prudent management of expectations on all sides could be an important part of maintaining, and even enhancing, a set of indispensable relations.

http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/how-america-can-influence-the-syrian-conflict

Washington faces a crucial decision on Syria in the coming weeks, with massive implications for its entire Middle East agenda.

Because the strategic situation in Syria has been relatively stable – largely in favour of the regime – since the fall of Aleppo in December, the external parties that have gained major leverage during the conflict are starting to define how to end it and what will come next.

At the Astana talks, Russia and Turkey, with the grudging cooperation of Iran, have agreed to create four “de-escalation zones”. These are essentially the “safe areas” for displaced persons, supposedly free of conflict, that Donald Trump and others cite.

But there has been no American involvement in these conversations or this agreement, because for years there has been no effort by Washington to try to shape the nature or outcome of the conflict.

It’s no mystery why Russia and Turkey like this idea. Both Ankara and the Bashar Al Assad regime benefit from fragmentation in Syria. Mr Al Assad can prevent opposition groups and areas from uniting, and Turkey can ensure that Kurdish areas along its southern border don’t consolidate either.

The agreement, which may have little or no buy-in from many Syrian armed parties, nonetheless reflects the interests of both the Turks and the Russians and their Syrian clients, which is why they agreed to it, at least theoretically.

Meanwhile, all the articulated American aims in Syria are in desperate trouble. Indeed, the chances of achieving them are dwindling daily, and in many cases may well soon evaporate altogether.

Washington says its biggest priority in Syria is eliminating ISIL, and especially ousting it from Raqqa. But it is glaringly obvious that Al Qaeda affiliates, which have been increasingly dominating much of the opposition since the fall of Aleppo, are at least as dangerous a terrorist threat as ISIL, and probably more.

Also, an additional imperative is rolling back the Iranian presence and influence in Syria, and, even more importantly, reducing Hizbollah’s newfound power and influence there. And, following the regime’s renewed use of sarin gas, the Trump administration has returned the United States to the view that Mr Al Assad cannot be part of the long-term solution in Syria.

Every single one of these goals is rapidly becoming unrealisable because of a single, overarching failing: the lack of any reliable and sizeable pro-American force on the ground drawn largely from and representing the Sunni Arab majority.

Take the campaign to liberate Raqqa. Washington has been assuming Kurdish militias will lead that battle. But they can’t.

First, there’s no reason to believe Turkey would allow that, especially with American forces compelled to intervene directly to prevent their two allies inside Syria, Turkish soldiers and Kurdish militants from devouring each other.

Second, there’s no reason to believe the Kurdish forces are willing to spend the massive, and largely military, resources and energy required for post-conflict stabilisation in Raqqa and its surroundings, far from their own areas.

Third, there’s no reason to believe the local population would welcome what would be, in effect, Kurdish rule.

In short, the Kurdish militia is simply the wrong force to lead this battle, no matter how keen the Americans are on them. So, who could?

What about Al Qaeda now dominating much of the opposition? This is largely a function of how impotent other groups have become, mainly because they have been so badly neglected.

What could challenge Iran and Hizbollah’s long-term presence in Syria, and the consolidation of a game-changing literal land bridge between Iran and both Lebanon and the Mediterranean coast, running directly through Syria and controlled by Iranian and Hizbollah forces?

What could change the calculations in Damascus to prompt the eventual replacement of Mr Al Assad?

And how can Washington earn a seat at the negotiations, not merely as observers, but as real players with skin in the game and an actual voice in what happens in Syria?

The answer to all of these questions is the same: the United States must bite the bullet and seriously and rapidly work to create its own, powerful, viable, well trained and well armed Syrian allies, based largely on the ample and sincere nationalistic Sunni Muslim community.

If Washington does not do this – which it certainly could and is mainly a matter of determination, clout and funding – it can kiss goodbye to the war against ISIL and Al Qaeda, rolling back Iran and Hizbollah, being taken seriously by Russia and Turkey, and having any role in shaping the nature and outcome of the Syrian conflict.

Trump administration officials say their two main regional priorities are counterterrorism and confronting Iran.

If they’re at all serious about that, they can no longer stay passively on the sidelines in Syria, where the future of both terrorism and Iranian power in the Middle East are being decided right now, in real time.

https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/trump-abbas-palestinians/525441/

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’s official delegation and the Palestinian mission in Washington haven’t been this ebullient or enthusiastic in at least a decade. One can certainly understand why. Abbas’s visit to the White House, strikingly early in the new Trump administration, is a political and diplomatic bonanza for Abbas as leader of the mainstream nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA). For them, it’s not a moment too soon.

The PLO mission in Washington celebrated with a reception for Abbas that welcomed a veritable D.C. who’s who on the issue, including representatives of pro-Israel groups like the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and others not usually at the head of such guest lists. But now that the party (literally) and the honeymoon (figuratively) are over, the deeply daunting work to translate the positive atmosphere into even modest progress between Israel and the Palestinians will begin in earnest. Painful hangovers all around are a distinct likelihood.

The Palestinian enthusiasm for Donald Trump may be surprising to many, but it’s hardly mysterious. By prioritizing Israeli-Palestinian peace, the Trump administration has resurrected the Palestinian issue on the world stage (and hence also on the Middle Eastern stage) after several years during which it seemed to recede into the background. Indeed, Palestinians were despairing that their issue had been simply lost in the crush of other priorities such as the wars in Syria and Iraq, the rise of the Islamic State and the spread of al-Qaeda, the spread of Iranian influence in the Middle East and Saudi-led efforts to counter that. In its last two years, the Obama administration, and especially Barack Obama himself, seemed to lose interest in the peace process and the Palestinian issue, having apparently concluded that there was little or nothing that Washington could accomplish given the regional circumstances and the attitudes of the parties toward one another.

Now, suddenly, the peace process, for all its faults, is back—and it’s being pushed by the White House and the new American president, no less. Palestinians can be forgiven for feeling like Lazarus, whom some might regard as a distant ancestor.

Moreover, for Abbas personally and for his movement, the political lifeline is equally dramatic, badly needed, and, hence, profoundly welcome. Abbas’s popularity has been sinking in the absence of diplomacy with Israel, a stagnating West Bank economy that is being neglected by international donors, and the resurgence of forms of corruption that had been significantly reduced under former Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.

Abbas, who is 82 and not in the best of health, is suddenly surrounded by a series of political challenges that amount to jockeying for succession. A group of Palestinian “security prisoners” in Israeli jails, led by the most popular Palestinian political figure, Abbas’s rival in the Fatah party, Marwan Barghouti, are engaged in a highly-publicized hunger strike for better conditions. Barghouti has ridden prisoner issues, which are among the few that can sometimes unite Fatah and Hamas activists in the same campaign, to unrivaled credibility with the Palestinian public.

But with Abbas being fêted in the White House, and standing next to the new American president, his status and authority as Palestinian president is practically unassailable. He joins those pro-American Arab leaders, almost all his regional allies, such as the Gulf Arab monarchs and Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, as one of Washington’s “traditional Middle Eastern partners” who were estranged under Obama but who are now being warmly embraced by Trump. Barghouti may still be a possible successor, but he’s hardly a rival under the present circumstances, which find him in prison while Abbas is in the White House.

Hamas, too, has been trying to complicate life for Abbas and the PLO by issuing a new “amended charter” that drops the group’s categorical anti-Semitism, does not mention its relationship to the Muslim Brotherhood movement (of which it is a part), and suggests it is open to the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. However, it does not replace or abrogate the infamous 1998 charter, renounce violence and terrorism, or open the door for any form of recognition of Israel. From a Palestinian point of view, the main point is a simple one: Until Hamas accepts the authority of existing Palestinian treaty obligations undertaken by the PLO (universally recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people), it cannot join the PLO or take part in Palestinian governance or diplomacy in any meaningful sense. All other benchmarks are secondary at best, particularly from the point of view of Palestinian foreign policy. In order to be viable, Palestinian institutions must adhere to the binding nature of their diplomatic representatives’ national undertakings. This is the basis for the only real asset Palestinians have: their international diplomatic presence and role.

Hamas’s conundrum is virtually irresolvable. Were they to accept the legitimacy of Palestinian diplomatic undertakings, most notably the 1993 recognition of Israel, they would be pursuing the same goal as the PLO and the PA—the creation of a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967—and the main distinction between the two would again be Hamas’s reactionary religious conservatism. Such an Islamist social agenda is not now, and is unlikely to be in the near future, the ticket to Palestinian majority support. Therefore, Hamas cannot openly accept, in a categorical and unequivocal way, the two-state goal they know full well is the most Palestinians can hope to achieve. Instead, they have to continue to try to outbid the PLO and the PA on Israel by continuing to promote and practice violence, insist on maximalist demands, and rule out recognizing Israel. The new Hamas document also indicates the extent to which the organization is still split between those who see the need to move beyond the 1988 charter, and the crippling impact it has on the organization’s international brand and national viability, and those who won’t countenance it. Now, as is typical, Hamas wants to have it both ways, and to be able to say to its hardcore base that it hasn’t changed at all while telling the international community, including the Arab world, that it is born-again moderate.

Hamas’s main audience for the new document is probably the government in Cairo, which is in a position to determine much of who and what can come in and out of Gaza. The Egyptian government has terrible relations with Hamas, which it accuses of abetting Islamist radicals in Sinai, and regards as an unwholesome extension of its mortal enemy: the Muslim Brotherhood. Therefore, under Hamas’ misrule, Gaza is being severely squeezed not only by Israel, but also by Egypt and even the PA, which has recently cut salary payments for public servants in Gaza and declined to foot the electricity bill for Israeli providers. None of them are likely to be impressed with the new Hamas document, and neither is Washington.

Indeed, such cynical and wholly unconvincing maneuvers only make Abbas look even better both at home and abroad, as he stands next to the American president in the White House and reiterates a solemn commitment to a two-state solution and opposition to violence. Moreover, the substantive content of the new Hamas document, such as it is, almost entirely concedes that the Abbas/PLO/PA approach has been correct, at least in terms of its broadest national goals. So, both his new friends in the White House and his old enemies at home have given Abbas a desperately needed shot of political adrenaline. No wonder the Palestinian delegation was so upbeat on Wednesday night and ready to embrace at its formal reception what it called a “mosaic of America” that cares about the issue.

Yet significant pitfalls lie ahead. For all his effusive praise of Abbas and statements of determination to “get this done,” at their joint appearance Trump strikingly did not make any explicit reference to the creation of a Palestinian state, merely to “peace.” As with his ambiguities on settlements, potential for moving the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem, and some other hot-button issues, Trump still seems to be open to a real shift from long-standing American approaches. None of these would be to the Palestinians’ advantage. The economic initiatives for the West Bank being pursued by Trump’s chief negotiator Jason Greenblatt will, if realized, certainly help stabilize the situation. But expectations are being raised, possibly dangerously, for progress that may not be achievable.

Many Israelis argue that an interim arrangement is the best that can be accomplished under the current circumstances. For Trump, this could be a big win, and maybe what he has in mind when he speaks of “peace.” But for Palestinians, interim arrangements are potentially very dangerous, because the post-Oslo experience, and indeed 50 years of occupation, demonstrate that what is often assumed to be temporary can become disturbingly permanent given their lack of leverage over Israel and, more to the point, Israeli politicians’ accountability to a nationalistic Jewish public. Still, a sufficiently broad-ranging interim agreement could be acceptable to Palestinians under the right circumstances, with the clear understanding that a conditional accord means a conditional peace, and that the “end of conflict and end of claims” requires a full final status accord that inevitably will involve the creation of a sovereign, independent Palestinian state. As long as that goal remains generally accepted and viable, an interim arrangement is conceivable. But even that is extremely ambitious under the current circumstances.

The Trump administration is also reportedly keen on the “outside in” approach, which imagines that greater engagement with Israel by Gulf Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar, largely inspired by mutual opposition to Iran’s regional agenda, can help to generate progress between Israel and the Palestinians. The idea is that a strategic relationship and normalization with Arab countries will be a major new incentive for Israel, and that the Palestinians can simultaneously get political cover, diplomatic support, and crucial economic aid from the Gulf countries, prompting both to make the necessary concessions to move forward. However, at present, this prospect is mired in the chicken-and-egg conundrum of which must come first. The Gulf Arab countries have a real strategic interest in a broader partnership with Israel, but their domestic politics and sincerely held values severely limit how much further they can go without seeing real progress on advancing Palestinian rights. And, for Israel, any concessions to Palestinians intended to bring about greater strategic cooperation with Arab countries are equally unlikely to come on spec.

Trump could, just conceivably, move this ball forward by making the rolling back of Iran’s expanded regional influence in countries like Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and even parts of Iraq a major American priority; he could be seen as succeeding in changing the regional equation, and linking all that to Gulf Arab cooperation on the peace process. It’s a very long shot indeed, but it’s not impossible. A major American effort to roll back Iran’s hegemony in the Middle East could be sufficient inducement to get Arab buy-in to a new, and much more open, strategic relationship with Israel that also helps to stabilize, if not fully resolve, the Palestinian issue.

All three factors—economic initiatives in the West Bank, the prospect of an interim agreement that benefits both sides and does not foreclose a two-state future, and the development of a new Arab-Israeli strategic entente cordial against Iran—could combine to produce a virtuous circle of progress. Indeed, any two of those could produce a significant benefit. But the obstacles are vast and prospects remote.

Which brings us back to the looming likely hangover. The party was definitely bracing—a real tonic for the Palestinian leadership, and especially for Abbas. But the walk home may be brutal. The coming months will leave Palestinians and others on the ground asking what has, or can be, achieved to make their lives better and, above all, bring them closer to independence. For all the good will from Trump, the resuscitation of the Palestinian issue on the American and international agenda, and the clear political benefits for Abbas and his allies among the Palestinians and in the region, the only paths forward are narrow, rocky, and exceptionally steep.