https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/why-democrats-should-proceed-with-caution-in-trying-to-impeach-donald-trump-1.916311

In the hands of a Republican-majority Senate, leader Mitch McConnell could call the shots in an impeachment trial.

The Washington political landscape has been battered by a hurricane of shattering revelations, which gathered force and speed last week. It revealed what might prove to be one of the most damning scandals in US history: allegations that US President Donald Trump abused the power of his office to solicit foreign intervention in the 2020 election and that his officials improperly tried to cover it up.

What happens next will be decisive. Mr Trump faces potential impeachment and disgrace. But by launching a formal impeachment inquiry, Democrats have a huge opportunity that could also backfire in a catastrophic failure.

The whistleblower complaint by a US intelligence official, thought to be a CIA officer, was released to the House intelligence committee on Thursday and opens with this declaration: “In the course of my official duties, I have received information from multiple US government officials that the president of the United States is using the power of his office to solicit interference from a foreign country in the 2020 US election.”

The complainant alleges that over several months, Mr Trump tried to strongarm newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy into co-operating with his private lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, to dig up dirt on his political foes. The documents suggest others might also have been involved, including attorney general William Barr. On Wednesday, the White House released a memo summarising a telephone conversation that took place on July 25 between the two presidents but has so far refused to release the full transcript, despite repeated demands.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/leading-from-behind-iran-should-beware-of-underestimating-donald-trump-1.913520


If regime leaders in Tehran conclude they are dealing with a paper tiger, they will be making a grave miscalculation.

US President Donald Trump might see himself as the antithesis of his predecessor Barack Obama, yet he often seems to follow his example and even amplify his policies. During the 2011 Nato intervention in Libya, for example, then president Mr Obama was described by White House officials as “leading from behind”. The phrase was quickly seized upon by his political opponents as a derogatory metaphor for his foreign policy, suggestive of shirking responsibility and allowing others to take the initiative.

In the unfolding confrontation with Iran, Mr Trump appears to be seriously attempting to “lead from behind” when it comes to military actions. Washington has spearheaded a “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against Tehran that continues to intensify and the US administration is directing its diplomatic and political efforts to isolate and stigmatise Iran.

Indeed, its central role in building a strong global coalition to address Iran’s misconduct has been complicated because Mr Trump has alienated much of the international community, including close US allies in Europe, who are still trying to salvage the 2015 nuclear deal after he withdrew from it last year.

But given the recent attack on key Saudi oil facilities, which the US says was orchestrated by Tehran, other countries must set aside whatever resentments and doubts they might harbour because Iran has now targeted global oil supplies and energy markets.

Because of a growing diplomatic momentum against Iran and significant steps towards constructing a broad international coalition to thwart its destabilising activities – beginning with an increasing number of participants in the US-led naval force to protect international shipping in the Gulf – it’s heartening that Washington and Riyadh have reacted with calm and deliberate assembling of the evidence and a measured response to Iran’s provocation.

The next battlefield will be the UN General Assembly in New York this week, where Washington and Riyadh will work to build a coalition broad and committed enough to restore deterrence without a major military retaliation. The hope is that it might still be possible to thwart Iran without being drawn into the military clash that Tehran is trying to provoke, and thereby maintain prospects for negotiation.

The paramount goal at this stage must be to restore deterrence, given that attacks on the Saudi oil sites demonstrate an outrageous degree of presumed impunity by Iran and a dangerous sense that the US and Saudi Arabia either cannot, or will not, retaliate.

If diplomacy and international coalition-building fail to persuade Tehran, then military force might eventually be required to correct Iran’s evident misapprehension that it is “winning” and, worse, is dealing with countries incapable of striking back.

And that is where Mr Trump appears to be leaning strongly towards a genuine version of “leading from behind”. He is signalling that he wants US allies to take the lead in any necessary military retaliations.

This pattern has already been developing in Syria and Iraq, where Israel has been striking pro-Iranian militias and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps installations and assets.

Since the attack on Abqaiq and Khurais on September 14, Mr Trump has sent unmistakable signals that he also expects Saudi Arabia to take the lead militarily, at least at first.

He tweeted that the US military was “locked and loaded” but was “waiting to hear from the Kingdom” before determining “under what terms we would proceed”.

At the very least, this suggested that until Saudi Arabia publicly blamed Iran, and therefore accepted responsibility for whatever subsequently unfolded, the US would not consider military retaliation.

Later the president noted: “That was an attack on Saudi Arabia, and that wasn’t an attack on us,” adding: “I’m somebody [who] would like not to have war.”

Given the emphasis the US president has put on the “burden-sharing” by his partners and his aversion to using military force unless American interests have been directly attacked or Americans have been killed, he certainly seems to be sending the strong message that he hopes, or even expects, Saudi Arabia and other regional allies to take the lead in any military retaliation.

There is no doubt that if the confrontation with Iran becomes a conflict, US forces would have to take the initiative fairly quickly. But Mr Trump rightly wants to avoid such a dangerous development and putting the onus on regional allies to take the military lead initially might help him avoid being drawn into an over-hasty clash.

Even more than Mr Obama, then, Mr Trump might have discovered the real virtue in leading from behind.

But if regime leaders in Tehran conclude that, because Mr Trump would rather avoid conflict for political reasons and prefers regional partners to take the lead, they are dealing with a paper tiger, they will certainly rue that miscalculation.

Even those who see the world in “America First” terms must understand that if the US cannot quickly restore deterrence with Iran, its status as a Middle Eastern and even a global power will be all but over.

ttps://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-20/trump-needs-to-restore-deterrence-against-iran

If Tehran is allowed to believe it is winning against the U.S., it will grow more reckless. 

Iran is convinced that it is winning the confrontation with the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. This view will likely encourage Iran to launch more attacks against its neighbors. It is crucial that Washington and its partners correct this misapprehension and restore deterrence before more mayhem ensues.

President Donald Trump insists that American restraint is “a sign of strength that some people just don’t understand!” But, as Senator Lindsey Graham suggests, the Iranian leaders will probably misinterpret the lack of a robust kinetic response to last weekend’s massive attacks on key Saudi oil installations as weakness.

The attack, which temporarily knocked out more than 50% of Saudi oil output, demonstrated that Iran has concluded that momentum is on its side, and that it has little to fear from paper tigers unable or unwilling to seriously fight back.

Four months ago, Iran abandoned the policy of trying to wait out the Trump administration and its “maximum pressure” campaign and seek sanctions relief from Europe in favor of a carefully calibrated intensifying series of low-level attacks. Tehran reckoned that, instead, a policy of strategic recklessness, which it dubbed “maximum resistance,” was the only hope to gain breathing room from suffocating sanctions.

Iran gambled that by creating a massive crisis it could generate diplomatic momentum and coerce other countries—most notably European, Arab and Asian states—to compel Washington to ease the pressure on Tehran.

At first, its provocations involved attacks on shipping, whether using mines against tankers or seizing vessels outright, and other low-intensity, and often deniable, actions. These were designed to slowly generate an atmosphere of chaos and demonstrate that if Iran cannot sell oil, “no oil will be exported from the Persian Gulf.”

At no stage has there been any military response Though, judging by its systematic provocations, Iran was certainly seemed willing to absorb painful blows from, for example, cruise missile strikes against its military assets, the blows never came. Even when Iran downed an unmanned U.S. drone on June 20, Trump called off planned retaliatory airstrikes.

Instead, Tehran watched in amazement as a series of political and diplomatic developments seemed to indicate startling and overwhelming success. Trump repeatedly offering meetings with Iranian officials without preconditions. He even seemed open to a French proposal to extend Iran $15 billion in credit and other forms of sanctions relief to facilitate the talks.

The UAE resumed diplomatic contacts with Iran and announced a major drawdown in southern Yemen, where an Arab coalition has for four years been in a war against Iran-backed Houthi rebels. In private, even Saudi officials were quietly muttering unease about U.S. leadership on this issue.

Best of all from Iran’s point of view, Trump fired his national security advisor, John Bolton, viewed by Tehran as the very embodiment of a U.S. military threat.

Given all that, it’s no wonder Iran has concluded it gambled correctly that Trump wouldn’t risk a conflict before the 2020 election, and that Saudi Arabia wouldn’t act without active American support.

Washington and Riyadh are acting wisely in not rushing into a military response to the latest provocation. Iran might welcome a limited strike that could feed the sense of uncontrolled chaos it is seeking to cultivate.

However, it is obvious that deterrence must be restored in order to prevent additional and worse Iranian assaults. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia need to marshal evidence that Iran was responsible for the latest attack and convince the rest of the international community that the Islamic Republic is endangering not only on Saudi Arabia but global energy supplies and markets.

The objective would be to assemble a robust coalition willing to approve of, or participate in, substantial reprisals for any additional Iranian mischief. It is worth trying—against inevitable Chinese and Russian reluctance—to secure a strongly worded Security Council resolution authorizing such a response.

Iran must not be allowed to mistake this calm and deliberate reaction for weakness or fecklessness. The regime in Tehran must be made to realize that it has overstepped and blundered, exhausted international patience, and set itself up for a bitter dénouement.

https://agsiw.org/international-response-required-to-deter-further-iranian-attacks-on-global-energy-supplies/

Strikes on Saudi oil facilities are an opportunity to marshal a global coalition to restore deterrence in the Gulf.

On September 14, attacks targeting Saudi Arabia’s oil processing plant in Abqaiq and oil field in Khurais marked a major new escalation in tensions between Iran and its regional allies and U.S. Gulf Arab partners led by Saudi Arabia. The strikes, which have cut Saudi oil production by as much as half, represent both an important challenge and a significant opportunity in dealing with Iran. Most important, they represent an opportunity to heal significant rifts in the international community regarding approaches toward Tehran and to form a united international front against its ongoing campaign of provocations, sabotage, and destabilization.

Shortly after they were launched, the attacks were claimed by the Houthi rebels in Yemen. The Houthis have launched many previous drone and missile attacks against Saudi Arabia, which intervened in the Yemen war on behalf of the internationally recognized government. But these claims were quickly questioned because these attacks would constitute a major increase in scope and sophistication for the Houthis. In the past, their missile attacks have been largely ineffective, often intercepted by Saudi missile-defense systems, and have fallen much closer to the Yemeni-Saudi border. For the Houthi strikes in Saudi Arabia to go from symbolic and ineffective to devastating and internationally disruptive would be an improbable sudden qualitative leap.

U.S. officials began casting doubt on this story and by the following day were blaming Iran. They noted that 17 points of impact came from the north and northwest, suggesting that the missiles were launched from Iran or Iraq instead of Yemen. They told journalists that the attacks were not merely by drones as initially reported but also involved many cruise missiles, a level of coordination generally thought to be beyond that of the Houthis. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo blamed Iran without providing any specific evidence. But on September 16, Saudi Arabia added that Iranian weapons were used in the attack which, it insisted, did not originate in Yemen.

Unnamed U.S. government sources are increasingly saying that the attacks were launched from Iran itself, though the Saudi statement maintains the possibility that they were the handiwork of pro-Iran militia groups in Iraq, something the Iraqi government adamantly denies. But even if the attacks originated in Iraq, the blame would fall squarely on Iran because pro-Iranian militias in Iraq operate so closely with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps that Tehran would be seen as directly responsible anyway. Even the increasingly discounted Houthi claims of responsibility wouldn’t relieve Iran of strong suspicions of being culpable in providing weapons and training, and quite possibly the inspiration for the timing of the attacks. It’s very difficult not to view these attacks as the latest phase of a carefully calibrated series of gradually intensifying provocations by Iran, combined with the seizing of yet another merchant vessel in the Gulf waters and the increased detention of Westerners.

The political context indicates that these attacks fit perfectly into the next phase of Iran’s strategy in conducting its “maximum resistance” campaign to try to break out of the straitjacket imposed by Washington’s “maximum pressure” sanctions regime. Iran was primarily attempting to use a carefully calibrated series of low-intensity military actions and provocations to try to convince or coerce various third parties ­– Europeans, Arab states, and Asian powers – to pressure the United States to ease the sanctions. Thus far, this campaign has not succeeded in producing any sanctions relief, so another escalation was anticipated, although the recent attacks on Saudi Arabia would be a striking escalation in Tehran’s campaign of strategic recklessness.

In addition to feeling the need to escalate to maintain and increase the pressure on third parties, and indirectly therefore on Washington, Iran may have interpreted a series of recent developments as indicating that momentum is on its side. First would be repeated statements from Trump administration officials that U.S. President Donald J. Trump is still interested in a meeting with Iranian officials, possibly at the upcoming U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York, and especially reports that he may have been considering easing or suspending some sanctions to facilitate such a meeting. Second would be French efforts to broker a new Iranian-U.S. dialogue. Third might be recent diplomatic efforts by the United Arab Emirates to ease tensions with Iran. A fourth factor could be persistent rumors that Saudi Arabia, too, was becoming nervous about the direction of U.S. strategy regarding Iran.

And, finally, Tehran may have interpreted the departure of former National Security Advisor John Bolton as a positive sign. From the outset of the “maximum resistance” campaign, Iran sought to drive a wedge between Trump and Bolton, who they viewed as impossibly hard line and the main advocate of a major military threat. Tehran’s core calculation has been that Trump will ultimately seek to avoid a military confrontation, particularly before the next election, and that this gives Iran considerable leverage with Washington, which it is using to call the president’s bluff through calibrated provocations.

So with Trump signaling a diplomatic opening and hinting at sanctions relief, the 2020 elections becoming a greater factor in U.S. decision making, and Bolton leaving the administration over disputes that include Iran policy, Tehran may have concluded now was an optimal opportunity to again test Trump’s determination to avoid military action. Tehran may have also been seeking additional leverage in anticipation of engaging in talks with Washington sooner rather than later because the Trump administration appears open to them and Tehran cannot resist dialogue indefinitely if “maximum resistance” continues to fail to produce significant sanctions relief.

Whether or not this was the precise calculation, it seems almost certain that Iran is responsible for these attacks. Tehran is not wrong that its adversaries do not want a conflict. Trump would clearly rather avoid one for political reasons. And it’s notable that Saudi Arabia has thus far avoided directly accusing Iran, much as the UAE had in earlier provocations, while signaling that this is what it strongly suspects. Tweeting about the issue on September 16, Trump said the U.S. military was “locked and loaded depending on verification” of the culprits, and that Washington was “waiting to hear from the Kingdom as to who they believe was the cause of this attack, and under what terms we would proceed.” While Trump’s critics suggested he was expressing deference to Saudi authority, in fact his language suggests a very different message: that the United States might be willing to act militarily or forcefully but only if Saudi Arabia is willing to take responsibility by publicly blaming Iran and sharing some relevant evidence.

This is the conundrum presently facing Riyadh. Saudi Arabia, like Washington, must realize that this brazen and damaging attack, even if the installations can be repaired in a matter of days, represents an alarming collapse of deterrence in the Gulf region. Iran seemingly believes it can orchestrate such a major military attack on its neighbor’s key installations with relative impunity. Riyadh and Washington must find a way of restoring deterrence or invite additional, and perhaps worse, attacks in the near future. Yet the Iranian messages to Saudi Arabia were clear: If we suffer, you will also suffer, and we have a wide range of capabilities and options to menace you if need be. So, Saudi Arabia is presumably carefully calculating the costs and benefits of directly accusing Tehran of responsibility and then facing the need to either act itself to restore deterrence or assist the United States in doing so and, in either case, absorbing the consequences.

But a kinetic response is not the only option or the only way to restore deterrence although, given the brazenness of this strike, one may ultimately be considered necessary. Yet given that Iran appears to be attempting to provoke such a response, a retaliatory strike – despite the pain that is inflicted – may be playing Tehran’s game on its terms and timetable. An important alternative response could be an effort to use this attack to isolate and stigmatize Iran internationally and reinforce the sense that it is a dangerous rogue state that requires restraint by a broad coalition of countries. The forthcoming U.N. General Assembly meeting could be a perfect opportunity to make the case that this attack was not merely on Saudi Arabia as a regional adversary and U.S. ally, but on the entire international energy market as a whole, and thus the global economy. Oil prices rose only moderately as a consequence of the attacks because Saudi Arabia claims it can repair the damage within days, there is a relative oil glut on the market, and the United States has released strategic reserves to make up the shortfall.

However, the Iranian message encoded in the attack – the oft-repeated claim that if we cannot sell our oil, no one can sell their oil in peace – is aimed at the international community, which is dependent on well functioning, stable, and reliable energy markets. To make its point about seeking sanctions relief and expressing displeasure with Washington and Riyadh, Tehran has effectively just taken a significant chunk of the international energy market hostage. Meanwhile, it is continuing to engage in piracy on the seas, detaining Western civilians, issuing dire threats, and supporting designated terrorist groups.

A kinetic response, especially if it is poorly calibrated and, as a result, widely viewed as an overreaction, is probably what Iran is hoping to provoke. What Iran is surely not hoping for is to be systematically isolated, condemned, and stigmatized by a re-united international community. One of the most effective ways to thwart Iran’s “maximum resistance” campaign might be to use these and other attacks to convince European states and others to set aside their resentment over the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear deal, and doubts about Trump’s intentions and veracity, and join with the United States and its regional allies in restoring regional stability and security by isolating Tehran and punishing its abusive conduct. That could begin with a U.N. Security Council resolution condemning Iran’s actions against Saudi Arabia, seizures of commercial maritime vessels, and detaining Western citizens. Rather than the United States easing sanctions, other international powers might be persuaded to reimpose them until Tehran desists. And several countries that rejected joining a U.S.-led naval effort to protect Gulf shipping might now be willing to reconsider.

Ultimately, it’s not just Saudi Arabia and the United States that have suffered a collapse of deterrence against Iran in this case. The international community and system of global order have as well. This was an assault on an oil installation of global significance, intended to cause pain not merely on the Saudis and their friends, but to all oil consumers around the world. Cast in that light, especially if backed up by solid evidence that the attack originated in Iraq or Iran rather than Yemen, this provocation could be made to backfire very badly on the Iranians. Restoring deterrence after an attack of such magnitude is indispensable, but that might be most effectively done through international cooperation rather than unilateral action.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/with-the-2020-election-looming-the-clock-was-ticking-on-the-trump-bolton-relationship-1.910634

The national security adviser had to go because the US administration’s foreign policy was increasingly deviating from his uber-hawkish views.

The departure of John Bolton, US President Donald Trump’s third national security adviser in as many years, was both inevitable and extremely instructive.

In Mr Trump’s court, everyone goes, often sooner rather than later, except those within his nuclear family.

After his inauguration, Mr Trump appointed numerous senior officials with gravitas, experience and their own personal and professional standing independent of him. With the departure of Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats last month, the last of the experienced professionals has now been purged.

The remaining team, many serving in unconfirmed and acting capacities, are all relatively junior and entirely dependent on the president for standing and authority. He doesn’t like subordinates who have fixed ideas that don’t readily bend to suit his ever-changing political agenda.

Mr Bolton had to go because, even though he was often willing to shelve his objections or allow himself to be pushed aside, the direction of the US administration’s foreign policy as the 2020 election approaches was increasingly deviating from his militaristic and uber-hawkish views.

Mr Trump does not engage in policy at all. He only practices politics and – especially where foreign policy is concerned – he has few strong views or clear ideas.

His political challenge, however, is that he heads a Republican coalition that is deeply divided between hawks like Mr Bolton, whose ideas and attitudes were shaped during the Cold War and who are committed to a robust global profile and militarism, versus neo-isolationists like Kentucky senator Rand Paul, who advocate a low-profile mercantilist foreign policy that shuns intervention and global responsibilities.

Mr Trump has tended to oscillate between these two attitudes, depending on the politics of the moment.

Now, as the election begins to loom, the neo-isolationism that so strongly appeals to his base, and to many liberal and working-class Democrats, is gaining priority.

Mr Trump believes he was elected to end wars and he certainly doesn’t want to be perceived as recklessly flirting with new ones going into the next election: hence the outreach to the Afghan Taliban, the Iranian regime and others.

Mr Bolton’s perspectives didn’t suit that agenda at all. Yet the former adviser was certainly willing to accommodate Mr Trump on many things for a long time.

He dutifully swallowed wholesale a series of capitulations to the North Korean dictatorship and allowed himself to be completely excluded from those conversations. He also kept quiet when Mr Trump ingratiated himself with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and repeatedly sided with Pyongyang and Moscow over various Americans, including his own intelligence services and other officials.

Three key disputes brought Mr Bolton down.

He committed the administration to supporting a planned coup in Venezuela that fell apart, enraging the president.

He was livid when Mr Trump called off a planned strike against Iran in retaliation for the downing of an unmanned US drone and rejected any notion of easing sanctions to facilitate talks with Tehran.

Finally, he opposed plans for a summit meeting at Camp David with Taliban officials, which Mr Trump eventually abandoned himself.

It became increasingly clear that until the election, Mr Trump has little use for unreconstructed hawks like Mr Bolton, even when they are willing to be highly accommodating.

The impact of his departure isn’t yet clear. North Korea despised him but there’s no reason to think he was an effective impediment to those discussions.

The Iranian regime might take satisfaction in his departure but unless its leaders are interested in the summit that Mr Trump is proposing, and which Mr Bolton would probably have opposed, it is unlikely to do them much good. Indeed, it might even provoke Tehran to overreach if they miscalculate Mr Trump’s aversion to conflict in the coming months.

Some of the impact will depend on Mr Bolton’s successor.

One initial idea, reportedly shelved, was for Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to take on that role as well, much as Henry Kissinger had in the 1970s. Mr Trump has said he is not considering Mr Pompeo, however, while Mr Pompeo shows signs of growing political ambitions back in Kansas.

The co-ordinator of Iran sanctions, Brian Hook, is reportedly under serious consideration. That would be the strongest possible signal that the sanctions campaign against Iran will continue to intensify.

The drone attacks on Saturday against Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais, claimed by the Yemeni Houthi rebels but quite possibly having been launched from Iraq instead, make any other scenario far more unlikely. No matter who was really responsible, Washington will have no choice but to view the attacks as another major escalation of Tehran’s “maximum resistance” campaign, meaning that Mr Bolton will be leaving with his hawkish attitude towards Iran seemingly vindicated.

It is also possible that a Trump loyalist like US ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell could be installed as a presidential surrogate.

In any event, US policy will be entirely dictated by Mr Trump’s political calculations and the challenge of navigating between Republican hawks and neo-isolationists.

The president has reportedly asked why he needs a chief of staff when he can do the job better. He virtually serves as his own press secretary. And, in effect, he will be his own national security adviser too.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-09/there-s-still-hope-for-israeli-palestinian-peace

How the U.S. can rebuild a foundation for diplomacy with the Palestinians.

U.S. special envoy Jason Greenblatt, a principal designer of President Donald Trump’s promised Middle East peace plan, resigned last week, having never revealed a word of the mysterious plan or presided over a minute of actual negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. It’s clearer than ever that the administration’s rethinking of U.S. Mideast peace policy has been a crushing failure. The question now is how to move beyond it.

There’s a mess to be cleaned up, to be sure, one that was created by the Trump peace team, headed by presidential son-in-law Jared Kushner, when it smashed the agreed-upon basis for talks by recognizing Israel’s sovereignty in Jerusalem, without distinguishing between the West and East parts of the city. The team also cut off diplomatic relations with the Palestinians, leaving the U.S. as the only major world power without direct ties to one of the key parties. Indeed, the administration cut off all aid to anything and everything Palestinian, including security forces, health and education programs, and even people-to-people peace programs.

Worst of all, the White House endorsed Israel’s sovereignty in the Golan Heights, thus encouraging Israel to annex more occupied territories.

Meanwhile, Kushner, Greenblatt and David Friedman, the American ambassador to Israel, made it clear their boss no longer endorsed a two-state solution and would push only for what they have vaguely called Palestinian “autonomy,” presumably within an unequal Greater Israel. That’s obviously a nonstarter, not only for the Palestinians but also for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab countries.

In all this trouble-making, the White House has followed its Obamacare playbook: Repeal, but don’t replace. Destroy the existing, agreed-upon framework for negotiation toward a two-state solution without bothering to propose an alternative.

If the goal is to build a new consensus for a Greater Israel, it means open-ended conflict into the foreseeable future, and it forecloses the prospect of a robust alliance between Israel and Gulf Arab countries against Iran.

But it’s not too late to resurrect America’s commitment to a two-state outcome, even if it has to wait for the next U.S. president.

Washington should begin by clarifying that its recognition of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem applies only to West Jerusalem and not to occupied East Jerusalem, whose status must still be determined by negotiations. It should then re-endorse the 1993 Oslo peace accords, and the United Nations Security Council resolutions — all approved by the U. S. — that call for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

The U.S. should especially reiterate its support for Security Council Resolution 2334, which demanded an end to Israeli settlement expansion. Israel needs to hear that America will not endorse additional annexations or major settlement activity.

The Arab states should be reassured that the U.S. continues to share the broad goals of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative: the full integration of Israel into the region and the establishment of a Palestinian state — though that should not mean plunging headlong into a quixotic effort to achieve immediate change. The building blocks for a peace agreement on both sides need to be carefully developed.

Diplomatic ties to the Palestinians must be restored and the Palestine Liberation Organization mission in Washington, reopened. There’s no need to move the American Embassy back to Tel Aviv from West Jerusalem, but the U.S. should reopen its consulate in East Jerusalem, its diplomatic mission to the Palestinians.

It is also important to stop the situation on the ground from further deteriorating. That means selectively restoring aid to Palestinians, targeting on-the-ground efforts to improve the quality of life in the West Bank and building civic, social and political institutions. The Palestinian justice system, in particular, needs urgent attention to promote the rule of law.

Also imperative is to seek a solution to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza that doesn’t unduly empower the militant group Hamas.

The crucial truth is that Israeli-Palestinian peace is still possible, despite the terrible situation the Trump administration inherited and the untold additional damage it has done. But it will require that the framework for peace be salvaged. The appalling alternative is to wait for another explosion of violence, which is otherwise unavoidable.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/sharpiegate-a-bellwether-of-the-trump-administration-s-attempts-to-strip-state-institutions-of-their-authority-1.908163

As a storm brews over an apparently doctored map showing the path of Hurricane Dorian, why can’t the US president admit when he gets it wrong?

Last week a new word entered the Washington lexicon: Sharpiegate, named after the marker pen that generally sells for less than $1. That’s because it’s the writing instrument of choice of US President Donald Trump, who spurns the $120 rolling ballpoint pens preferred by his predecessors.

The president likes Sharpies because they write smoothly and boldly in thick, indelible strokes, perfectly conveying his now-familiar signature, which has been compared to an electrocardiogram reading. And since so much of his presidency has been based on imprinting his ECG signature on declarations and executive orders, Sharpies are now closely associated with him. His campaign team is even selling Sharpies decorated with his signature now for $15.

The Sharpie became an issue when, following the trauma of Hurricane Dorian, what should have been a minor mistake turned into a prolonged political struggle over truth and reality.

Just over a week ago, the president, who had extensively tweeted news and advice about the impending hurricane, had mistakenly warned the people of Alabama, together with the Carolinas and Georgia, that they were in its destructive path and were “most likely to be hit harder than anticipated”. The National Weather Service, however, said no such thing, and in an immediate response reiterated that Alabama faced no risk at all.

So far, no big deal. Everybody makes mistakes.

But not this president. What should have been a minor hiccup became a seemingly endless tug-of-war over whether Mr Trump is capable of error.

The Trump administration issued numerous statements by senior officials backing up his claims, all completely unconvincing, as the president angrily insisted that he, and not the government’s scientists, had been correct.

Last Wednesday, the president summoned reporters into the Oval Office and brandished a map purporting to show the projected trajectory of the hurricane. It had been crudely altered with a Sharpie to show the storm winds reaching Alabama.

According to the Washington Post, senior unnamed officials confirmed that the president had made the alteration himself. While Mr Trump denied knowing who had doctored the map, his inability to admit a simple human error and move on has been obsessive and perturbing.

For several years in these pages, I have been tracking the progress of deinstitutionalisation in the US under Mr Trump. This recent incident, however seemingly absurd, constitutes a new threshold in an alarming process.

It is unlawful for anyone to tamper with an official US government meteorological map. It is also a perfect example of how Mr Trump is more comfortable with a psychologically affirming narrative than objective, quantifiable reality, and the extent he will go to assert the primacy of myth, politics and ego over fact. Government scientists and meteorologists have now been formally warned to “only stick with official National Hurricane Centre forecasts if questions arise from some national level social media posts”, which has been interpreted as a reprimand for criticising Mr Trump, even if he is misleading the public on a matter as serious as the path of a hurricane.

Time and again, it has not mattered to him what relevant and qualified authorities say about crowd size, voting patterns, immigration, terrorism, economic trajectories, climate change, scientific findings, or any number of other measurable, objective realities. These cases constitute a clear pattern of this administration batting facts aside in favour of a narrative that is more emotionally satisfying, ideologically buttressing and politically empowering.

In recent weeks deinstitutionalisation has taken a qualitative leap forward in several crucial ways.

The attack on fact-based reality and the scientists at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is one example.

Another is Mr Trump’s ongoing war with the Federal Reserve Bank and its chairman in maintaining that, even though the economy is strong, the bank should lower the prime interest rate anyway, presumably because that might help secure his re-election.

Mr Trump has amplified his attacks on the press, the FBI, Congress, courts, his own bureaucracy and, seemingly, anyone and anything that might provide an alternative source of authority and information.

The prime target remains the media, ever the low-hanging fruit in democratic politics, with Mr Trump now even turning on Fox News, which is split between entirely supportive and moderately supportive programming, as insufficiently “working for us anymore” and, as a consequence, “we”, meaning his political support base, “need a new network”.

Deinstitutionalisation is even targeting the electoral process itself.

The Federal Election Commission has been allowed to dwindle below a quorum, so there will apparently be no referee for accountability in the forthcoming election. And Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell, now commonly referred to as “Moscow Mitch” because of his refusal to do anything to stop Russian meddling in US elections, has blocked every effort to create a national set of election standards.

Deinstitutionalisation has also come to the Republican primaries, given that three relatively minor candidates are standing against Mr Trump. Caucuses and primaries within the party have been cancelled in South Carolina, Nevada, Arizona and Kansas, ostensibly to save money.

And Mr Trump, who is sworn to uphold and enforce the law, allegedly told his officials to disregard laws and simply seize land to build his wall along the southern border, promising them pardons if needs be, according to the Washington Post and New York Times, although administration officials claimed he was merely joking.

American deinstitutionalisation is rapidly accelerating. Many hope all this will be easily reversed when Mr Trump leaves office. But as any parent of young children will tell you, it’s incredibly hard to remove ugly stains left by a misused Sharpie.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-09/there-s-still-hope-for-israeli-palestinian-peace?srnd=opinion-politics-and-policy

How the U.S. can rebuild a foundation for diplomacy with the Palestinians.

U.S. special envoy Jason Greenblatt, a principal designer of President Donald Trump’s promised Middle East peace plan, resigned last week, having never revealed a word of the mysterious plan or presided over a minute of actual negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians. It’s clearer than ever that the administration’s rethinking of U.S. Mideast peace policy has been a crushing failure. The question now is how to move beyond it.

There’s a mess to be cleaned up, to be sure, one that was created by the Trump peace team, headed by presidential son-in-law Jared Kushner, when it smashed the agreed-upon basis for talks by recognizing Israel’s sovereignty in Jerusalem, without distinguishing between the West and East parts of the city. The team also cut off diplomatic relations with the Palestinians, leaving the U.S. as the only major world power without direct ties to one of the key parties. Indeed, the administration cut off all aid to anything and everything Palestinian, including security forces, health and education programs, and even people-to-people peace programs.

Worst of all, the White House endorsed Israel’s sovereignty in the Golan Heights, thus encouraging Israel to annex more occupied territories.

Meanwhile, Kushner, Greenblatt and David Friedman, the American ambassador to Israel, made it clear their boss no longer endorsed a two-state solution and would push only for what they have vaguely called Palestinian “autonomy,” presumably within an unequal Greater Israel. That’s obviously a nonstarter, not only for the Palestinians but also for Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and other Arab countries.

In all this trouble-making, the White House has followed its Obamacare playbook: Repeal, but don’t replace. Destroy the existing, agreed-upon framework for negotiation toward a two-state solution without bothering to propose an alternative.

If the goal is to build a new consensus for a Greater Israel, it means open-ended conflict into the foreseeable future, and it forecloses the prospect of a robust alliance between Israel and Gulf Arab countries against Iran.

But it’s not too late to resurrect America’s commitment to a two-state outcome, even if it has to wait for the next U.S. president.

Washington should begin by clarifying that its recognition of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem applies only to West Jerusalem and not to occupied East Jerusalem, whose status must still be determined by negotiations. It should then re-endorse the 1993 Oslo peace accords, and the United Nations Security Council resolutions — all approved by the U. S. — that call for the creation of a Palestinian state alongside Israel.

The U.S. should especially reiterate its support for Security Council Resolution 2334, which demanded an end to Israeli settlement expansion. Israel needs to hear that America will not endorse additional annexations or major settlement activity.

The Arab states should be reassured that the U.S. continues to share the broad goals of the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative: the full integration of Israel into the region and the establishment of a Palestinian state — though that should not mean plunging headlong into a quixotic effort to achieve immediate change. The building blocks for a peace agreement on both sides need to be carefully developed.

Diplomatic ties to the Palestinians must be restored and the Palestine Liberation Organization mission in Washington, reopened. There’s no need to move the American Embassy back to Tel Aviv from West Jerusalem, but the U.S. should reopen its consulate in East Jerusalem, its diplomatic mission to the Palestinians.

It is also important to stop the situation on the ground from further deteriorating. That means selectively restoring aid to Palestinians, targeting on-the-ground efforts to improve the quality of life in the West Bank and building civic, social and political institutions. The Palestinian justice system, in particular, needs urgent attention to promote the rule of law.

Also imperative is to seek a solution to the humanitarian crisis in Gaza that doesn’t unduly empower the militant group Hamas.

The crucial truth is that Israeli-Palestinian peace is still possible, despite the terrible situation the Trump administration inherited and the untold additional damage it has done. But it will require that the framework for peace be salvaged. The appalling alternative is to wait for another explosion of violence, which is otherwise unavoidable.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/how-a-17-year-old-harvard-student-has-become-symbolic-of-the-bias-of-an-entire-system-1.905167

Thought police officials have gone far beyond their legitimate security mandate in banning Ismail Ajjawi from entering the US.

The disturbing case of Ismail Ajjawi tell us much about the increasingly hostile American attitude to the outside world.

The 17-year-old Palestinian refugee from Tyre, Lebanon, secured a coveted scholarship to attend Harvard University but on his way to take up his hard-won place at one of the world’s leading educational institutions, he was denied entry by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at Boston Logan International Airport last week.

Mr Ajjawi says a CBP agent questioned him for five hours, including about his religious practices, and discovered Facebook posts by people he is friends with that were critical of US policies. He says the woman started screaming at him, even though, as he pointed out, he had not authored, endorsed or even “liked” them. Yet his visa was then revoked and he was immediately deported.

The NGO that administers these scholarships, an American non-profit organisation called Amideast, has long faced obstacles to Palestinians pursuing scholarships they have earned to US universities.

Israel has repeatedly blocked Palestinian students from travelling to the US, particularly from Gaza, as part of its punitive campaign against the population.

Worse still, Hamas has also blocked Palestinian students from leaving Gaza to pursue US scholarships, appallingly claiming to be protecting them from western influences.

But it is extremely unusual for such students to denied entry by US officials.

In part, this is the result of new Trump administration policies requiring visitors to submit all their social media usernames for the past five years.

Billed as a counterterrorism and national security measure, in the current atmosphere it is plainly degenerating into a campaign to enforce a narrowly drawn political correctness by self-appointed thought police officials, going far beyond their legitimate security mandate.

There are numerous anecdotal reports of CBP and immigration officials adopting aggressive tones and attitudes towards travellers on the grounds of some insufficient acquiescence to the US administration’s world view.

In this case, however, no such opinions were discovered at all. Rather, like millions of people worldwide, Mr Ajjawi had a mere distant online connection to people who expressed criticism of certain policies – something that is now apparently sufficient to be denied entry into the US.

Hostile attitudes from the top have fed a growing and arbitrary intolerance by US officials on the operational immigration frontlines, who it seems now feel empowered to adopt extreme attitudes towards certain visitors.

It is also reflective of the growing desire to find any rationalisation, no matter how tenuous and absurd, to deny entry to migrants, particularly those from Muslim countries.

This incident is less a direct result of State and Homeland Security department policies and more indicative of a growing attitude of intolerance and thin-skinned hypersensitivity to any criticism, in this case even by third parties.

However, given that Mr Ajjawi is a Palestinian, this administration’s antagonism towards Palestinians is surely part of the backdrop to his treatment.

Under president Donald Trump, the US has backed the Israeli occupation and annexation of Palestinian territories and eliminated all diplomatic representation for and from the Palestinians. It has cut off all aid to Palestinians and denied visas to non-violent Palestinian leaders with deep connections to the US such as Hanan Ashrawi.

The State Department has long stopped referring to occupation in any official documents such as its annual human rights reports. It has also now dropped any mention of Palestine or the Palestinian Authority from its publications and website.

The entire thrust of the Trump administration’s approach has been to shift US policy and political discourse to accepting that the occupied territories are simply part of Israel and are neither Palestinian nor occupied. That has involved, in practice, a rejection of all things Palestinian.

That is not directly related to Mr Ajjawi’s ordeal – but it’s not irrelevant either.

The scrutiny levelled at him, with his phone and laptop searched for five hours, speaks to an attitude of jingoism and xenophobia, especially towards Muslims, Arabs and Palestinians.

Such attitudes are endemic in the administration, as indicated by Mr Trump’s Twitter posts and his comments aimed at immigrants, foreigners and all those who disagree with him, from telling four congresswomen of colour to “go back” to their countries of origin to using an expletive to describe African countries.

If critics of Mr Trump or US policy, even members of Congress born in the US, should “go back”, then it makes a kind of twisted sense that anyone whose online associates might have also been critical should simply be denied entry in the first place. So much quicker and easier that way.

The good news is that there has been a widespread outcry about the injustice of this case and Harvard University, Amideast and others are calmly and intelligently working to reverse Mr Ajjawi’s exclusion and get him to Harvard as soon as possible.

The bad news is that this is how things are now, and not all instances of unjust abuse will be this blatant and high profile or get this much exposure.

The US is still the world’s greatest power. But under Mr Trump, it is increasingly thinking and acting like a small, besieged, fearful little country.