https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/editorial/in-his-drive-to-dismantle-american-institutions-trump-is-following-in-erdogan-s-footsteps-1.795238

Starting with the the media, the US president has systematically attacked symbols of trust and authority – but the courts are pushing back

This year’s Thanksgiving holiday in the United States was punctuated by an unprecedented war of words between President Donald Trump and Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts.

Mr Trump dismissed the federal judiciary as, in effect, partisan hacks. Mr Roberts fired back defending judicial integrity. The Republican heads of two of the three branches of US government were suddenly clashing.

But this was readily foreseeable. In these pages, I have been tracking Mr Trump’s experiment in American de-institutionalisation, and specifically predicted it back on June 2.

Observing that the US president was systematically discrediting all sources of authority and veracity beyond his own direct control − beginning with the press, and moving on to Congress, the FBI and Justice Department, and the intelligence services – I wrote that “his probable next target is alarmingly obvious. An independent judiciary is an enormous obstacle and threat to any leader. The courts must be next…”

Mr Trump has never had any respect for courts. He repeatedly attacked Gonzalo Curiel, the judge presiding over the lawsuit against his “Trump University” over alleged fraudulent practices, as a hopelessly biased “Mexican”, although he was born in Indiana.

And from the outset of his presidency, Mr Trump has been repeatedly thwarted by federal judges.

Several early versions of his Muslim “travel ban” were struck down by courts as unconstitutional, and Mr Trump responded by describing one of the key jurists as a “so-called judge”.

He has repeatedly threatened to dissolve or purge the Ninth Circuit Court, which he particularly dislikes.

There have been numerous other instances in which courts have blocked his attempted policies.

In other cases, they have rescued Mr Trump from himself. One example is his deeply unpopular effort to strip people brought to the United States as children, who have since lived exemplary lives, of protections from deportation instituted by the Obama administration. He has been saved from the damaging impact of this order by courts that have repeatedly blocked it.

Another court may, however, be positioned to hoist Mr Trump with his own petard. His Justice Department and several state attorneys general have been suing to effectively overturn “Obamacare” health laws that are now very popular, especially since they protect Americans against denial of insurance because of “pre-existing conditions”.

In the recent midterm elections, for instance, Mr Trump preposterously claimed that Democrats would strip people of such protections while Republicans would preserve them, even as his own attorneys were trying to overthrow those very rules in the courts. Should Mr Trump prevail in the suit, public outrage would be colossal.

Either way, in this and several other encounters with the courts, he loses. That’s precisely the problem: he cannot control what the courts will or won’t do.

That is unacceptable for a leader seeking de-institutionalisation. The best example of this process succeeding is probably Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom Mr Trump greatly admires.

Mr Erdogan inherited a Turkish system with many institutions, no matter how fledgling or fragile they may have been. He has systematically dismantled them, particularly after the failed 2016 coup attempt, and replaced them with hollow institutional simulacra that, in reality, simply rubberstamp his own decisions.

Whether he fully realises it or not, that’s exactly the de-institutionalisation process Mr Trump is groping towards in the United States.

And he is going down the list of independent sources of authority and information with a relatively impressive precision, beginning with the media, which was low-hanging fruit, and only now directly attacking the courts and his other new target: senior military leaders, such as the widely respected retired Admiral William McRaven, architect of the killing of Osama bin Laden.

Unlike Republicans in Congress, however, Chief Justice Roberts appears to be strongly signalling to Mr Trump that even though he and a majority of Supreme Court colleagues − now including Brett Kavanaugh − may be committed Republicans, they have a keen sense of their institutional judicial prerogatives and are prepared to defend them against executive encroachment.

Mr Trump is likely to face some serious legal headaches in the coming months with the Robert Mueller investigation no longer restrained by a looming midterm election, and with Democrats poised to retake control of the House of Representatives’ committees and investigative authority in January.

Mr Mueller may attempt to subpoena the president. House Democrats may seek to subpoena his tax records. Many of his most controversial policies may also face serious legal challenge, and his conduct investigation and exposure.

He knows this, and his extreme anxiety is evident.

Obviously, the US judiciary is highly political and quite partisan. It is certainly clear that there are Republican and Democratic judges who often rule accordingly.

Chief Justice Roberts is implying that there is a limit to how compliant many Republican judges, especially on the Supreme Court, might be when the law clearly contradicts Mr Trump’s wishes.

Courts, however, have no enforcement power. They rely on the executive to respect their authority. Mr Trump is signalling he does not.

If they rule against him, and he does not accept their decisions, a historic constitutional crisis, which could decide the fate of Mr Trump’s de-institutionalisation project, will ensue.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-23/khashoggi-killing-saudi-king-is-accountable-too?srnd=opinion

One of the central figures in the drama over the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi has remained an invisible man. Global attention has focused on the role played by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in the Oct. 2 killing at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. But another figure deserves equal billing: the prince’s father, King Salman.

The crown prince is often referred to as the “de facto ruler” of Saudi Arabia. But that’s not what he really is. The king has virtually total power. He has apparently delegated a lot of administrative authority to his son, enough to make “day-to-day ruler” a reasonable description of the younger man’s government role. But the king remains the ultimate authority.

It’s significant, then, that King Salman either goes unmentioned by public figures demanding accountability for the killing, or is specifically exonerated. Writing in the Washington Post, for example, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan insisted that “We know the order to kill Khashoggi came from the highest levels of the Saudi government” but added, “I do not believe for a second that King Salman, the custodian of the holy mosques, ordered the hit on Khashoggi.”

From this, Erdogan reasoned, “I have no reason to believe that his murder reflected Saudi Arabia’s official policy,” and that there was therefore no reason for a rift in Turkish-Saudi relations.

Exonerating the king thus reflects Turkey’s impulse to inflict as much damage on a regional rival as possible without precipitating a geopolitical meltdown.

U.S. politicians and media have also given the king a pass while demanding accountability from the crown prince.

Even in his statement on Tuesday defending strong U.S.-Saudi ties, President Donald Trump acknowledged, “It could very well be that the crown prince had knowledge of this tragic event — maybe he did and maybe he didn’t!” Trump didn’t say anything like that about King Salman.

There are defensible reasons for this. The king is elderly and is assumed not to bother himself with day-to-day governance. He lacks the reputation for rashness and adventurism that his son has acquired.

Yet if blame for the killing and a subsequent cover-up goes all the way to the top in Saudi Arabia, it cannot stop at the crown prince. And while there is no evidence indicating that the king was involved, he must certainly have played a major role in shaping the Saudi response, which is almost universally regarded as inadequate.

Several factors are at play. First, by distinguishing between the king and the crown prince, Saudi Arabia’s interlocutors preserve their ability to accuse parts of the Saudi government of culpability while sustaining the relationship with the state. It’s a pragmatic fiction.

Second, the narrative props up a simplistic fantasy of two Saudi Arabias, each personified by one of the Saudi royals. The king represents the “good” Saudi Arabia of caution and stability. The crown prince represents the “bad” Saudi Arabia of recklessness and ruthlessness.

In truth, the old Saudi Arabia personified by the king had many flaws, not least of them the propagation of a dogmatic version of Sunni Islam that informed extremists. And the prince’s new Saudi Arabia has much to recommend it, including advances in women’s rights, a retreat from religious extremism, and economic modernization.

The distinction is mythological. Saudi Arabia has changed, but it hasn’t gone from good to bad or bad to good. It remains an essential but problematic U.S. ally.

Washington and Riyadh need their vexed partnership, which survived the 1973 oil embargo, the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, the 2003 Iraq war and other strains. But there’s no need for fake nostalgia or fantasies about “good” versus “bad” leaders of the same Saudi government.

Those who want Washington to back away from Riyadh — including Erdogan, much of the U.S. media and many in Congress — find the dual-leader fable to be convenient. But it doesn’t stand up to scrutiny and it won’t produce an intelligent policy response.

The U.S. is going to have to deal with Saudi Arabia for what it is. In that sense, Trump’s willingness to overlook the Khashoggi killing in the name of sustaining the alliance has more integrity despite its flaws than the mythmaking that defends the Saudi king while attacking the crown prince.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/a-shift-to-the-left-is-now-the-biggest-threat-to-democrat-ambitions-1.792854

Democrats obviously performed very well in the US midterm elections. More importantly, they now appear to have a clear path to regain the White House in two years, if they pick their battles wisely.

They will now face a familiar dilemma. Do they embrace their ideological impulses and reward their base by shifting radically to the left, or do they make the compromises necessary to ensure that they remain a “big tent” grouping that can appeal to moderates − and even some conservatives − and therefore win nationally?

If they can resist being co-opted by an angry base, their chances of regaining the White House in 2020 are starting to look quite strong.

While the initial results on election night caused many who were hoping for a “blue wave” repudiation of President Donald Trump to feel disappointed, in fact Democratic gains are very much in “wave” territory.

With the final results still coming in, they appear on track to have gained at least 35 seats, an impressive performance by almost any standards.

Republicans may increase their Senate majority by one or two votes, but given the extremely disadvantageous Senate election map they faced this year, Democrats actually did well to hold their losses to such a limited level.

Indeed, given the large number of seats they had to defend in states that voted enthusiastically for Mr Trump two years ago, it’s remarkable they didn’t lose more.

But looking forward to the 2020 effort to regain the White House, particularly given that Americans have a solid pattern in recent decades of re-electing even decidedly mediocre sitting presidents, the party has to be concerned.

Mr Trump has a firm hold on his own base, strong support in many rural and exurban areas, which are disproportionately powerful in the presidential electoral college, and, at least as things stand now, can certainly try to take credit for a strong economy.

Democrats are mesmerised by their inroads in several traditionally conservative “red” states, such as Georgia and Texas, where they narrowly lost hotly contested elections. The idea of an African-American woman winning the election for governor of Georgia, as Stacy Abrams nearly did, was deeply inspiring to many Democrats.

“Flipping” traditionally Republican red states across the South and the Bible Belt is extremely appealing emotionally.

However, the crucial fact is that Democrats don’t need to perform such relative political miracles in order to retake the White House in 2020, although they certainly could.

As the noted political commentator William Galston has pointed out, there is a much simpler and more logical path for the Democrats in the next election. Three Midwestern states that have frequently voted Democratic in the past are the key.

Begin with the assumption that Democrats can hold onto all the states that Hillary Clinton carried in 2016. Mr Trump and the Republicans don’t seem to be increasingly competitive in any of them at this stage.

Even concede that Mr Trump can again prevail in crucial swing states, such as Florida and Ohio, which seems entirely plausible.

Nonetheless, all the Democrats would need to add to Mrs Clinton’s 2016 performance are victories in Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin. Together, they provide 46 additional electoral college votes, which is enough to regain the White House.

Ohio seems to be consolidating as a Republican state, and Democrats certainly can’t count on winning Florida against Mr Trump.

But if they focus on Pennsylvania, Michigan and Wisconsin − and the blue-collar and unionised voters there who were seduced by Mr Trump two years ago − they could beat him.

Democratic candidates performed very well in all three states in the midterms. A key reason is that Mr Trump’s main achievement so far has been a large tax cut for the wealthy and corporations, at the expense of working people.

Mr Trump could complicate this if he resurrects his idea of a trillion-dollar infrastructure public investment, which would create large numbers of jobs. But he’s shown absolutely no sign of it, and could face stiff resistance from conservative Republicans, and possibly Democrats, if he did try.

For now, he seems focused on staging poisonous fights over race and culture. Such white-nationalist fear mongering works in many parts of the country, but probably won’t be sufficient in these Midwestern states.

The biggest obstacle for Democrats could be an ideological shift too far to the left. The Bernie Sanders-led “democratic socialist” faction is certainly thriving.

However, around the country in the recent election, Democrats showed an encouraging willingness to tailor nominations to suit local preferences, running left-leaning, centrist and even slightly conservative candidates where that proved most effective.

A presidential nomination, though, is more complicated. That person will be a national leader, and Democrats may well have to endure a bitter struggle between the left and the centre.

However, the election result they just secured in the face of a prosperous national economy suggests that if Democrats can remain open to a wide range of orientations, nominate a candidate with broad appeal, and focus their energies on Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and Michigan, they can make Mr Trump a one-term president.

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-11-16/yemen-war-u-a-e-and-saudi-arabia-look-for-a-way-out

The war in Yemen, and the humanitarian crisis it has inflamed, is usually thought of as Saudi-led and controlled. But the reality is more complicated, and involves a major role by the United Arab Emirates.

That’s why a meeting in Abu Dhabi this week between the leader of the U.A.E. and the heads of the main Sunni Islamist political party in Yemen is a dramatic development, and could be a crucial step toward ending the war. The conflict has killed at least 10,000 people, put millions under threat of starvation, worsened the global refugee crisis, and divided Arab governments from each other and from their allies in the West.

Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E. intervened jointly in Yemen in 2015 in response to the takeover by Iran-backed Houthi rebels of the capital, Sanaa, along with large amounts of territory. Since then, though, the conflict has diverged into two separate but overlapping campaigns.

The Saudis and their Yemeni allies are concentrating their efforts in the north of the country and are mainly opposing the Houthis. That’s where the war has turned into a desperate quagmire.

But in the south, the U.A.E. and its more effective Yemeni allies have largely driven out Houthi forces and have been concentrating on a counterinsurgency against terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and Islamic State, often in coordination with U.S. special forces.

A key ideological division has emerged between the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia in how to end the conflict. The U.A.E. is categorically opposed to all forms of political Islam. Saudi Arabia detests the terrorist groups and is wary of most Islamist parties, but is not as rigid as the Emirates.

In particular, Riyadh has been willing to work with the Yemeni party al-Islah, which is associated with the oldest and most established Islamist network in the Middle East, the Muslim Brotherhood, because they share an uncompromising antipathy towards the Houthis and their Iranian backers.

The Saudis think al-Islah’s cooperation can help stabilize the situation, especially in the northern parts of the country where the kingdom is most influential. And they’re optimistic about al-Islah’s claim to be part of a post-Islamist wave of religiously-oriented political groups that are getting rid of the revolutionary, conspiratorial and transnational aspects of Islamism and re-emerging as law-abiding conservative nationalists.

The U.A.E., by contrast, has continued to view al-Islah and all Brotherhood-oriented parties with suspicion, and dismisses any claims about a post-Islamist tendency as opportunistic hypocrisy.

But as pressure from the West increases on Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E., the coalition’s leaders are clearly trying to think through an exit strategy.

Saudi Arabia has been pressing the U.A.E. to join Riyadh in putting aside doubts about al-Islah and working with the group to craft a domestic political alternative to Houthi domination.

So when al-Islah Chairman Mohammed Abdullah al-Yidoumi and Secretary-General Abdulwahab Ahmad al-Anisi suddenly appeared in Abu Dhabi this week to meet with the de facto ruler of the U.A.E., Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, something significant was going on.

After all, bin Zayed could have met al-Islah leaders quietly if he wanted to. Indeed, relatively senior Emirati officials have sat down with Yemeni Islamists in Saudi Arabia on more than one occasion over the past two years in response to prodding by Riyadh.

But on this occasion, the senior U.A.E. leader met publicly in his own capital with the heads of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood group and publicized it aggressively on all forms of media, including through his own Twitter account, complete with pictures and mainly in Arabic.

The message was not primarily aimed at Washington, but at regional neighbors and his own domestic audience. It was intended to show Saudi Arabia that the U.A.E. is serious about helping Riyadh work with al-Islah to stabilize those parts of Yemen in which its influence predominates, and possibly to signal a willingness to cooperate with the group in Emirati areas of influence as well.

There’s every reason to hope that this is a signal that both the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia are seeking a way to get out of Yemen, as Washington and most of the world are increasingly demanding.

Why Washington has Reacted So Intensely to the Khashoggi Murder

Factors including regard for the victim, the nature of the crime, the powerful accusers, and Trump-related anxieties all contribute to the extraordinary impact in Washington of the Khashoggi murder.

Many weeks on, the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi is continuing to roil U.S. relations with a key regional ally. The journalist and critic of the Saudi government was murdered at the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul on October 2 and, along with mounting criticism about civilian casualties and a growing humanitarian crisis associated with the war in Yemen, has produced the greatest crisis in U.S.-Saudi relations since the attacks on September 11, 2001. In the aftermath, the reputation of the Saudi government, and particularly Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has been profoundly damaged in the United States and much of the West.

But why? There have been numerous assassinations of critics, journalists, dissidents, and others around the world in recent years that have not comparably captured the public imagination, so deeply changed perceptions, challenged accepted policies, and undermined long-standing alliances. Russia, in particular, stands accused of a wave of such killings, including in Britain and other European Union countries. Iran, too, has a long history of this behavior, and has recently been accused by Denmark of resuming such efforts. There are many other instances of such assassinations, and Turkey itself has a uniquely aggressive record in repressing and imprisoning, although not necessarily murdering, journalists in recent years.

So why has the Khashoggi affair hit politics, policies, and international relations with such ferocity and why does it not appear to be receding into the background despite numerous shifts in the usually definitive news cycle? The answers reveal much about the context in which the scandal is playing out and what its short-, medium-, and long-term impacts might be on U.S.-Saudi relations.

The Victim

To understand the impact of Jamal Khashoggi’s murder in the U.S. context, it’s necessary to understand his standing and perceived role in Washington. Many people in the Middle East and Europe may have had a somewhat different view of him, and most Americans, including most who follow politics, in the United States had never heard of him. But among Middle East watchers in Washington, Khashoggi was a ubiquitous and almost universally appreciated figure. It would be difficult to find someone plugged into this scene who didn’t know him, and even harder to find anyone who didn’t like him. He was personable, effusive, generous, charming, and blunt. He also knew a great deal, having covered the Saudi role in the Afghan war in the 1980s, and then having been very close to some Saudi ruling circles in the 1990s and beyond. This gave him a particular cachet as a commentator and critic, and made him an invaluable interlocutor for scores of U.S. policymakers, academics, journalists, and analysts of the Middle East. It also may have contributed to his assassination.

Moreover, in Washington he was widely, if not universally, perceived as primarily a liberal critic of Saudi government repression and a proponent of free speech and human rights. His Islamist sympathies were real and evident to those who know the language of such things. But they were limited to sympathies, rather than the full-fledged Muslim Brotherhood partisanship now being alleged by his critics, and were mixed with a very compelling interest in freedoms and democracy. Everyone who knew him well understood that Khashoggi’s views were evolving and complex, and very different from the caricature of his critics. But many Americans who knew him failed to pick up on those aspects of his political orientation that so riled his enemies, and which are now being frequently exaggerated. He did not, for example, make Islamist arguments in Islamist terms. He made often Islamist-friendly arguments in liberal terms. Therefore, in the United States he was widely perceived simply as a liberal, which is a true but incomplete picture.

In short, he was well-known and well-liked in Washington to a degree and in terms that are probably still not fully registered by many people in the Middle East. This author, for one, knew and respected him for 15 years, despite deep disagreements on many issues. But the universal sense of outrage in Washington is amplified by the number of people who respected and appreciated Khashoggi. Moreover, it was magnified in the slightly more than a year he spent as a contributing columnist for The Washington Post, which elevated his already significant profile considerably and provided him with a powerful posthumous champion.

The Crime

There are several aspects to the killing itself that greatly contributed to the impact of the murder. Most obvious is its location in a Saudi diplomatic mission, which is a violation of the most fundamental norms of diplomacy and international relations. Second, the notion that Khashoggi was killed while trying to advance a new marriage and with his fiancée waiting plaintively outside the consulate certainly adds to the pathos of the scenario. Third, Turkish authorities used the media skillfully to emphasize the most bloodcurdling and lurid suggestions about the murder, many of which have yet to be confirmed and some that appear utterly unfounded. However, what is now known is so appalling that there was no need of Turkish tall tales to chill the blood and rouse the spirit. All three factors added to keeping the story in the public eye, building suspense, and maximizing revulsion.

The Accused

There is no underestimating the extent to which pre-existing anti-Saudi attitudes play into the extraordinary reaction to the Khashoggi killing. Since the oil embargo of 1973, Americans have been primed to see the “oil sheikhs” of the Gulf Arab countries as thoroughly bad actors. The 9/11 attacks greatly cemented such attitudes. While the plainly vital strategic alliance between the two countries, and particularly cooperation on counterterrorism, helped to quickly repair bilateral relations, lingering American doubts about the essential nature of Saudi Arabia were never eliminated on either the left or the right. While it might be possible for such critics to precisely point to this murder as evidence of the veracity of their views, one aspect of the extraordinary and sustained response to it is rooted in a deep-seated pattern of animus that has nothing to do with the event itself.

The Accusers

At least two of the major accusers in the case have played a major role in amplifying and sustaining it: the Turkish government and U.S. media, in particular The Washington Post. The Turkish government saw an opportunity to weaken and hobble a major regional rival at very little cost and exploited it with great skill. Yet Turkey has been careful to avoid any total rupture with, or to provoke any major retaliation from, Saudi Arabia. Instead Ankara has sought to embarrass Riyadh, and particularly Mohammed bin Salman, while making clear that it does not want a break in relations and does not insist on formally blaming the crown prince personally (while continuously implying his culpability). These highly effective tactics greatly increased international attention to the case, by emphasizing and even exaggerating the cruelty of the murder and through a slow drip of information and evidence that captured the public attention around the world.

A major factor in the impact of the Khashoggi murder in the United States has been the role of the media. The Washington Post, understandably, regarded this as a killing within the family, and has spared no effort to demand information and accountability and to keep this crime in the public eye. As one of the most influential newspapers in the United States, if not the world, there is hardly a more potent information warfare adversary. Moreover, many other U.S. media outlets have taken this personally as well. The maxim that an attack on one journalist is an attack on all is not always fully operative, to say the least. But in this case, it could not have been more thoroughly embraced.

The Trump Effect

One of the most crucial and overlooked aspects of the potency of this affair is the vast range of political and social anxieties that have attached themselves to and coalesced in Khashoggi’s murder. Several key factors for this can be readily identified. Many of them have to do with anxieties connected with the presidency of Donald J. Trump. In particular, there’s the sense that Trump has cultivated an atmosphere of hatred and violence against journalists, whom he calls the “enemy of the American people,” responsible for “fake news.” This theme has been echoed by authoritarians and despots around the world, including those who have jailed and abused journalists, at times in large numbers. So, to critics of the president, the killing of a Washington Post columnist by a key U.S. ally appears to be one culmination of a campaign of vilification and violence against the media he has whipped up.

Then there is the additional impression that Trump’s rhetoric and policies have largely, if not entirely, dispensed with the notion of human rights as an issue in U.S. foreign policy, particularly in dealing with long-standing allies like Saudi Arabia. Trump’s rhetoric about the value of “sovereignty” and “nationalism” and attacks on what he calls the “ideology of globalism,” and his evident disinterest in “imposing values” on other societies have amplified fears that the policies of his administration have greatly encouraged human-rights abuses around the globe. The Khashoggi murder has been widely interpreted as a key example of this dynamic in action.

Finally, the Trump administration and the Saudi royal family have both cultivated a public perception of their closeness that has magnified the damage this scandal has caused for each. Trump has been implicitly implicated in an affair to which he has no direct connection. The Saudi government has become a favored target of Trump’s political and foreign policy critics because of this attachment and because, unlike other close Trump Middle East allies (for example, Israel) Riyadh can be bashed without any domestic political cost or backlash.

The war in Yemen was already the source of growing concern due to its mounting civilian casualties and the humanitarian crisis it has exacerbated. Because of the association between Trump and Riyadh, anti-Trump forces in U.S. politics have often seized on the Yemen war as a means of bashing the president. Criticism of the Yemen war has dovetailed with horror at the Khashoggi murder to create a massive anti-Saudi backlash in Washington that is often tied to hostility toward the Trump administration. Even some Republican critics of administration foreign policy, such as Senators Bob Corker, Lindsey Graham, and Marco Rubio, advocates for a more internationalist and traditionally conservative direction, have used criticism of Saudi Arabia as a means of applying pressure on the Trump White House. This effect is likely to be amplified in the coming months, particularly after Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives in the midterm elections. There will likely be major hearings on, and possibly investigations into, aspects of both the Yemen war and the Khashoggi murder, and possibly both together.

The Long-Term Implications

There are undoubtedly numerous other factors that have contributed to the extraordinary impact and staying power of the Khashoggi murder in the American conversation. But those outlined above are probably enough to ensure that the issue will not simply fade away, particularly as long as the Yemen war continues. The core elements of the U.S.-Saudi partnership – military ties, intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation, and efforts to stabilize and manage global energy markets – are unlikely to be affected. However, the tone and tenor, and many of the transactional aspects of the alliance (even including weapons sales) may be significantly and negatively affected.

Around the world for the past two years, the big question has been whether the new American profile is simply a Donald Trump phenomenon or whether this is a more permanent orientation for the US both at home and abroad.

After last week’s midterms, that question still cannot be confidently answered because an extraordinary number of tectonic plates in American politics are shifting concurrently.

Anyone hoping for a total repudiation of Mr Trump despite the booming US economy might have been disappointed by the outcome of the elections but compared to two years ago, it’s still good news.

The midterms delivered a mixed result, leaving, as I predicted, both sides with reasonable grounds for feeling simultaneously vindicated and vulnerable.

In The National shortly after the 2016 election, I noted that Mr Trump’s surprising victory opened the possibility of a total realignment of the American political landscape.

In that scenario, working-class and union constituencies around the country, plus domestic businesses and industries, would shift to the Republican Party, champions of Fortress America.

This would be coupled with an increasing shift of US-based multinational industries, as well as more internationalist, cosmopolitan constituencies, to the Democrats, guardians of US leadership and global order.

US politics would then no longer be divided along its traditional left-right axis but rather, based on open-versus-closed national social and economic attitudes.

Mr Trump hasn’t accomplished that yet but he’s continuing to make progress. White rural, exurban and working-class voters continued to turn out for him in massive numbers, preserving and expanding the Republican control of the Senate.

This is obviously a profound frustration for Democrats. However, the growing support of urban and suburban middle- and upper-middle-class, college-educated Americans of all ethnicities for Democrats underscored a slowly unfolding but substantial House victory.

Most notable were striking Democratic gains in midwestern and increasingly “blue” mountain states, despite disappointing defeats in Missouri, Indiana and North Dakota.

Democrats also boasted unusually strong performances in southern states such as Georgia, Florida and Texas, with some key races still undecided.

That all suggests that Democrats are consolidating strong control of the national popular vote, as indicated in their greatly disproportionate share of overall votes cast for those now serving in the Senate, despite continuing to lose ground there because of the federal electoral structure.

As the brilliant commentator Michael Tomasky notes, Democrats certainly need a rural strategy to become competitive again in many “red” areas, and a new economic narrative.

But it seems clear that Republicans face a grim future in the long run as a rural, white, ethno-national party with little appeal in the urban and suburban areas where most Americans increasingly live.

The bottom line is that Democrats have significantly cracked Republican control of the whole of government and expanded their popular appeal with the American majority.

Mr Trump, meanwhile, has almost consolidated his total control of the Republican Party. But the Democratic victory in the House of Representatives gives a new lease of life, however small, to traditional, conservative Republican opposition to Mr Trump.

Had Republicans held the House of Representatives, the US president would have been guaranteed no primary challenger, no matter what happened to the economy. Had Republicans lost the Senate, that challenge might have been formidable.

As it stands, some Republican opposition to Mr Trump will continue and there will be alternatives waiting in the wings should some crisis or scandal emerge in the next two years.

Many congressional Republicans will now worry that Mr Trump will abandon them and seek to make common cause with House Democrats on populist measures such as infrastructure, spending and healthcare.

That’s possible – but Mr Trump’s past form suggests he would prefer to fight on racial and migration issues rather than switch to the broader realignment strategy Republicans will need for their long-term viability.

All this uncertainty leaves the rest of the world, friends and foes alike, still wondering whether “America First” is the new face of the US or simply a Trump aberration.

It’s not even clear if “America First” is a new kind of US internationalism or neo-isolationism, as Mr Trump has oscillated unpredictably between the two.

The cyclical pattern of American politics in a post-Cold War era suggested Republicans were due for a comprehensive victory in 2016, which they got. Then it hinted that Democrats would retake the House now, which they have.

It also implies that Mr Trump is now better positioned to be re-elected in 2020, barring a major scandal or meltdown, by blaming everything on House Democrats.

Yet the broader context is becoming consolidated. And there’s good news and bad news for both sides.

The good news for Republicans is that the federal American system, established at the end of the 18th century for entirely different reasons, now gives their voters disproportionate sway in much of the government and unfairly favours them.

The good news for Democrats is they have the solid and growing support of most of the American people.

And the only rational conclusion for US allies is, you had better be on good terms with both Democrats and Republicans – and not become a partisan football.

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/handing-trump-more-power-would-be-a-disastrous-outcome-for-the-midterms-1.787485

The vote has been framed as a referendum on Trump’s tenure so far. However, a real verdict may have to wait until the 2020 presidential election

Next week’s US midterm elections are widely expected to be among the most consequential in decades. Both sides have, in different ways, framed them as a referendum on President Donald Trump, who has been doing his best to nationalise the vote and insist that he’s “on the ballot”.

But he’s not.

The vote will be exceptionally important, but unless there is a decisive outcome, which seems unlikely, the American jury will still be effectively out on Mr Trump and his nativist agenda.

Mr Trump is a remarkably unpopular president with the public at large, yet he has won the strong support of the Republican base.

A split decision reflecting that seems to be shaping up, with the Democrats’ widespread appeal, especially in urban and suburban areas, positioning them to win control of the House of Representatives, in which all 435 seats will be contested.

However, only about a third of the Senate – 35 out of 100 seats – will be decided. Twenty-six of those seats are now held by Democrats and only nine by Republicans, who currently hold a two-vote majority.

The Senate elections, unlike the House, won’t be comprehensive or in any sense national. This year, they will largely reflect the voting power and influence of the rural and exurban white electorate that backs Mr Trump and his allies.

So, it now looks likely that Democrats will win a solid majority in the House, but Republicans will keep a narrow grip on the Senate. That’s the kind of split decision that decides nothing major and postpones the national verdict on Trumpism to the presidential contest of 2020.

The political landscape has fundamentally altered since 2016. Mr Trump has seized complete control of the Republican Party, which now sometimes looks like a personality cult, with most of its officials competing to express devotion to him.

Mr Trump has accomplished a total realignment − but only on the right − by transforming the GOP from a conservative party to a white-nationalist one. His continued support among former Democratic and swing voters, especially among the white working class, is untested and a split decision will leave this question unanswered.

The US system seems to have produced a profound anomaly in 2016: comprehensive minority rule in a democratic system.

Most empirical evidence suggests that the US public, as a national whole, has a core and growing centre-left majority. But the complexities of the political system have left Republicans both in total control of national government while shifting in a white-nationalist direction.

The federal electoral system, which gave the White House to Mr Trump, even though Hillary Clinton beat him by almost three million votes, produces even starker distortions in the Senate.

The political impact of a single vote in Montana (with fewer than 600,000 residents) is significantly greater than one in California (with almost 40 million), since both states get the same two Senate seats.

Added to this are rampant partisan gerrymandering, growing voter suppression, a flood of dark money and a right-wing majority on the Supreme Court bolstered by the recent addition of long-time Republican apparatchik Brett Kavanaugh.

That all suggests that the national government has, for the past two years, been entirely controlled by a minority, and in some ways even fringe, tendency.

Democrats were hoping to demonstrate that with an overwhelming “blue wave” vote. If the midterms were truly a national election, that could have happened. But the Senate, which is more powerful than the House, makes it unlikely that Democrats can establish any such thing.

However, if Democrats can capture a House majority, the political conversation will be significantly altered.

Democrats can and will use House committee and subpoena powers to investigate a wide range of information regarding Mr Trump, his allies and other Republicans, and will conduct the kind of oversight that the Republican Congress has meticulously avoided.

Mr Trump’s legislative agenda will be essentially paralysed, unless he veers significantly to the centre and compromises with the Democrats.

However, losing the House will not be a complete disaster for him. Unless there are some easily discovered and highly damning secrets about him, it will greatly strengthen his ability to get re-elected in 2020 by blaming House Democrats for everything the public does not like. Victory now would leave Mr Trump and the Republicans solely responsible for all developments in a country that consistently prefers divided government.

There are two other possibilities, though.

First, the Democrats could win both the House and Senate, and the apparent centre-left American majority could start strongly reasserting its power, despite the significant structural obstacles. That would be widely regarded as a powerful repudiation of Mr Trump. Second, the Republicans could retain control of both the House and the Senate, and score a decisive vindication for Mr Trump and his policies.

An anthropologist from Mars, dispassionately observing this process as fascinatingly strange behaviour by an odd species, might welcome the second outcome, as it would invite Mr Trump to test just how far he can go in exercising what would be an extraordinary level of power and to experiment with the implementation of his obviously authoritarian tendencies.

That’s such an alarming prospect that many Americans will be relieved by an otherwise unsatisfactory split decision that postpones the national reckoning with Trumpism for two more, very long, years.

https://agsiw.org/the-midterms-could-reshape-u-s-gulf-arab-relations/

The midterm elections may illustrate that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have become too much of a partisan issue in US politics.

The November 6 U.S. midterm elections are widely believed to be the most consequential in decades. Control of both the House of Representatives and Senate hang in the balance, and several important governors’ mansions are on the line. But in addition to these, in many ways local, contests, both the Democrats and Republicans have effectively acknowledged that this will be the first major public referendum on Donald J. Trump and his presidency since his upset victory over Hillary Clinton in 2016. The outcome will determine the balance of power in Washington for the next two years and will therefore have a disproportionately influential role, at least compared to most other midterms, in helping shape U.S. foreign policy until the next presidential election in 2020.

If Democrats win a strong majority in the House through a decisive “blue wave,” and especially should they also seize control of the Senate (although that seems unlikely), Trump’s authority, including in foreign policy, will be significantly circumscribed. If, on the other hand, Republicans not only hold the Senate but manage to retain control of the House, his administration and grip on foreign policy will be strengthened. A split decision, with Democrats winning a sizeable House majority but Republicans retaining a small but solid Senate majority, would be problematic for Trump, but would also result in the most complex power equation. It would mean that, in effect, the jury is still out on Trumpism, and the matter will be tabled until 2020. This scenario, leaving both sides feeling both vindicated and vulnerable, is entirely plausible, and indeed likely.

What’s at Stake for the Gulf Arab States

With several key Gulf Arab countries – especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – closely associated with the Trump administration, especially in public perceptions, many of their interests are in play and potentially at risk. Democratic control of the House would entirely transform policymaking in the coming two years. Under Trump, Republicans have enjoyed an unusual, though hardly unprecedented, monopoly on power in Washington, with both houses of Congress under their control. Trump has therefore faced very little resistance from Congress to his foreign and other policies. Legislators did buck Trump by insisting on new sanctions against Russia that he did not want and there was some institutional resistance in Congress to some weapon sales, including to Gulf Arab countries. But, overall, Trump has enjoyed a relatively free hand.

Democratic control of the House would transform that equation. Trump would need the cooperation of Democrats on a wide range of foreign-policy initiatives that involve U.S. funding or that can be blocked by legislative actions. While the Senate is better placed, in most cases, to block presidential initiatives, key House members can also take substantial action to restrict weapons sales, technology transfer, and anything involving the allocation of U.S. government funds. Moreover, Democrats would wield the chairman’s gavel in multiple House committees, and could therefore launch consequential investigations and actively help to shape the public debate on U.S. foreign policy. A number of policies would be affected by such a result, especially those involving Trump’s relationship with Saudi Arabia. Both Trump and the Saudis have greatly publicized their alignment following the strains of the era of former President Barack Obama. Indeed, the extremely close relations between the Saudi government and the Trump administration are now a prime avenue of foreign policy attacks against the president, and come at very little, if any, political cost to his critics.

Weapon Sales and the Yemen War

Weapons sales to key Gulf allies, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, already faced mounting opposition in Congress due to concerns regarding the Yemen war. A large group of Democrats and even some well-placed Republicans, including Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Bob Corker, Lindsey Graham, and Marco Rubio, have expressed growing unease about U.S. responsibility for a humanitarian crisis in Yemen that has been greatly exacerbated by the conflict. During Obama’s second term, and again under Trump, temporary holds were placed on certain Yemen war-related sales, especially 120,000 precision guided munitions that would replenish stocks expended in the Yemen campaign. A bipartisan effort to force the U.S. government to abandon any substantial cooperation with the Arab intervention in Yemen failed, but garnered substantial support.

Yet concern regarding Yemen continues to develop, and anger at Saudi Arabia is now focusing on the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi on October 2 at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. There is a widespread desire in Congress to register U.S. disapproval of the Khashoggi murder that dovetails with mounting anxiety about the situation in Yemen, suggesting that another legislative effort to restrict U.S. involvement in the war might meet with success, especially should Democrats hold majorities in either or both houses of Congress. This may also threaten certain weapon sales, at least with significant holds, delays, and legislative caveats. Several pending sales to Saudi Arabia potentially fall in this category, including the precision guided munitions and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile defense system. THAAD also involves potential significant technology transfer in which U.S. national security and Israel’s qualitative military edge could be invoked to delay or block it. The same applies to UAE efforts to purchase the F-35 fifth generation fighter jet, which could also face Yemen-related difficulties.

By investigating hot-button issues such as the humanitarian crisis and civilian deaths in Yemen, the Khashoggi murder, or other human rights concerns, empowered congressional Democrats could seek to sabotage Trump’s close relations with Saudi Arabia, and even the UAE, for partisan political benefit while ostensibly asserting U.S. and Democratic Party values.

Iran

Iran has also become a partisan political issue between Republicans and Democrats. Trump’s incessant attacks on Obama’s Iran policies, particularly the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement, which he withdrew from earlier this year, reveal the stark divide on Iran between Republicans and Democrats. Most Republicans have welcomed Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, but many Democrats condemn it as irrational and misguided, and compare it unfavorably to the nuclear deal, which they broadly supported. Most Iran-related policies are not dependent on congressional action and can be ordered by the executive alone. But a White House that enjoys legislative support will be much more authoritative than one that is constantly bickering with the House, or the Senate, over sanctions and other pressure against Iran.

Therefore, Democratic control of one or both chambers of Congress would significantly complicate Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. European countries seeking to keep the nuclear deal going in spite of U.S. opposition would suddenly find themselves with empowered partners in Washington. This could reinforce the feeling in European capitals and especially Tehran that the wisest approach would be to wait out the Trump administration in preparation for a more amenable Democratic-dominated government following 2020. If, on the other hand, Republicans retain majority control of all of Congress, the impression will grow that U.S. policy has decisively turned the corner, and that mounting sanctions and other pressure against Iran and U.S. allies in Europe on these issues will be the U.S. approach into the foreseeable future. Given the extent to which a pressure campaign involves shaping perceptions and psychological warfare, the impact of the elections’ outcome on the efficacy of Iran policy might be substantial.

Other Gulf-Related Policies

A range of other Middle East policies may be affected by the elections’ outcome. The Trump administration appears to be finally coalescing around a new Syria policy based on maintaining U.S. force structures in eastern Syria and cooperation with Turkey and Russia to ultimately restrict Iran’s influence in the country. It’s unclear whether Democrats substantially object to this policy, especially given Israel’s strong interest in a robust long-term U.S. presence in Syria, and therefore this approach might even be bolstered by a Democratic House.

Support for Israel among Democrats is strong, so there has been very little partisan opposition to Trump’s major swing toward Israel by moving the U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem, cutting off ties to the Palestine Liberation Organization, and defunding virtually all U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority and agencies caring for Palestinians. There has similarly not been a partisan edge to varying opinions in Congress about the boycott of Qatar. Military aid to Egypt, though, could face objections similar to those regarding weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, based on human rights considerations.

Democrats and some Republicans may also continue to push back on the idea of the United States playing a leading role in helping Saudi Arabia develop a domestic nuclear industry, including the enrichment of uranium mined in the kingdom and the reprocessing of plutonium. In the wake of the Khashoggi murder, a bipartisan group in Congress has been pushing for the United States to pull back from these negotiations. However, Riyadh would probably be able to obtain most, if not all, of the required technology from other suppliers. Nuclear negotiations with Saudi Arabia are an excellent illustration of the chasm in priorities separating two U.S. foreign policy visions. Most Democrats and some Republicans want to use foreign policy to achieve broad and consistent policy goals based on the promotion of an international rules-based order and would therefore not want to assist any Saudi nuclear energy project without “gold-standard” commitments from Riyadh. Trump and his allies hold a more mercantile view that would suggest that if there are competitors willing to take the contracts, there is no good reason for the United States cheating itself out of a profit for an effectively empty gesture.

A Referendum on “America First?”

The midterms may help clarify whether this “America first” Trumpian view is gaining or losing traction with the public and, therefore, demonstrate its long-term prospects as a driving force in U.S. foreign policy. But a split decision leaving Democrats in control of the House and Republicans with a small edge in the Senate seems to be shaping up. That would decide little and postpone a more thorough reckoning until 2020. Many Arab governments in the Gulf will probably be rooting for a strong Republican showing, but history shows they can also work well with Democrats. However, the willingness of some Gulf countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, to allow themselves to become so closely associated with Trump and his policies in the public mind has made their interests more of a partisan wedge than they could, or logically should, be. And, unlike Israel, Gulf Arab countries don’t have a strong body of independent support in the U.S. system to defend them from any resulting partisan attacks. Whatever the outcome of these particular elections, reaching out to Democrats is advisable for those Gulf Arab countries that have become too closely associated with the Republicans in the Trump era for their own long-term interests.