Monthly Archives: September 2017

After Kurdish Vote, New Flashpoints Loom

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/kurds-need-to-combine-diplomacy-strategy-and-persistence-to-advance-their-cause-1.662805

Nothing about the Kurdish independence referendum in Iraq ought to surprise anyone. Kurdish politicians were too busy scoring nationalistic points to postpone it, as would have been wise. The Kurds’ neighbours – Iran, Iraq and Turkey – by recklessly and foolishly throwing their weight and bluster around in the run-up to the vote, ensured both a high turnout and an overwhelming “yes” result of more than 90 per cent, neither of which were by any means guaranteed a few weeks ago.

And Washington, which discouraged the referendum, has once again demonstrated that, these days, even its closest friends rarely heed its advice.

So, what now? Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani says a “long process” of negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad will soon commence about the terms of separation. Obviously, a dialogue between the Kurds and the Arabs of Iraq, as well as Turks, Iranians and others, is necessary and inevitable. Hopefully, it will be an exchange of words rather than bullets. But that’s hardly guaranteed.

The Kurds’ antagonists are all being decidedly belligerent.

Not only are the Iraqis and Turks holding joint military exercises adjacent to Kurdish territories, but the Iranians are also conducting military manoeuvres of their own, also unmistakably aimed at intimidating Erbil.

Perhaps even more significantly, Baghdad has imposed what, thus far, appears to be a fairly effective air-traffic blockade against the Kurdish government.

Because Iraqi authorities legally control the airspace over the Kurdish territories, their demand that all international flights cease left most carriers with little choice but to suspend travel or face a wide range of unpalatable problems, including prohibitive insurance rates.

It is unlikely Baghdad will have as much success with its demand that the Kurdistan Regional Government hand over control of its two international airports. But what use are runways if nobody will fly in and out of them?

These responses are all designed to remind the Kurds that not only are they surrounded by potential enemies, but their territory is also landlocked, and thus dependent on the minimal goodwill of at least one, if not all, of its immediate neighbours. Right now, they’ve managed to thoroughly alienate them all.

Moreover, a potential immediate flashpoint looms menacingly.

The otherwise idyllic town of Tuz Khurmatu, 90 kilometres south of the disputed city of Kirkuk, has been the scene of deep sectarian tensions in recent years. It is split between largely Shiite Turkmen and largely Sunni Arabs and Kurds, “protected” by sectarian Shiite militias on one side and Kurdish Peshmerga forces on the other.

If sectarian Shiite “Popular Mobilisation Forces”, or even the Iraqi military, react violently to the Kurdish independence moves, it will probably begin in or near Tuz Khurmatu, but it will be hard to keep it there. If violence erupts and spreads, it could engender a more generalised conflagration.

And if things go badly for the Shiite militias, it’s not hard to imagine Hizbollah, no longer as urgently needed in Syria as before, dispatching its own forces across yet another border in support of Iranian hegemony.

All this must be avoided in everyone’s interests.

Eventually, Kurds will undoubtedly achieve their statehood. But they can’t do that if their neighbours, particularly the Arabs of Iraq and, most of all, Turkey, haven’t yet been convinced of the benefits.

No one knows what Mr Barzani has in mind when he invokes a “long process”. But if it’s as long as it could, and probably should, be, then another obvious step towards eventual Kurdish statehood would be the development of a radically decentralised, extremely loose, confederated system within a nominally and formally united Iraq.

In such a scenario, Kurds could negotiate virtually everything they would practically want out of statehood, but without some of the formal trappings, while also gaining time to get their deeply dysfunctional domestic political house in order and begin to lay the groundwork with the rest of Iraq, Iran and, especially, Turkey, for the next stage at some future date.

There are clear benefits to all the other parties as well, particularly since such a scenario avoids the bloody conflict that has accompanied almost all successful secession movements in recent decades, with the exception of Slovakia.

On September 22, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, on Twitter recommended that Iraqis consider the “flexibility and functionality” of the Emirates’ experience with a federal system.

Obviously, the arrangement in Iraq would look radically different from that in the UAE. But this suggestion offers not only a way out of a dangerous quagmire, but a serious, practical and wise path forward, for all parties, above all the Kurds in their morally unquestionable but still politically labyrinthine quest for eventual statehood.

De facto independence in a highly decentralised and federated, but nominally unified Iraq, wasn’t what the Kurds voted for last week. But it would be a strategically shrewd move towards their ultimate goal of de jure independence.

Kurds deserve their state. But it won’t result from a referendum or by magic. It can only be the result of persistence, sharp diplomacy and wise strategy.

The Gulf Arab Countries and the Kurdish Referendum

http://www.agsiw.org/gulf-arab-countries-kurdish-referendum/

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) authorities in Iraq have reported a predictably huge “yes” vote, over 90 percent, in the nonbinding referendum on Kurdish independence that was held September 25. The KRG’s immediate neighbors – Iraq, Turkey, and Iran (all of which have substantial Kurdish populations) – reacted with anger, and the United States expressed strong disapproval, while Israel praised the vote and endorsed Kurdish statehood. But most of the Gulf Arab countries have had a more ambivalent response, reflecting their own diverse interests in the Kurdistan region and what the vote, and potential Kurdish independence, could auger, both positively and negatively, from their perspectives.

Broadly speaking, several Gulf Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, see an opening in the Kurdistan region to expand the pro-Arab Sunni Muslim bloc in the Middle East, enhance the position of Sunni Arabs in other parts of Iraq, frustrate Iran on a number of fronts, and create additional leverage with Turkey. Their primary concerns include the potential outbreak of conflict, the uncontrolled potential disintegration of Iraq, a crisis in the battle against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, or the Kurdish issue somehow playing into the hands of Iran and its clients in Iraq and beyond.

This ambivalence was reflected in the reaction in Gulf Arab countries in the run up to the referendum. There was strong support in the Saudi and Emirati traditional and social media for the vote, but both governments formally expressed concerns about Iraq’s territorial integrity and the need for stability. Bahrain also advised Kurdish leaders not to rush into an independence vote that might destabilize Iraq. Kuwait was even more forthright in emphasizing that its primary interest was in the continued national unity and independence of Iraq. Oman did not take a public position. Qatartook the strongest Gulf Arab position in opposition to the Kurdish vote, expressing “deep concern” that the referendum could “pose a threat to the unity of Iraq and the security and stability of the region.”

Gulf States’ Relations with the KRG

Diplomatic relations between Gulf Arab countries and the KRG are limited, as the Gulf Arab states have had to balance between building relations with the Kurds and maintaining their relations with, and interests in, the broader Iraqi state. The UAE has the most extensive diplomatic and political ties with the Kurdish capital of Erbil having established a consulate general there as early as 2012. That was followed by Kuwait in 2015, and then Saudi Arabia in 2016, an upgrade in relations that was conducted despite Iran’s objections. KRG President Masoud Barzani visited a number of Gulf countries in 2015, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The KRG granted Emirati, Qatari, and Kuwaiti citizens the right of nonvisa entry in 2014. Oman, Bahrain, and Qatar do not have high-level representation with the KRG.

Several of the Gulf countries have extensive investments in the Kurdistan region, particularly the UAE and, to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia. As early as 2014, Iraq had risen to seventh place among the UAE’s trading partners, with most Emirati investment in Iraq concentrated in the Kurdistan region and with 130 Emirati companies registered as doing business there. Kuwait also has substantial and early investments in the Kurdistan region, although most of its presence in Iraq tends to be in the south. But the diplomatic and political concerns of Gulf countries in northern Iraq now far outweigh any commercial interests, no matter how substantial.

Kuwait’s interests in the Kurdistan region are, perhaps, the most straightforward. As with Kuwait’s attitude toward the rest of Iraq, its relations with Erbil are viewed primarily through the lens of the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and the determination to avoid any repetition of such a scenario. Therefore, Kuwait has long seen an interest in maintaining good relations with Iraqi leaders, particularly insofar as they represent some national, regional, confessional, or ethnic constituencies, and above all in the south of the country near the Kuwaiti border. The potential violent total disintegration of Iraq poses the same threat of chaos to Kuwait as it does to all of its neighbors. However, Kuwait’s interest in promoting a more fragmented and less unified Iraq in which regional authorities have considerable power – thereby reducing the potential for the resurrection of an overwhelmingly mighty, integrated, and potentially predatory neighbor to the north – certainly predates that of its fellow Gulf Arab countries.

The KRG’s Regional Strategic Role

More recently, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also begun to see strategic and political benefits to some rise for the Kurds – potentially to the extent of independent statehood, but certainly including maximal autonomy in a federal Iraq. Iraqi national unity and territorial integrity, at least in their most formal and nominal senses, are still important values for these countries. The final, formal breakup of Iraq through the establishment of an independent Kurdish state, unless it were amicably negotiated between Erbil and Baghdad, would probably not be a peaceful affair and could initiate a long, bloody, and highly destabilizing conflict that would not serve the interests of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are fundamentally status quo powers in the Middle East, at least in general, and are unlikely to welcome much redrawing of the established political map.

However, the strengthening of the KRG specifically, and the Kurdish position in Iraq in general, has become a powerful strategic interest for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The KRG is now viewed as an important new addition to a struggling Sunni Muslim bloc in the Middle East, even if its relations with Turkey and some other potentially important members of that camp are particularly strained under the circumstances. The notion that an empowered KRG is a significant obstacle to Iranian interests has become irresistible. At a minimum, the KRG would be geographically equidistant from Tehran and Riyadh, and at the very least slightly tilted toward the latter. At a maximum, Gulf Arab countries could develop a strategic relationship with Erbil in which the KRG emerges as a fully-fledged member or adjunct of the group of Middle Eastern actors actively opposing Iran.

This is particularly important because the Kurdistan region could be a substantial barrier to the development and maintenance of a “land bridge” from Iran, through Iraq and into Syria and Lebanon, linking Tehran with both its clients in those countries and the strategically crucial Mediterranean Sea. Such a land bridge, if consolidated under the complete control of Iran and its proxies, would alter dramatically the Middle Eastern strategic equation. Given the success of the pro-Iranian and pro-President Bashar al-Assad forces in Syria, particularly after the fall of Aleppo, preventing the consolidation of such a land bridge is one of the chief goals of Iran’s adversaries in the Middle East.

The KRG’s Political and Strategic Role in Iraq

This goal will be further advanced if Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and others can help foster better relations between Erbil and the Sunni Arab leadership in western Iraq (much of whose territory would include the only other route from Iran to Syria). Strong relations have been brewing for several years as Iraqi Sunni Arab political leaders who have had to flee from Shia militias, the government, or ISIL have largely sought refuge in Erbil. Moreover, Saudi Arabia has been strengthening its relations not only with the government of Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi in Baghdad, but with Iraqi Sunni political and tribal leaders in western Iraq. The disposition of these forces, particularly in the post-ISIL period, combined with the orientation of Erbil, will do much to determine the power balance inside Iraq.

Qatar, Iran, and Turkey

A year ago, Qatar might have shared many of these perspectives. However, given the confrontation between Doha and the quartet of countries opposing Qatar’s policies, the Qatari position is much more sensitive to the concerns of Iran, which is quietly supporting Doha, and, especially, Turkey, which is Qatar’s main regional ally – hence Qatar’s unusually strong warnings against the Kurdish referendum. However, Turkey is not shocked by the referendum. It has been living with the “Kurdish question” since the breakup of the Ottoman Empire. Iraqi Arabs are also angered, but they too are not shocked, having watched the groundwork for Kurdish independence in the region built since the establishment of the no-fly zones in Iraq in 1991 and, especially, the fallout of the U.S. invasion in 2003.

Iran, however, is both alarmed and shocked, not only by the strategic implications of Kurdish power in northern Iraq, but also by the sudden eruption of unprecedented displays of Kurdish nationalism inside Iran (which has a much smaller Kurdish population than Turkey, but a larger one than Iraq). Up to now, the main ethnic concerns inside Iran have focused on the Baluchi and Arab minorities. However, increasingly the Kurds of Iran appear to be restive and highly dissatisfied. This nationalistic Kurdish sentiment inside Iran is obviously linked to independence moves in the KRG, and that, too, contributes to sympathy in parts of the Gulf Arab states for the referendum and the Kurdish independence movement more generally.

Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s Goals

The ideal scenario regarding the KRG in the long run, from the point of view of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, would be the emergence via negotiations of a hyper-empowered and de facto independent Kurdish entity in the context of a formal but loosely confederated Iraq. This would allow the Kurds to play their regional and Iraqi roles with maximum effectiveness, but without risking the violence of a secession struggle. It would allow the Kurds to serve as a balancing power against Iran in the region, including in Iraq. It should, at least in theory, strengthen the hand of Sunni Arabs inside Iraq, and therefore, regionally. And it would greatly reduce the prospects for the consolidation of Iran’s land bridge to Lebanon and the Mediterranean.

Moreover, the model of a loosely united federal system in Iraq would allow Sunni Arabs to control their own areas, creating another brake on Iran’s influence in Iraq. Furthermore, from a Saudi and Emirati perspective the loose federation model serves as a potential workable and minimally acceptable solution for the long-term future in Syria. In fact, it is likely they will now use their influence to promote the development of federal systems in both countries.

However, Arab opposition to full and formal Kurdish independence is not, by any means, absolute. Should the project of thwarting Iran’s influence by strengthening Sunni Arabs and Kurds in Iraq, developing stronger ties to the Abadi government and other wings of the Iraqi Shia political spectrum, and eventually promoting a loose confederation in Iraq fail in the long run, the equation would dramatically change. If Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other Arab states must ever choose between full and formal Kurdish independence in northern Iraq and the consolidation of an Iranian-controlled, more integrated Iraqi state, the former would undoubtedly win out, despite the inevitable qualms about the breakup of a major Arab country.

The Kurdish referendum is a distraction from the real issues at stake

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-kurdish-referendum-is-a-distraction-from-the-real-issues-at-stake-1.660981

Not only is the process designed to burnish the nationalist credentials of Kurdish politicians, it is also a substitute for the actual, binding elections that these parties don’t want to have

On the eve of their scheduled independence referendum on Monday, the Kurds once again find themselves with no friends but the mountains.

A major push by almost all interested parties to get the leadership of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq to cancel, or at least postpone, the non-binding referendum appears to be failing. KRG head Masoud Barzani on Friday vowed that the vote would go ahead.

Opposition from some quarters was predictable. Iraq, Iran and Turkey held an extremely unusual trilateral event on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York last week to emphasise their joint “unequivocal opposition to the referendum,” and vowed to “consider taking counter-measures in coordination” with each other if it is held.
However, strong opposition has also come from the Kurds’ most important ally: the United States. Washington says it “strongly opposes” the referendum and notes that “all of Iraq’s neighbours, and virtually the entire international community” do so as well.
There’s one exception. Israel, alone, has strongly endorsed the Kurdish referendum. But while the Israelis are minor players in the KRG territory, Israel has little at stake, and certainly nothing to lose. Unfortunately for the Kurds, Israel’s endorsement is hardly an asset.

The Kurdish leadership is going ahead with the referendum partly because Kurds want, and deserve, their independent state, and if one is to emerge, it will be in the KRG territories.

But it is far more importantly designed to cover up the fact that, like the Palestinian leaders of Fatah and Hamas, the heads of the two large Iraqi Kurdish factions have gone for years without submitting themselves for re-election to their various positions. Not only is the referendum designed to burnish the nationalist credentials of Kurdish politicians, it is also a substitute for the actual, binding and real elections that these parties don’t want to have.

Moreover, while the timing of the referendum might suit Iraqi Kurdish politics, it really is terrible for the cause of Kurdish independence. The outraged retort from referendum supporters to this rather obvious objection is that, as far as non-Kurds are concerned, there will never be a “convenient” moment for Kurdish independence and the Kurds are being asked to go away and stop bothering everybody about their human and national rights.

That’s a morally impeccable argument. But it’s politically cretinous.

As with the Palestinians, the Kurds are not going to achieve their national independence by being morally correct or winning an academic debate. They’re going to have to convince their more powerful neighbours to agree to that independence. This referendum won’t help them do that and will probably actually hurt their chances.

It’s not the consent of far-off, and relatively irrelevant, Israel that the Kurds need. It is that of Tehran, Baghdad and Ankara, in that order of importance. This can be done, but it hasn’t been done yet, and a provocative referendum won’t help it get done.

The United States has urged the Kurdish leadership to pursue independence through negotiations with the government in Baghdad. That might sound like a cop-out, but it’s actually good advice.

Of course, Washington has ulterior motives. It’s worried about the impact of the referendum on the struggle against ISIL, the campaign to stabilise Iraq and efforts to contain Iran and calm a Turkish government still overwrought from the failed coup.

But the Kurds need to remember they cannot do this on their own, even if they had Washington’s backing (which they don’t). A Kurdish state in the KRG territories would be landlocked and vulnerable.

Iran could sabotage its happiness. Iraq could subject it to a semi-permanent state of warfare or conflict. And Turkey could intervene militarily to block its foundation or create a “buffer zone” along the border and establish a semi-permanent occupation that would bedevil both parties for decades.

Yet Iraqi Arabs can be convinced, over time, to support Kurdish independence if disputes over energy resources, money and contested territories like Kirkuk are equitably resolved. Baghdad and Basra may well conclude that it would be nice to no longer pay Erbil’s bills.

Iran, and more importantly, Turkey, could be placated as well. But these countries, especially Turkey, need to know that the Kurdish state won’t be a springboard for an insurgency or nationalistic Kurdish movement in their own territories, that Kurdish national aspirations will be realised there and not in Turkey or Iran and that relations are strong enough that Erbil will not risk alienating them.

The Turkish and Iraqi Kurdish leaders were well on the way to establishing such a relationship a few years ago. For several complex reasons, that has recently greatly deteriorated. But it can, and must, be rebuilt if Kurdish independence is to be realised.

But the other parties need to calm down as well. If the Kurds do have their vote, it needs to be treated as aspirational, and the beginning of a long process of negotiations, not a conclusion.

While Kurds certainly deserve their state, this referendum is unwise, if not irresponsible. But an overreaction by the Kurds’ neighbours would be infinitely worse – and much less understandable.

The US must find a third way over Iran, one that is neither reticent nor reckless

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/the-us-must-find-a-third-way-over-iran-one-that-is-neither-reticent-nor-reckless-1.628957

A proposed plan would involve sticking with the nuclear deal, while stepping up pressure on Tehran over its destabilising policies

The internal debate regarding the Trump administration’s policy towards Iran is coming to a head. A sensible – and indeed significantly improved – American approach is now competing with foolish and potentially disastrous impulses. The coming weeks will provide very strong indications of which will prevail.

US president Donald Trump, UN ambassador Nikki Haley and others are pushing for an aggressive confrontation with Tehran. An improvement over Barack Obama’s policies is clearly required, but their approach would surely be a dangerous over-correction.

This faction wants Washington to either abandon or sabotage the nuclear deal, beginning by at least declining to certify to Congress next month that Iran is in compliance with its obligations. That could easily lead to the unraveling of an arrangement that is, by all accounts, effectively restraining Iran’s programme to develop nuclear weapons.While limited strictly to nuclear issues, the deal is working so far. It makes no sense for Washington to scupper it. That’s a dream scenario for Iranian hardliners. They would have managed to get rid of the international sanctions by reaching a deal with Mr Obama, only to be relieved of their commitments by Mr Trump. Heads they win, tails we lose.

And it would be especially damaging, well beyond Iran-related issues, to American credibility and international leadership if Washington is perceived by the other global powers as having unilaterally and capriciously undone years of painstaking multilateral diplomacy, particularly if there is no plausible alternative stratagem that makes sense to anyone outside of the White House.
Thankfully, there are strong signs that a second administration faction, which wisely urges maintaining the nuclear agreement, while intensifying a range of other pressures and countermeasures against Iran, may be winning the day.
Defence secretary Jim Mattis, secretary of state Rex Tillerson, national security adviser HR McMaster and others presented a plan for such an approach at a recent National Security Council meeting.
Their proposal is designed to preserve the gains secured by the nuclear agreement and avoid the harm that scrapping or sabotaging it would cause to American interests, while intensifying policies designed to confront Iran’s persistent destabilising policies.
These would include continued or expanded economic sanctions addressing a variety of non-nuclear issues, including Tehran’s support for terrorism. Washington would intensify efforts to interdict Iranian weapons shipments to violent extremist organisations such as the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gazaand radicals in Sinai.

The plan also proposes strengthened US engagement in Bahrain, particularly as evidence of Iranian-inspired and supported violent radicalism on the island continues to mount. The proposal also advocates that US naval forces react more aggressively if confronted or harassed by Iranian speedboats in international waters.From what is known so far, this plan hardly seems perfect. It does not, for example, suggest doing anything serious to reverse Iran’s domination of Syria, instead maintaining an exclusive focus on ISIL. It also fails to recognise the need or value of exploring potential grounds for US-Iranian cooperation. But it would help to correct some weaknesses of the Obama approach without the kind of reckless overreach Mr Trump has suggested.

If such a relatively sophisticated approach ends up guiding Washington’s stance on Iran, it would mark an improvement over Mr Obama’s baffling naivety, while avoiding impulsiveness and rash mistakes.

In an encouraging sign that this comparatively nuanced perspective may be starting to prevail, Mr Trump on Thursday declined to re-impose some major sanctions against Iran, allowing a congressionally-mandated deadline for him to act to expire.

Moreover, Mr Tillerson is scheduled to meet with Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif at a September 20 meeting of the nuclear deal signatories.In June, Mr Tillerson caused outrage in Tehran by suggesting Washington is seeking regime change as a long-term outcome in Iran. Next week’s meeting could be a useful opportunity to clear the air.

A sophisticated approach to Iran would have to include balancing the virtues of sticking with the nuclear agreement – as long as it is really being implemented – and confronting Tehran over its aggressive and destabilising conduct.

But it also requires pursuing avenues of co-operation and confrontation with an eye to promoting, at the very least, significant and long-term strategic policy change, if not full regime change, in Iran.

That means, above all, recognising that Iran is neither a policy monolith, nor is it politically homogenous. Much of the population appears to want a very different approach to the outside world than the ruling faction. Even within the establishment, there are significant differences over strategy, foreign policy and basic international attitudes, and it matters which prevails.Any major decision regarding Iran should involve a serious evaluation of how it will impact strategic thinking, decision-making and the balance of power within Iran. That is why a calibrated approach towards Tehran that avoids both Mr Obama’s reticence and Mr Trump’s recklessness would be greatly welcome. It may not be perfect, but the new plan is an important step in the right direction.

Hizbollah’s regional agenda is a surefire recipe for more war

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/hizbollah-s-regional-agenda-is-a-surefire-recipe-for-more-war-1.624945

The group’s willingness and ability to unilaterally decide when and how Lebanon is dragged into conflicts is among many telltale signs of its menace

It is excellent news that ISIL has been driven out of Lebanon. Yet serious alarm is warranted regarding the evolving role of Hizbollah.

ISIL has been defeated in Tal Afar in Iraq and is rapidly losing Raqqa, its main redoubt in Syria. ISIL was therefore already struggling when its positions along the Syrian-Lebanese border were simultaneously attacked by the Lebanese military and Hizbollah from its strongholds in Syria.

Territorially, the operation was a success. However, in a bizarre surrender agreement, reportedly unilaterally agreed by Hizbollah, several hundred ISIL terrorists and their families were allowed to escape in air-conditioned buses to eastern Syria. They are now being hunted by American warplanes. In return, the bodies of eight Lebanese fighters were located.

Hizbollah apparently did not consult the authorities in Beirut, but did inform Syrian president Bashar Al Assad.

This underscores Hizbollah’s willingness and ability to unilaterally decide when and how it coordinates with the Lebanese state or usurps its authority. Hizbollah is using the victory to increase its already alarming dominance of Lebanese politics.

Worse, the Syrian war has transformed the nature and role of Hizbollah. The organisation has become much better armed, experienced, connected and capable. It now controls highly strategic areas in Syria, answering only to Tehran, and not Damascus, let alone Beirut.

Hizbollah is no longer simply, or even primarily, a Lebanese political organisation or just another dangerous militia. It is becoming a regional player, serving, in effect, as the armed vanguard of pro-Iranian forces as far afield as Yemen.

Indeed, Hizbollah has a plausible claim to being the most powerful non-state fighting force, depending on how that’s defined, in human history.

The organisation has long been more than a non-state militia, serving as a sub-state actor that carries out many state functions and prerogatives in parts of Lebanon and now Syria. But it is also a supra-state actor operating on a regional level, playing a crucial role within the pro-Iranian alliance in a growing list of battlegrounds.

Hizbollah’s role as a hyper-empowered and transnational sub-state entity spells big trouble for the region in general and Lebanon in particular.

For years, Hizbollah has maintained an independent foreign and defence policy to match its autonomous military capability. And it has demonstrated a brazen willingness to drag the rest of Lebanon into disastrous conflicts, particularly with Israel, without warning.

In July 2006, apparently hoping to seize prisoners for a swap, Hizbollah launched a cross-border raid that killed three Israeli soldiers. This, almost inevitably, provoked a massive Israeli response that left about 1,000 Lebanese dead and much of the country devastated.

Hizbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, described this debacle as a “divine victory”, but later apologised to other Lebanese, claiming he would never have authorised the attack had he anticipated the consequences. No one, however, even remotely familiar with Israel’s policies could have failed to anticipate them.

The truth is that Hizbollah acted in its own interests, and those of its Iranian masters, and both its own constituency and the rest of Lebanon paid the price.

With the primary fighting in the main part of the Syrian civil war effectively resolved by the fall of the rebel-held parts of Aleppo eight months ago, Hizbollah is not only stronger than ever, but also no longer fully occupied or bogged down in Syria. Indeed, it has emerged from that conflict as a much graver strategic threat to Israel, among many others, than it ever was in the past.

Israeli alarm is evident, and all year long the two sides have been exchanging dire, and very real, threats.

Hizbollah has been touting its undoubtedly greatly improved missile capabilities, threatening to attack all of Israel, including Tel Aviv, and even the nuclear reactor at Dimona.

The Israelis have made it clear that no part of Lebanon will be spared in any future conflict. Israel never cared much what other parts of Lebanon suffered in its conflicts with Hizbollah. But now it has sent the message that next time it will actively seek to brutally punish everyone and everything.

Can Israel live with a hyper-empowered, regionally significant and ascendant Hizbollah more dominant than ever in Lebanon, ruling parts of Syria and threatening its cities and nuclear reactors? Israel has already struck several times in Syria to prevent weapons transfers to Hizbollah forces in Lebanon.

If no other means of containing or reversing Hizbollah’s rise develops, then a broader Israeli campaign designed to significantly degrade this perceived threat could be a matter of when, not if. Alternatively, Iran might decide to unleash Hizbollah against Israel for its own reasons. Or Hizbollah could again deliberately initiate a conflict.

In any of these scenarios, most other Lebanese would pay an appalling price for a decision over which they have practically no influence.

Lebanese Shiites plainly need effective leadership to defend their interests. But they don’t need, and neither they nor their Lebanese compatriots can afford, to be the playthings of a region-wide terrorist network answerable to no one except the most cynical hardliners in Tehran.

Hizbollah’s growing power and nefarious regional agenda isn’t just a nightmare for Lebanon. It’s a serious threat to the whole region and a surefire recipe for yet more war.

If the US walks away from the Iran nuclear deal, it will live to regret it

https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/if-the-us-walks-away-from-the-iran-nuclear-deal-it-will-live-to-regret-it-1.626768

Donald Trump must not rip up the agreement, however flawed it may be

 

In recent weeks, North Korea has taken two major steps forward in expanding its capability as a nuclear power. First, it successfully fired what amounts to an intercontinental ballistic missile. Second, it tested what appears to be a hydrogen bomb.

It would be idiotic to assume Pyongyang hasn’t been able to resolve other technical challenges, such as miniaturising warheads sufficiently to fit on long-range missiles or ensuring they can survive reentry.

That means Pyongyang can now probably strike much of the continental United States. All American options – implausible negotiations, ineffective sanctions and dangerous military attacks – are unappealing and none are likely to change North Korean minds.

If only an effective sanctions regime had produced meaningful negotiations that convinced North Korea to freeze its nuclear programme before it went intercontinental and thermonuclear. Imagine, in a utopian fantasy, they stopped Pyongyang going nuclear in the first place.

Yet this is precisely what is actually in place regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. For now.

Tehran has yet to go nuclear, and is very far from intercontinental missile capability. Iran did face an effective and comprehensive worldwide sanctions regime to which it has responded rationally by agreeing to a 10-year freeze of its nuclear development programme in order to reengage with the global economy and international community.

If North Korea would agree to freeze its nuclear development in exchange for more trade and international dialogue, it would be an extremely tempting proposition. And if anyone could arrange for Pyongyang to go non-nuclear for the next 10 years, they’d be rightly hailed as one of the greatest diplomatic geniuses in history.

The contrast is extremely instructive.

Donald Trump, the US president, seems determined to try to damage, if not destroy, the Iranian nuclear agreement in the coming months. Earlier this summer, he announced his “expectation” that his administration would refuse to certify to Congress that Iran is complying with its obligations under the agreement it made with the major international powers.

His UN ambassador, Nikki Haley, at a Washington function this week made the case for why the administration should decertify Iranian compliance. Her specific claims about Iranian noncompliance regarding heavy water production and the inspection of military sites were dubious and don’t approach meaningful material breaches of the terms of the agreement.

More broadly, she complained about a wide range of truly objectionable Iranian misbehaviour, which she said is a violation of the “spirit” of the agreement. But there is no passage in the agreement defining a “spirit” and no mutually agreed understanding among the international powers, let alone Iran, about what that might mean.

Iran is, however, destabilising the Middle East by supporting dangerous non-state actors, militias and terrorist groups throughout the region, and exploiting and promoting chaos in order to aggressively advance its influence into the heart of the Arab world. Iran also continues to develop its missile capabilities. Serious countermeasures are unquestionably required.

However, the nuclear agreement was specifically, and by unanimous consent, designed to deal with a limited pair of issues: a freeze on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. There was no effort to negotiate anything else, such as Iran’s destabilising regional policies, support for violent extremist organisations or its missile programme.

Indeed, Washington continues to maintain significant bilateral sanctions against Iran outside the scope of the agreement, based on those misdeeds, all of which is outside the scope of the agreement.

Some of Mr Trump’s allies in Washington say that if his administration follows through on the threat to refuse to certify that Iran is compliant with the agreement, when all evidence and other parties insist that it effectively is, that this won’t mean scuppering the agreement. They claim that Congress would then have to decide what to do about sanctions and, in effect, the extent to which Washington continues to be party to its side of the bargain.

But, in fact, even if the Trump administration tries to fudge the issue in this manner, it will severely weaken the agreement, and open the door for Iran, sooner rather than later, to resume much, if not all, of its nuclear activities with no realistic prospect of resurrecting the comprehensive international sanctions regime that forced it to the negotiating table in the first place.

It’s obvious that if Mr Trump does this, he will be alienating the entire international community on a crucial issue where the United States requires worldwide support and cooperation, and playing into the hands of Iran’s hardliners, who would hardly believe their good fortune.

There’s no serious indication of what an alternative American strategy would, or even could, be. But scanning the Asian continent from Tehran to Pyongyang it’s easy to imagine a day when Washington would yearn to be in precisely the position it now is regarding Iran’s mothballed nuclear programme, and which Mr Trump seems to be preparing to abandon.