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The overthrow of Libyan leader Moammar al-Qaddafi has been widely regarded in the United States as a victory for President Barack Obama, as well as a vindication of his policy of limited military engagement. However, the extent to which the Libya policy is regarded as a template for American engagement when it comes to other ongoing Arab uprisings is still being hotly debated. In particular, there is still a strong consensus in Washington against any form of military intervention in Syria.
However, some voices in the Syrian opposition have begun to point to the Libyan experience as a template of their own for how to overthrow Bashar al-Assad’s regime: first, by launching an armed rebellion; second, by establishing a stronghold and rival government on some part of Syrian territory; third, by appealing for outside intervention from the air and other coercive measures to chip away at the infrastructure of the Syrian leadership; and fourth, by launching a major offensive with the aim of taking Damascus and securing the dictatorship’s overthrow.
Like most Arab commentators, a majority of Americans regards this scenario as a pipe dream. The differences between Libya and Syria are many, and there is great fear that an armed uprising might play into the hands of the regime and legitimize repression. There is also skepticism that a rebel army could successfully be formed or prove a match for elite Syrian security forces that have so far proven fiercely loyal to the regime. There is considerable concern as well that a civil conflict could become even more sectarian in nature and spill over into neighboring Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey.
However, following Qaddafi’s overthrow there was growing interest among some Syrian opposition figures in armed rebellion. As a consequence, some Americans are beginning to toy with the idea that if a rebel force were to begin operating, it might be wise or even necessary to take significant actions to support it.
Michael O’Hanlon, a military expert at the Brookings Institution, has been one of the first and most forthright American commentators to raise the prospect of military options for the West in Syria. Like everyone else, he rejects the notion of an Iraq-style American invasion; says it is too soon to impose no-fly or no-go areas, while adding that this is a future possibility; suggests that a naval and land blockade might be effective; and raises the prospect of a Kosovo-style air campaign against the Assad regime and its assets. O’Hanlon says he favors none of these options at the moment, but insists now is the time to begin considering them.
Such thinking not only reflects a sense of vindication of Obama’s measured and calculated use of force in Libya to encourage regime change, but also the lack of other options the United States has to encourage the end or transformation of the regime in Damascus.
For months, American policy was focused on creating a dialogue between elements of the opposition and those in the Syrian power structure interested in a “pacted transition” to forestall the drift toward civil conflict. Almost everyone has concluded that such efforts are not plausible given the regime’s intransigence and the difficulty the opposition has faced in forming a unified front.
Consequently, the Obama administration is now committed to regime change because it has finally accepted that Assad cannot reform. But it lacks powerful leverage, and is forced to rely on cooperation with Turkey, Saudi Arabia and European allies who have closer ties to Damascus, further limiting its options.
However, the model Obama laid out for Libya—balancing interests with values whenever possible—is readily applicable to a project of regime change in Syria, which would serve American interests and values. Anxiety about regional unrest from Syria’s destabilization remains acute in Washington, but there is a growing sense that it is the regime itself that is the greatest source of instability.
Indeed, there is a growing belief that Assad and his acolytes are deliberately promoting conflict and sectarian tension in order to compel Syrians to accept the regime’s version of stability, regardless of the repression and brutality entailing, over the dangers of an uncertain future following an armed rebellion.
Washington would almost certainly prefer not to see an armed rebellion or any kind of destabilizing civil conflict in Syria. However, many American observers believe that an armed rebellion or civil war in Syria is almost inevitable and that the Assad regime is doomed. If such a situation were to take shape, and if an eventual rebel force and organized opposition were to pose a serious challenge to the power of the regime, although it would certainly follow a different trajectory than the conflict in Libya, Western and American inaction would make little sense.
The United States knows it would have a major stake in the outcome of such a conflict. Like it or not, Washington would eventually have to take significant measures—if not take on a repetition of the limited military intervention in Libya—to ensure an acceptable post-Assad future in Syria.